diff options
author | djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org> | 2018-07-03 11:39:54 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> | 2018-07-03 23:26:36 +1000 |
commit | 4ba0d54794814ec0de1ec87987d0c3b89379b436 (patch) | |
tree | b8d904880f8927374b377b2e4d5661213c1138b6 | |
parent | 95344c257412b51199ead18d54eaed5bafb75617 (diff) |
upstream: Improve strictness and control over RSA-SHA2 signature
In ssh, when an agent fails to return a RSA-SHA2 signature when
requested and falls back to RSA-SHA1 instead, retry the signature to
ensure that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH
matches the one in the signature itself.
In sshd, strictly enforce that the public key algorithm sent in the
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH message matches what appears in the signature.
Make the sshd_config PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and
HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options control accepted signature algorithms
(previously they selected supported key types). This allows these
options to ban RSA-SHA1 in favour of RSA-SHA2.
Add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" to force use of RSA-SHA2 signatures
with certificate keys.
feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6e9f6d45eed8962ad502d315d7eaef32c419dde
-rw-r--r-- | PROTOCOL.certkeys | 20 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | auth2-hostbased.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | auth2-pubkey.c | 13 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | authfd.c | 24 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | compat.c | 27 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | compat.h | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kex.c | 17 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kex.h | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | myproposal.h | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssh-rsa.c | 60 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssh_config.5 | 13 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sshconnect2.c | 345 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sshd.c | 63 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sshd_config.5 | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssherr.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssherr.h | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sshkey.c | 104 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sshkey.h | 4 |
18 files changed, 469 insertions, 256 deletions
diff --git a/PROTOCOL.certkeys b/PROTOCOL.certkeys index 65f11f53..11363fdc 100644 --- a/PROTOCOL.certkeys +++ b/PROTOCOL.certkeys @@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ raw user keys. The ssh client will support automatic verification of acceptance of certified host keys, by adding a similar ability to specify CA keys in ~/.ssh/known_hosts. +All certificate types include certification information along with the +public key that is used to sign challenges. In OpenSSH, ssh-keygen +performs the CA signing operation. + Certified keys are represented using new key types: ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com @@ -33,9 +37,17 @@ Certified keys are represented using new key types: ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com -These include certification information along with the public key -that is used to sign challenges. ssh-keygen performs the CA signing -operation. +Two additional types exist for RSA certificates to force use of +SHA-2 signatures (SHA-256 and SHA-512 respectively): + + rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com + rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com + +These RSA/SHA-2 types should not appear in keys at rest or transmitted +on their wire, but do appear in a SSH_MSG_KEXINIT's host-key algorithms +field or in the "public key algorithm name" field of a "publickey" +SSH_USERAUTH_REQUEST to indicate that the signature will use the +specified algorithm. Protocol extensions ------------------- @@ -291,4 +303,4 @@ permit-user-rc empty Flag indicating that execution of of this script will not be permitted if this option is not present. -$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.14 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.15 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c index 8996f7e0..f70609cb 100644 --- a/auth2-hostbased.c +++ b/auth2-hostbased.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.33 2018/01/23 05:27:21 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.34 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -111,8 +111,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh) "signature format"); goto done; } - if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), - options.hostbased_key_types, 0) != 1) { + if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.hostbased_key_types, 0) != 1) { logit("%s: key type %s not in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes", __func__, sshkey_type(key)); goto done; diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c index 3ccc3a21..4feeae3e 100644 --- a/auth2-pubkey.c +++ b/auth2-pubkey.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.79 2018/06/06 18:29:18 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.80 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh) pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg); if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) { /* this is perfectly legal */ - logit("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s", + verbose("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s", __func__, pkalg); goto done; } @@ -136,8 +136,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh) logit("refusing previously-used %s key", sshkey_type(key)); goto done; } - if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), - options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) { + if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) { logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); goto done; @@ -188,8 +187,10 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh) /* test for correct signature */ authenticated = 0; if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) && - PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), - sshbuf_len(b), NULL, ssh->compat)) == 0) { + PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, + sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), + (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL, + ssh->compat)) == 0) { authenticated = 1; } sshbuf_free(b); @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.109 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.110 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -343,8 +343,8 @@ ssh_agent_sign(int sock, const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat) { struct sshbuf *msg; - u_char *blob = NULL, type; - size_t blen = 0, len = 0; + u_char *sig = NULL, type = 0; + size_t len = 0; u_int flags = 0; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; @@ -355,11 +355,9 @@ ssh_agent_sign(int sock, const struct sshkey *key, return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) - goto out; flags |= agent_encode_alg(key, alg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_puts(key, msg)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, datalen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, flags)) != 0) goto out; @@ -374,15 +372,19 @@ ssh_agent_sign(int sock, const struct sshkey *key, r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } - if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, sigp, &len)) != 0) + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &sig, &len)) != 0) + goto out; + /* Check what we actually got back from the agent. */ + if ((r = sshkey_check_sigtype(sig, len, alg)) != 0) goto out; + /* success */ + *sigp = sig; *lenp = len; + sig = NULL; + len = 0; r = 0; out: - if (blob != NULL) { - explicit_bzero(blob, blen); - free(blob); - } + freezero(sig, len); sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.107 2018/04/16 22:50:44 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.108 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -52,16 +52,27 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version) } check[] = { { "OpenSSH_2.*," "OpenSSH_3.0*," - "OpenSSH_3.1*", SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR}, - { "OpenSSH_3.*", SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR }, - { "Sun_SSH_1.0*", SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF}, + "OpenSSH_3.1*", SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR| + SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, + { "OpenSSH_3.*", SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE }, + { "Sun_SSH_1.0*", SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF| + SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, { "OpenSSH_2*," "OpenSSH_3*," - "OpenSSH_4*", 0 }, - { "OpenSSH_5*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT}, - { "OpenSSH_6.6.1*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH}, + "OpenSSH_4*", SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE }, + { "OpenSSH_5*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT| + SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, + { "OpenSSH_6.6.1*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, { "OpenSSH_6.5*," - "OpenSSH_6.6*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD}, + "OpenSSH_6.6*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD| + SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, + { "OpenSSH_7.0*," + "OpenSSH_7.1*," + "OpenSSH_7.2*," + "OpenSSH_7.3*," + "OpenSSH_7.4*," + "OpenSSH_7.5*," + "OpenSSH_7.6*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE}, { "OpenSSH*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH }, { "*MindTerm*", 0 }, { "3.0.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG }, @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.51 2018/02/16 04:43:11 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.52 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ #define SSH_PROTO_2 0x04 #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE 0x00000001 -/* #define unused 0x00000002 */ +#define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE 0x00000002 /* #define unused 0x00000004 */ /* #define unused 0x00000008 */ #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID 0x00000010 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.136 2018/02/07 02:06:50 jsing Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.137 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -342,6 +342,7 @@ kex_send_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh) if ((algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',')) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + /* XXX filter algs list by allowed pubkey/hostbased types */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 || @@ -378,7 +379,7 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; u_int32_t i, ninfo; - char *name, *found; + char *name; u_char *val; size_t vlen; int r; @@ -401,16 +402,8 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } debug("%s: %s=<%s>", __func__, name, val); - found = match_list("rsa-sha2-256", val, NULL); - if (found) { - kex->rsa_sha2 = 256; - free(found); - } - found = match_list("rsa-sha2-512", val, NULL); - if (found) { - kex->rsa_sha2 = 512; - free(found); - } + kex->server_sig_algs = val; + val = NULL; } else debug("%s: %s (unrecognised)", __func__, name); free(name); @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.83 2017/05/30 14:23:52 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.84 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ struct kex { int hostkey_type; int hostkey_nid; u_int kex_type; - int rsa_sha2; + char *server_sig_algs; int ext_info_c; struct sshbuf *my; struct sshbuf *peer; diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h index c255147a..08782dd3 100644 --- a/myproposal.h +++ b/myproposal.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.55 2017/05/07 23:13:42 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.56 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. @@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ #define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \ HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \ "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ + "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ + "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \ "ssh-ed25519," \ @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.66 2018/02/14 16:27:24 jsing Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.67 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org> * @@ -51,11 +51,14 @@ rsa_hash_alg_ident(int hash_alg) return NULL; } +/* + * Returns the hash algorithm ID for a given algorithm identifier as used + * inside the signature blob, + */ static int -rsa_hash_alg_from_ident(const char *ident) +rsa_hash_id_from_ident(const char *ident) { - if (strcmp(ident, "ssh-rsa") == 0 || - strcmp(ident, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) + if (strcmp(ident, "ssh-rsa") == 0) return SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; if (strcmp(ident, "rsa-sha2-256") == 0) return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; @@ -64,6 +67,27 @@ rsa_hash_alg_from_ident(const char *ident) return -1; } +/* + * Return the hash algorithm ID for the specified key name. This includes + * all the cases of rsa_hash_id_from_ident() but also the certificate key + * types. + */ +static int +rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(const char *alg) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = rsa_hash_id_from_ident(alg)) != -1) + return r; + if (strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) + return SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; + if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) + return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; + if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) + return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512; + return -1; +} + static int rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type) { @@ -135,7 +159,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, if (alg_ident == NULL || strlen(alg_ident) == 0) hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; else - hash_alg = rsa_hash_alg_from_ident(alg_ident); + hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg_ident); if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; @@ -202,7 +226,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const char *alg) { char *sigtype = NULL; - int hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + int hash_alg, want_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, dlen; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL; @@ -220,18 +244,24 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } - /* XXX djm: need cert types that reliably yield SHA-2 signatures */ - if (alg != NULL && strcmp(alg, sigtype) != 0 && - strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com") != 0) { - error("%s: RSA signature type mismatch: " - "expected %s received %s", __func__, alg, sigtype); - ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; - goto out; - } - if ((hash_alg = rsa_hash_alg_from_ident(sigtype)) == -1) { + if ((hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_ident(sigtype)) == -1) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; goto out; } + /* + * Allow ssh-rsa-cert-v01 certs to generate SHA2 signatures for + * legacy reasons, but otherwise the signature type should match. + */ + if (alg != NULL && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com") != 0) { + if ((want_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg)) == -1) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if (hash_alg != want_alg) { + ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + goto out; + } + } if (sshbuf_get_string(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index e5eadcaa..eff9c5e6 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.277 2018/06/09 06:36:31 jmc Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: June 9 2018 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.278 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: July 3 2018 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -772,9 +772,10 @@ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, -ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa +ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa .Ed .Pp The @@ -799,9 +800,10 @@ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, -ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa +ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa .Ed .Pp If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified @@ -1255,9 +1257,10 @@ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, +rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, -ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa +ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa .Ed .Pp The list of available key types may also be obtained using diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c index d8ae6eb3..92037640 100644 --- a/sshconnect2.c +++ b/sshconnect2.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.271 2018/06/26 02:02:36 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.272 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. @@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); void userauth(Authctxt *, char *); -static int sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *, Identity *); +static int sign_and_send_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *, Identity *); static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *); static void pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *); static void pubkey_reset(Authctxt *); @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) */ TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(id, &authctxt->keys, idlist, next) { if (key_equal(key, id->key)) { - sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, id); + sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(ssh, authctxt, id); break; } } @@ -986,73 +986,80 @@ input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh) return 0; } -static const char * -key_sign_encode(const struct sshkey *key) -{ - struct ssh *ssh = active_state; - - if (key->type == KEY_RSA) { - switch (ssh->kex->rsa_sha2) { - case 256: - return "rsa-sha2-256"; - case 512: - return "rsa-sha2-512"; - } - } - return key_ssh_name(key); -} - /* - * Some agents will return ssh-rsa signatures when asked to make a - * rsa-sha2-* signature. Check what they actually gave back and warn the - * user if the agent has returned an unexpected type. + * Select an algorithm for publickey signatures. + * Returns algorithm (caller must free) or NULL if no mutual algorithm found. + * + * Call with ssh==NULL to ignore server-sig-algs extension list and + * only attempt with the key's base signature type. */ -static int -check_sigtype(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t len) +static char * +key_sig_algorithm(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key) { - int r; - char *sigtype = NULL; - const char *alg = key_sign_encode(key); + char *allowed, *oallowed, *cp, *alg = NULL; - if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) - return 0; - if ((r = sshkey_sigtype(sig, len, &sigtype)) != 0) - return r; - if (strcmp(sigtype, alg) != 0) { - logit("warning: agent returned different signature type %s " - "(expected %s)", sigtype, alg); - } - free(sigtype); - /* Incorrect signature types aren't an error ... yet */ - return 0; + /* + * The signature algorithm will only differ from the key algorithm + * for RSA keys/certs and when the server advertises support for + * newer (SHA2) algorithms. + */ + if (ssh == NULL || ssh->kex->server_sig_algs == NULL || + (key->type != KEY_RSA && key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT)) { + /* Filter base key signature alg against our configuration */ + return match_list(key_ssh_name(key), + options.pubkey_key_types, NULL); + } + + /* + * For RSA keys/certs, since these might have a different sig type: + * find the first entry in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes of the right type + * that also appears in the supported signature algorithms list from + * the server. + */ + oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_key_types); + while ((cp = strsep(&allowed, ",")) != NULL) { + if (sshkey_type_from_name(cp) != key->type) + continue; + alg = match_list(cp, ssh->kex->server_sig_algs, NULL); + if (alg != NULL) + break; + } + free(oallowed); + return alg; } static int identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, - const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat, const char *alg) { struct sshkey *prv; int r; - /* the agent supports this key */ + /* The agent supports this key. */ if (id->key != NULL && id->agent_fd != -1) { - if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(id->agent_fd, id->key, sigp, lenp, - data, datalen, key_sign_encode(id->key), compat)) != 0 || - (r = check_sigtype(id->key, *sigp, *lenp)) != 0) - return r; - return 0; + return ssh_agent_sign(id->agent_fd, id->key, sigp, lenp, + data, datalen, alg, compat); } /* - * we have already loaded the private key or - * the private key is stored in external hardware + * We have already loaded the private key or the private key is + * stored in external hardware. */ if (id->key != NULL && - (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT))) - return (sshkey_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, - key_sign_encode(id->key), compat)); + (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT))) { + if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, + alg, compat)) != 0) + return r; + /* + * PKCS#11 tokens may not support all signature algorithms, + * so check what we get back. + */ + if ((r = sshkey_check_sigtype(*sigp, *lenp, alg)) != 0) + return r; + return 0; + } - /* load the private key from the file */ + /* Load the private key from the file. */ if ((prv = load_identity_file(id)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; if (id->key != NULL && !sshkey_equal_public(prv, id->key)) { @@ -1060,8 +1067,7 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, __func__, id->filename); return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; } - r = sshkey_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, - key_sign_encode(prv), compat); + r = sshkey_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, compat); sshkey_free(prv); return r; } @@ -1086,57 +1092,35 @@ id_filename_matches(Identity *id, Identity *private_id) } static int -sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id) +sign_and_send_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id) { - Buffer b; - Identity *private_id; - u_char *blob, *signature; - size_t slen; - u_int bloblen, skip = 0; - int matched, ret = -1, have_sig = 1; - char *fp; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + Identity *private_id, *sign_id = NULL; + u_char *signature = NULL; + size_t slen = 0, skip = 0; + int r, fallback_sigtype, sent = 0; + char *alg = NULL, *fp = NULL; + const char *loc = ""; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) return 0; - debug3("%s: %s %s", __func__, key_type(id->key), fp); - free(fp); - if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) { - /* we cannot handle this key */ - debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: cannot handle key"); - return 0; - } - /* data to be signed */ - buffer_init(&b); - if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { - buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); - skip = session_id2_len; - } else { - buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); - skip = buffer_len(&b); - } - buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->service); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name); - buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_sign_encode(id->key)); - buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen); + debug3("%s: %s %s", __func__, sshkey_type(id->key), fp); /* * If the key is an certificate, try to find a matching private key * and use it to complete the signature. * If no such private key exists, fall back to trying the certificate * key itself in case it has a private half already loaded. + * This will try to set sign_id to the private key that will perform + * the signature. */ - if (key_is_cert(id->key)) { - matched = 0; + if (sshkey_is_cert(id->key)) { TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) { if (sshkey_equal_public(id->key, private_id->key) && id->key->type != private_id->key->type) { - id = private_id; - matched = 1; + sign_id = private_id; break; } } @@ -1147,18 +1131,18 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id) * of keeping just a private key file and public * certificate on disk. */ - if (!matched && !id->isprivate && id->agent_fd == -1 && + if (sign_id == NULL && + !id->isprivate && id->agent_fd == -1 && (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) { TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) { if (private_id->key == NULL && id_filename_matches(id, private_id)) { - id = private_id; - matched = 1; + sign_id = private_id; break; } } } - if (matched) { + if (sign_id != NULL) { debug2("%s: using private key \"%s\"%s for " "certificate", __func__, id->filename, id->agent_fd != -1 ? " from agent" : ""); @@ -1168,51 +1152,121 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id) } } - /* generate signature */ - ret = identity_sign(id, &signature, &slen, - buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), datafellows); - if (ret != 0) { - if (ret != SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND) - error("%s: signing failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); - free(blob); - buffer_free(&b); - return 0; + /* + * If the above didn't select another identity to do the signing + * then default to the one we started with. + */ + if (sign_id == NULL) + sign_id = id; + + /* assemble and sign data */ + for (fallback_sigtype = 0; fallback_sigtype <= 1; fallback_sigtype++) { + free(alg); + slen = 0; + signature = NULL; + if ((alg = key_sig_algorithm(fallback_sigtype ? NULL : ssh, + id->key)) == NULL) { + error("%s: no mutual signature supported", __func__); + goto out; + } + debug3("%s: signing using %s", __func__, alg); + + sshbuf_free(b); + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, session_id2, + session_id2_len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + } else { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, + session_id2_len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_string: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + skip = buffer_len(b); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, alg)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_puts(id->key, b)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: assemble signed data: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + + /* generate signature */ + r = identity_sign(sign_id, &signature, &slen, + sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), datafellows, alg); + if (r == 0) + break; + else if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND) + goto out; /* soft failure */ + else if (r == SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED && + !fallback_sigtype) { + if (sign_id->agent_fd != -1) + loc = "agent "; + else if ((sign_id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) + loc = "token "; + logit("%skey %s %s returned incorrect signature type", + loc, sshkey_type(id->key), fp); + continue; + } + error("%s: signing failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; } -#ifdef DEBUG_PK - buffer_dump(&b); -#endif - free(blob); + if (slen == 0 || signature == NULL) /* shouldn't happen */ + fatal("%s: no signature", __func__); /* append signature */ - buffer_put_string(&b, signature, slen); - free(signature); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, signature, slen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: append signature: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); +#endif /* skip session id and packet type */ - if (buffer_len(&b) < skip + 1) - fatal("userauth_pubkey: internal error"); - buffer_consume(&b, skip + 1); + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, skip + 1)) != 0) + fatal("%s: consume: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* put remaining data from buffer into packet */ - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); - packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)); - buffer_free(&b); - packet_send(); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, b)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: enqueue request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - return 1; + /* success */ + sent = 1; + + out: + free(fp); + free(alg); + sshbuf_free(b); + freezero(signature, slen); + return sent; } |