- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/06/22 21:57:01

     [servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c sshd_config.5 sandbox-rlimit.c]
     [sandbox-systrace.c sandbox.h configure.ac Makefile.in]
     introduce sandboxing of the pre-auth privsep child using systrace(4).

     This introduces a new "UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox" option for
     sshd_config that applies mandatory restrictions on the syscalls the
     privsep child can perform. This prevents a compromised privsep child
     from being used to attack other hosts (by opening sockets and proxying)
     or probing local kernel attack surface.

     The sandbox is implemented using systrace(4) in unsupervised "fast-path"
     mode, where a list of permitted syscalls is supplied. Any syscall not
     on the list results in SIGKILL being sent to the privsep child. Note
     that this requires a kernel with the new SYSTR_POLICY_KILL option.

     UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox will become the default in the future
     so please start testing it now.

     feedback dtucker@; ok markus@

10 files changed, 417 insertions, 15 deletions

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index b8adb8a8..6a18e719 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -3,6 +3,26 @@
    - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/06/22 21:47:28
      [servconf.c]
      reuse the multistate option arrays to pretty-print options for "sshd -T"
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/06/22 21:57:01
+     [servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c sshd_config.5]
+     [configure.ac Makefile.in]
+     introduce sandboxing of the pre-auth privsep child using systrace(4).
+     
+     This introduces a new "UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox" option for
+     sshd_config that applies mandatory restrictions on the syscalls the
+     privsep child can perform. This prevents a compromised privsep child
+     from being used to attack other hosts (by opening sockets and proxying)
+     or probing local kernel attack surface.
+     
+     The sandbox is implemented using systrace(4) in unsupervised "fast-path"
+     mode, where a list of permitted syscalls is supplied. Any syscall not
+     on the list results in SIGKILL being sent to the privsep child. Note
+     that this requires a kernel with the new SYSTR_POLICY_KILL option.
+     
+     UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox will become the default in the future
+     so please start testing it now.
+     
+     feedback dtucker@; ok markus@
 
 20110620
  - OpenBSD CVS Sync
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index f5b14761..f64aaac9 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.322 2011/05/05 03:48:37 djm Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.323 2011/06/22 22:30:03 djm Exp $
 
 # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
 #SHELL = @SH@
@@ -89,7 +89,8 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
 	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
-	roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o
+	roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \
+	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o
 
 MANPAGES	= moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
 MANPAGES_IN	= moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 8f36338f..380a8b94 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.476 2011/06/03 02:11:38 djm Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.477 2011/06/22 22:30:03 djm Exp $
 #
 # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
 #
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 
 AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
-AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.476 $)
+AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.477 $)
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
 AC_LANG([C])
 
@@ -106,6 +106,16 @@ AC_SUBST([LD])
 AC_C_INLINE
 
 AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX], [have_llong_max=1], , [#include <limits.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECL([SYSTR_POLICY_KILL], [have_systr_policy_kill=1], , [
+	#include <sys/types.h>
+	#include <sys/param.h>
+	#include <dev/systrace.h>
+])
+AC_CHECK_DECL([RLIMIT_NPROC],
+    [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC], [], [sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC])], , [
+	#include <sys/types.h>
+	#include <sys/resource.h>
+])
 
 use_stack_protector=1
 AC_ARG_WITH([stackprotect],
@@ -2461,6 +2471,34 @@ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], ["$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"],
 	[non-privileged user for privilege separation])
 AC_SUBST([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER])
 
+# Decide which sandbox style to use
+sandbox_arg=""
+AC_ARG_WITH([sandbox],
+	[  --with-sandbox=style    Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, rlimit, systrace)],
+	[
+		if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+			sandbox_arg=""
+		else
+			sandbox_arg="$withval"
+		fi
+	]
+)
+if test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsystrace" || \
+   ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" = "x1" ) ; then
+	SANDBOX_STYLE="systrace"
+	AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SYSTRACE], [1], [Sandbox using systrace(4)])
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \
+     ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" ) ; then
+	SANDBOX_STYLE="rlimit"
+	AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_RLIMIT], [1], [Sandbox using setrlimit(2)])
+elif test -z "$sandbox_arg" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xno" || \
+     test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnone" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnull" ; then
+	SANDBOX_STYLE="none"
+	AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_NULL], [1], [no privsep sandboxing])
+else
+	AC_MSG_ERROR([unsupported -with-sandbox])
+fi
+
 # Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right.
 if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then
   LIBS="$LIBS -liberty";
@@ -4191,6 +4229,7 @@ echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
 echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
 echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
 echo "              Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
+echo "             Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
 
 echo ""
 
diff --git a/sandbox-rlimit.c b/sandbox-rlimit.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4d832fc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sandbox-rlimit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_RLIMIT
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sandbox.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+/* Minimal sandbox that sets zero nfiles, nprocs and filesize rlimits */
+
+struct ssh_sandbox {
+	pid_t child_pid;
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox *
+ssh_sandbox_init(void)
+{
+	struct ssh_sandbox *box;
+
+	/*
+	 * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
+	 * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
+	 */
+	debug3("%s: preparing rlimit sandbox", __func__);
+	box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
+	box->child_pid = 0;
+
+	return box;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	struct rlimit rl_zero;
+
+	rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			__func__, strerror(errno));
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			__func__, strerror(errno));
+#ifdef HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			__func__, strerror(errno));
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	free(box);
+	debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
+{
+	box->child_pid = child_pid;
+}
+
+#endif /* SANDBOX_RLIMIT */
diff --git a/sandbox-systrace.c b/sandbox-systrace.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5d0b7fb8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sandbox-systrace.c
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <dev/systrace.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sandbox.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+static const int preauth_policy[] = {
+	SYS___sysctl,
+	SYS_close,
+	SYS_exit,
+	SYS_getpid,
+	SYS_gettimeofday,
+	SYS_madvise,
+	SYS_mmap,
+	SYS_mprotect,
+	SYS_poll,
+	SYS_munmap,
+	SYS_read,
+	SYS_select,
+	SYS_sigprocmask,
+	SYS_write,
+	-1
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox {
+	int child_sock;
+	int parent_sock;
+	int systrace_fd;
+	pid_t child_pid;
+	struct systrace_policy policy;
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox *
+ssh_sandbox_init(void)
+{
+	struct ssh_sandbox *box;
+	int s[2];
+
+	debug3("%s: preparing systrace sandbox", __func__);
+	box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
+	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, s) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+	box->child_sock = s[0];
+	box->parent_sock = s[1];
+	box->systrace_fd = -1;
+	box->child_pid = 0;
+
+	return box;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	char whatever = 0;
+
+	close(box->parent_sock);
+	/* Signal parent that we are ready */
+	debug3("%s: ready", __func__);
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, box->child_sock, &whatever, 1) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+	/* Wait for parent to signal for us to go */
+	if (atomicio(read, box->child_sock, &whatever, 1) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+	debug3("%s: started", __func__);
+	close(box->child_sock);
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_sandbox_parent(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid,
+    const int *allowed_syscalls)
+{
+	int dev_systrace, i, j, found;
+	char whatever = 0;
+
+	debug3("%s: wait for child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid);
+	box->child_pid = child_pid;
+	close(box->child_sock);
+	/* Wait for child to signal that it is ready */
+	if (atomicio(read, box->parent_sock, &whatever, 1) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+	debug3("%s: child %ld ready", __func__, (long)child_pid);
+
+	/* Set up systracing of child */
+	if ((dev_systrace = open("/dev/systrace", O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: open(\"/dev/systrace\"): %s", __func__,
+		    strerror(errno));
+	if (ioctl(dev_systrace, STRIOCCLONE, &box->systrace_fd) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: ioctl(STRIOCCLONE, %d): %s", __func__,
+		    dev_systrace, strerror(errno));
+	close(dev_systrace);
+	debug3("%s: systrace attach, fd=%d", __func__, box->systrace_fd);
+	if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCATTACH, &child_pid) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCATTACH, %d): %s", __func__,
+		    box->systrace_fd, child_pid, strerror(errno));
+
+	/* Allocate and assign policy */
+	bzero(&box->policy, sizeof(box->policy));
+	box->policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_NEW;
+	box->policy.strp_maxents = SYS_MAXSYSCALL;
+	if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &box->policy) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (new)): %s", __func__,
+		    box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno));
+
+	box->policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_ASSIGN;
+	box->policy.strp_pid = box->child_pid;
+	if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &box->policy) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (assign)): %s",
+		    __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno));
+
+	/* Set per-syscall policy */
+	for (i = 0; i < SYS_MAXSYSCALL; i++) {
+		for (j = found = 0; allowed_syscalls[j] != -1 && !found; j++) {
+			if (allowed_syscalls[j] == i)
+				found = 1;
+		}
+		box->policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_MODIFY;
+		box->policy.strp_code = i;
+		box->policy.strp_policy = found ?
+		    SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT : SYSTR_POLICY_KILL;
+		if (found)
+			debug3("%s: policy: enable syscall %d", __func__, i);
+		if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY,
+		    &box->policy) == -1)
+			fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (modify)): %s",
+			    __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	/* Signal the child to start running */
+	debug3("%s: start child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid);
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, box->parent_sock, &whatever, 1) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+	close(box->parent_sock);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	/* Closing this before the child exits will terminate it */
+	close(box->systrace_fd);
+
+	free(box);
+	debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
+{
+	ssh_sandbox_parent(box, child_pid, preauth_policy);
+}
+
+#endif /* SANDBOX_SYSTRACE */
diff --git a/sandbox.h b/sandbox.h
new file mode 100755
index 00000000..5fe30644
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sandbox.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sandbox.h,v 1.2 2011/06/22 22:14:05 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+struct ssh_sandbox;
+
+struct ssh_sandbox *ssh_sandbox_init(void);
+void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *);
+void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *);
+void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *, pid_t);
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index 03b97461..91986e55 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.221 2011/06/22 21:47:28 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.222 2011/06/22 21:57:01 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
  *                    All rights reserved
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 
 	/* Turn privilege separation on by default */
 	if (use_privsep == -1)
-		use_privsep = 1;
+		use_privsep = PRIVSEP_ON;
 
 #ifndef HAVE_MMAP
 	if (use_privsep && options->compression == 1) {
@@ -701,6 +701,12 @@ static const struct multistate multistate_gatewayports[] = {
 	{ "no",				0 },
 	{ NULL, -1 }
 };
+static const struct multistate multistate_privsep[] = {
+	{ "sandbox",			PRIVSEP_SANDBOX },
+	{ "yes",			PRIVSEP_ON },
+	{ "no",				PRIVSEP_OFF },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
 
 int
 process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
@@ -1066,7 +1072,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 
 	case sUsePrivilegeSeparation:
 		intptr = &use_privsep;
-		goto parse_flag;
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep;
+		goto parse_multistate;
 
 	case sAllowUsers:
 		while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
@@ -1574,6 +1581,8 @@ fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
 		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_gatewayports);
 	case sCompression:
 		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_compression);
+	case sUsePrivilegeSeparation:
+		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_privsep);
 	case sProtocol:
 		switch (val) {
 		case SSH_PROTO_1:
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
index 31e621bd..89f38e20 100644
--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.98 2011/05/23 03:30:07 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.99 2011/06/22 21:57:01 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -36,6 +36,11 @@
 #define	PERMIT_NO_PASSWD	2
 #define	PERMIT_YES		3
 
+/* use_privsep */
+#define PRIVSEP_OFF		0
+#define PRIVSEP_ON		1
+#define PRIVSEP_SANDBOX		2
+
 #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX	6	/* Default for MaxAuthTries */
 #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX	10	/* Default for MaxSessions */
 
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 6e15522b..bebcb9bf 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.383 2011/06/17 21:44:31 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.384 2011/06/22 21:57:01 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@
 #endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"
 #include "roaming.h"
+#include "sandbox.h"
 #include "version.h"
 
 #ifdef LIBWRAP
@@ -624,18 +625,23 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
 	int status;
 	pid_t pid;
+	struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL;
 
 	/* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
 	pmonitor = monitor_init();
 	/* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
 	pmonitor->m_pkex = &xxx_kex;
 
+	if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_SANDBOX)
+		box = ssh_sandbox_init();
 	pid = fork();
 	if (pid == -1) {
 		fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
 	} else if (pid != 0) {
 		debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
 
+		if (box != NULL)
+			ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid);
 		pmonitor->m_pid = pid;
 		monitor_child_preauth(authctxt, pmonitor);
 
@@ -643,10 +649,21 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		monitor_sync(pmonitor);
 
 		/* Wait for the child's exit status */
-		while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
+		while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) {
 			if (errno != EINTR)
-				break;
-		return (1);
+				fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
+				    strerror(errno));
+		}
+		if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
+			if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
+				fatal("%s: preauth child exited with status %d",
+				    __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+		} else if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
+			fatal("%s: preauth child terminated by signal %d",
+			    __func__, WTERMSIG(status));
+		if (box != NULL)
+			ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(box);
+		return 1;
 	} else {
 		/* child */
 		close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
@@ -659,8 +676,11 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
 			privsep_preauth_child();
 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
+		if (box != NULL)
+			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
+
+		return 0;
 	}
-	return (0);
 }
 
 static void
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index 70a53b3a..f78452c8 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.133 2011/05/23 07:10:21 jmc Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: May 23 2011 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.134 2011/06/22 21:57:01 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: June 22 2011 $
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -1071,6 +1071,12 @@ The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege
 escalation by containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes.
 The default is
 .Dq yes .
+If
+.Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
+is set to
+.Dq sandbox
+then the pre-authentication unprivileged process is subject to additional
+restrictions.
 .It Cm X11DisplayOffset
 Specifies the first display number available for
 .Xr sshd 8 Ns 's