diff options
author | Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> | 2011-06-23 08:30:03 +1000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> | 2011-06-23 08:30:03 +1000 |
commit | 69ff1df952eebf0489b775a60ede094eaf596a05 (patch) | |
tree | 6eb76b4632b7c131e0fbb52d8ce7cccf658b6bfa | |
parent | 82c558761d0fa42dc954d62812b9e4b4a94f64bd (diff) |
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/06/22 21:57:01
[servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c sshd_config.5 sandbox-rlimit.c]
[sandbox-systrace.c sandbox.h configure.ac Makefile.in]
introduce sandboxing of the pre-auth privsep child using systrace(4).
This introduces a new "UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox" option for
sshd_config that applies mandatory restrictions on the syscalls the
privsep child can perform. This prevents a compromised privsep child
from being used to attack other hosts (by opening sockets and proxying)
or probing local kernel attack surface.
The sandbox is implemented using systrace(4) in unsupervised "fast-path"
mode, where a list of permitted syscalls is supplied. Any syscall not
on the list results in SIGKILL being sent to the privsep child. Note
that this requires a kernel with the new SYSTR_POLICY_KILL option.
UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox will become the default in the future
so please start testing it now.
feedback dtucker@; ok markus@
-rw-r--r-- | ChangeLog | 20 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Makefile.in | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | configure.ac | 43 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sandbox-rlimit.c | 92 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sandbox-systrace.c | 187 | ||||
-rwxr-xr-x | sandbox.h | 23 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | servconf.c | 15 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | servconf.h | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sshd.c | 30 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sshd_config.5 | 10 |
10 files changed, 417 insertions, 15 deletions
@@ -3,6 +3,26 @@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/06/22 21:47:28 [servconf.c] reuse the multistate option arrays to pretty-print options for "sshd -T" + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/06/22 21:57:01 + [servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c sshd_config.5] + [configure.ac Makefile.in] + introduce sandboxing of the pre-auth privsep child using systrace(4). + + This introduces a new "UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox" option for + sshd_config that applies mandatory restrictions on the syscalls the + privsep child can perform. This prevents a compromised privsep child + from being used to attack other hosts (by opening sockets and proxying) + or probing local kernel attack surface. + + The sandbox is implemented using systrace(4) in unsupervised "fast-path" + mode, where a list of permitted syscalls is supplied. Any syscall not + on the list results in SIGKILL being sent to the privsep child. Note + that this requires a kernel with the new SYSTR_POLICY_KILL option. + + UsePrivilegeSeparation=sandbox will become the default in the future + so please start testing it now. + + feedback dtucker@; ok markus@ 20110620 - OpenBSD CVS Sync diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in index f5b14761..f64aaac9 100644 --- a/Makefile.in +++ b/Makefile.in @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.322 2011/05/05 03:48:37 djm Exp $ +# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.323 2011/06/22 22:30:03 djm Exp $ # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh #SHELL = @SH@ @@ -89,7 +89,8 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ - roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o + roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \ + sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5 diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index 8f36338f..380a8b94 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.476 2011/06/03 02:11:38 djm Exp $ +# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.477 2011/06/22 22:30:03 djm Exp $ # # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller # @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org]) -AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.476 $) +AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.477 $) AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c]) AC_LANG([C]) @@ -106,6 +106,16 @@ AC_SUBST([LD]) AC_C_INLINE AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX], [have_llong_max=1], , [#include <limits.h>]) +AC_CHECK_DECL([SYSTR_POLICY_KILL], [have_systr_policy_kill=1], , [ + #include <sys/types.h> + #include <sys/param.h> + #include <dev/systrace.h> +]) +AC_CHECK_DECL([RLIMIT_NPROC], + [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC], [], [sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC])], , [ + #include <sys/types.h> + #include <sys/resource.h> +]) use_stack_protector=1 AC_ARG_WITH([stackprotect], @@ -2461,6 +2471,34 @@ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], ["$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"], [non-privileged user for privilege separation]) AC_SUBST([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER]) +# Decide which sandbox style to use +sandbox_arg="" +AC_ARG_WITH([sandbox], + [ --with-sandbox=style Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, rlimit, systrace)], + [ + if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then + sandbox_arg="" + else + sandbox_arg="$withval" + fi + ] +) +if test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsystrace" || \ + ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" = "x1" ) ; then + SANDBOX_STYLE="systrace" + AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SYSTRACE], [1], [Sandbox using systrace(4)]) +elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \ + ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" ) ; then + SANDBOX_STYLE="rlimit" + AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_RLIMIT], [1], [Sandbox using setrlimit(2)]) +elif test -z "$sandbox_arg" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xno" || \ + test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnone" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnull" ; then + SANDBOX_STYLE="none" + AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_NULL], [1], [no privsep sandboxing]) +else + AC_MSG_ERROR([unsupported -with-sandbox]) +fi + # Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right. if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then LIBS="$LIBS -liberty"; @@ -4191,6 +4229,7 @@ echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG" echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG" echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG" echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG" +echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE" echo "" diff --git a/sandbox-rlimit.c b/sandbox-rlimit.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4d832fc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox-rlimit.c @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef SANDBOX_RLIMIT + +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/time.h> +#include <sys/resource.h> + +#include <errno.h> +#include <stdarg.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#include "log.h" +#include "sandbox.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +/* Minimal sandbox that sets zero nfiles, nprocs and filesize rlimits */ + +struct ssh_sandbox { + pid_t child_pid; +}; + +struct ssh_sandbox * +ssh_sandbox_init(void) +{ + struct ssh_sandbox *box; + + /* + * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need + * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API. + */ + debug3("%s: preparing rlimit sandbox", __func__); + box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); + box->child_pid = 0; + + return box; +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + struct rlimit rl_zero; + + rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; + + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1) + fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1) + fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); +#ifdef HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1) + fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); +#endif +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + free(box); + debug3("%s: finished", __func__); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) +{ + box->child_pid = child_pid; +} + +#endif /* SANDBOX_RLIMIT */ diff --git a/sandbox-systrace.c b/sandbox-systrace.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..5d0b7fb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox-systrace.c @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE + +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/ioctl.h> +#include <sys/syscall.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> + +#include <dev/systrace.h> + +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <stdarg.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "sandbox.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +static const int preauth_policy[] = { + SYS___sysctl, + SYS_close, + SYS_exit, + SYS_getpid, + SYS_gettimeofday, + SYS_madvise, + SYS_mmap, + SYS_mprotect, + SYS_poll, + SYS_munmap, + SYS_read, + SYS_select, + SYS_sigprocmask, + SYS_write, + -1 +}; + +struct ssh_sandbox { + int child_sock; + int parent_sock; + int systrace_fd; + pid_t child_pid; + struct systrace_policy policy; +}; + +struct ssh_sandbox * +ssh_sandbox_init(void) +{ + struct ssh_sandbox *box; + int s[2]; + + debug3("%s: preparing systrace sandbox", __func__); + box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); + if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, s) == -1) + fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + box->child_sock = s[0]; + box->parent_sock = s[1]; + box->systrace_fd = -1; + box->child_pid = 0; + + return box; +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + char whatever = 0; + + close(box->parent_sock); + /* Signal parent that we are ready */ + debug3("%s: ready", __func__); + if (atomicio(vwrite, box->child_sock, &whatever, 1) != 1) + fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + /* Wait for parent to signal for us to go */ + if (atomicio(read, box->child_sock, &whatever, 1) != 1) + fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + debug3("%s: started", __func__); + close(box->child_sock); +} + +static void +ssh_sandbox_parent(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid, + const int *allowed_syscalls) +{ + int dev_systrace, i, j, found; + char whatever = 0; + + debug3("%s: wait for child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid); + box->child_pid = child_pid; + close(box->child_sock); + /* Wait for child to signal that it is ready */ + if (atomicio(read, box->parent_sock, &whatever, 1) != 1) + fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + debug3("%s: child %ld ready", __func__, (long)child_pid); + + /* Set up systracing of child */ + if ((dev_systrace = open("/dev/systrace", O_RDONLY)) == -1) + fatal("%s: open(\"/dev/systrace\"): %s", __func__, + strerror(errno)); + if (ioctl(dev_systrace, STRIOCCLONE, &box->systrace_fd) == -1) + fatal("%s: ioctl(STRIOCCLONE, %d): %s", __func__, + dev_systrace, strerror(errno)); + close(dev_systrace); + debug3("%s: systrace attach, fd=%d", __func__, box->systrace_fd); + if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCATTACH, &child_pid) == -1) + fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCATTACH, %d): %s", __func__, + box->systrace_fd, child_pid, strerror(errno)); + + /* Allocate and assign policy */ + bzero(&box->policy, sizeof(box->policy)); + box->policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_NEW; + box->policy.strp_maxents = SYS_MAXSYSCALL; + if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &box->policy) == -1) + fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (new)): %s", __func__, + box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno)); + + box->policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_ASSIGN; + box->policy.strp_pid = box->child_pid; + if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &box->policy) == -1) + fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (assign)): %s", + __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno)); + + /* Set per-syscall policy */ + for (i = 0; i < SYS_MAXSYSCALL; i++) { + for (j = found = 0; allowed_syscalls[j] != -1 && !found; j++) { + if (allowed_syscalls[j] == i) + found = 1; + } + box->policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_MODIFY; + box->policy.strp_code = i; + box->policy.strp_policy = found ? + SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT : SYSTR_POLICY_KILL; + if (found) + debug3("%s: policy: enable syscall %d", __func__, i); + if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, + &box->policy) == -1) + fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (modify)): %s", + __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno)); + } + + /* Signal the child to start running */ + debug3("%s: start child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid); + if (atomicio(vwrite, box->parent_sock, &whatever, 1) != 1) + fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + close(box->parent_sock); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + /* Closing this before the child exits will terminate it */ + close(box->systrace_fd); + + free(box); + debug3("%s: finished", __func__); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) +{ + ssh_sandbox_parent(box, child_pid, preauth_policy); +} + +#endif /* SANDBOX_SYSTRACE */ diff --git a/sandbox.h b/sandbox.h new file mode 100755 index 00000000..5fe30644 --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox.h @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sandbox.h,v 1.2 2011/06/22 22:14:05 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +struct ssh_sandbox; + +struct ssh_sandbox *ssh_sandbox_init(void); +void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *); +void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *); +void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *, pid_t); @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.221 2011/06/22 21:47:28 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.222 2011/06/22 21:57:01 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved @@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) /* Turn privilege separation on by default */ if (use_privsep == -1) - use_privsep = 1; + use_privsep = PRIVSEP_ON; #ifndef HAVE_MMAP if (use_privsep && options->compression == 1) { @@ -701,6 +701,12 @@ static const struct multistate multistate_gatewayports[] = { { "no", 0 }, { NULL, -1 } }; +static const struct multistate multistate_privsep[] = { + { "sandbox", PRIVSEP_SANDBOX }, + { "yes", PRIVSEP_ON }, + { "no", PRIVSEP_OFF }, + { NULL, -1 } +}; int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, @@ -1066,7 +1072,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, case sUsePrivilegeSeparation: intptr = &use_privsep; - goto parse_flag; + multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep; + goto parse_multistate; case sAllowUsers: while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { @@ -1574,6 +1581,8 @@ fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val) return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_gatewayports); case sCompression: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_compression); + case sUsePrivilegeSeparation: + return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_privsep); case sProtocol: switch (val) { case SSH_PROTO_1: @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.98 2011/05/23 03:30:07 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.99 2011/06/22 21:57:01 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> @@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ #define PERMIT_NO_PASSWD 2 #define PERMIT_YES 3 +/* use_privsep */ +#define PRIVSEP_OFF 0 +#define PRIVSEP_ON 1 +#define PRIVSEP_SANDBOX 2 + #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6 /* Default for MaxAuthTries */ #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX 10 /* Default for MaxSessions */ @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.383 2011/06/17 21:44:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.384 2011/06/22 21:57:01 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "roaming.h" +#include "sandbox.h" #include "version.h" #ifdef LIBWRAP @@ -624,18 +625,23 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) { int status; pid_t pid; + struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL; /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */ pmonitor = monitor_init(); /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */ pmonitor->m_pkex = &xxx_kex; + if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_SANDBOX) + box = ssh_sandbox_init(); pid = fork(); if (pid == -1) { fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); } else if (pid != 0) { debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid); + if (box != NULL) + ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid); pmonitor->m_pid = pid; monitor_child_preauth(authctxt, pmonitor); @@ -643,10 +649,21 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) monitor_sync(pmonitor); /* Wait for the child's exit status */ - while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) + while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) { if (errno != EINTR) - break; - return (1); + fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, + strerror(errno)); + } + if (WIFEXITED(status)) { + if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) + fatal("%s: preauth child exited with status %d", + __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status)); + } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) + fatal("%s: preauth child terminated by signal %d", + __func__, WTERMSIG(status)); + if (box != NULL) + ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(box); + return 1; } else { /* child */ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); @@ -659,8 +676,11 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) privsep_preauth_child(); setproctitle("%s", "[net]"); + if (box != NULL) + ssh_sandbox_child(box); + + return 0; } - return (0); } static void diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 index 70a53b3a..f78452c8 100644 --- a/sshd_config.5 +++ b/sshd_config.5 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.133 2011/05/23 07:10:21 jmc Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: May 23 2011 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.134 2011/06/22 21:57:01 djm Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: June 22 2011 $ .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -1071,6 +1071,12 @@ The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes. The default is .Dq yes . +If +.Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation +is set to +.Dq sandbox +then the pre-authentication unprivileged process is subject to additional +restrictions. .It Cm X11DisplayOffset Specifies the first display number available for .Xr sshd 8 Ns 's |