- (djm) Pick up LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment or PATH if not set by headers

 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates:
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:07:23
     [ssh.c]
     accept remsh as a valid name as well; roman@buildpoint.com
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:17:13
     [deattack.c crc32.c packet.c]
     rename crc32() to ssh_crc32() to avoid zlib name clash.  do not move to
     libz crc32 function yet, because it has ugly "long"'s in it;
     oneill@cs.sfu.ca
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:26:08
     [scp.1 scp.c]
     -S prog support; tv@debian.org
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:50:07
     [scp.c]
     knf
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:57:33
     [log-client.c]
     shorten
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/08/19 12:48:11
     [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c ssh.c ssh.h]
     support for ~. in ssh2
   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:29:40
     [crc32.h]
     proper prototype
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/08/19 15:34:44
     [authfd.c authfd.h key.c key.h ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1]
     [ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c Makefile]
     [fingerprint.c fingerprint.h]
     add SSH2/DSA support to the agent and some other DSA related cleanups.
     (note that we cannot talk to ssh.com's ssh2 agents)
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/08/19 15:55:52
     [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c]
     more ~ support for ssh2
   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/08/19 16:21:19
     [clientloop.c]
     oops
   - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:25:53
     [session.c]
     We have to stash the result of get_remote_name_or_ip() before we
     close our socket or getpeername() will get EBADF and the process
     will exit.  Only a problem for "UseLogin yes".
   - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:30:59
     [session.c]
     Only check /etc/nologin if "UseLogin no" since login(1) may have its
     own policy on determining who is allowed to login when /etc/nologin
     is present.  Also use the _PATH_NOLOGIN define.
   - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:42:43
     [auth1.c auth2.c session.c ssh.c]
     Add calls to setusercontext() and login_get*().  We basically call
     setusercontext() in most places where previously we did a setlogin().
     Add default login.conf file and put root in the "daemon" login class.
   - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/21 10:23:31
     [session.c]
     Fix incorrect PATH setting; noted by Markus.

33 files changed, 1178 insertions, 811 deletions

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 4463cf2b..9d3dd02e 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -3,6 +3,61 @@
    Avoids "scp never exits" problem. Reports from Lutz Jaenicke 
    <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> and Tamito KAJIYAMA 
    <kajiyama@grad.sccs.chukyo-u.ac.jp>
+ - (djm) Pick up LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment or PATH if not set by headers
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates:
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:07:23
+     [ssh.c]
+     accept remsh as a valid name as well; roman@buildpoint.com
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:17:13
+     [deattack.c crc32.c packet.c]
+     rename crc32() to ssh_crc32() to avoid zlib name clash.  do not move to
+     libz crc32 function yet, because it has ugly "long"'s in it;
+     oneill@cs.sfu.ca
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:26:08
+     [scp.1 scp.c]
+     -S prog support; tv@debian.org
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:50:07
+     [scp.c]
+     knf
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:57:33
+     [log-client.c]
+     shorten
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/08/19 12:48:11
+     [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c ssh.c ssh.h]
+     support for ~. in ssh2
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:29:40
+     [crc32.h]
+     proper prototype
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/08/19 15:34:44
+     [authfd.c authfd.h key.c key.h ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1] 
+     [ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c Makefile] 
+     [fingerprint.c fingerprint.h]
+     add SSH2/DSA support to the agent and some other DSA related cleanups.
+     (note that we cannot talk to ssh.com's ssh2 agents)
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/08/19 15:55:52
+     [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c]
+     more ~ support for ssh2
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org  2000/08/19 16:21:19
+     [clientloop.c]
+     oops
+   - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:25:53
+     [session.c]
+     We have to stash the result of get_remote_name_or_ip() before we
+     close our socket or getpeername() will get EBADF and the process
+     will exit.  Only a problem for "UseLogin yes".
+   - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:30:59
+     [session.c]
+     Only check /etc/nologin if "UseLogin no" since login(1) may have its
+     own policy on determining who is allowed to login when /etc/nologin
+     is present.  Also use the _PATH_NOLOGIN define.
+   - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:42:43
+     [auth1.c auth2.c session.c ssh.c]
+     Add calls to setusercontext() and login_get*().  We basically call
+     setusercontext() in most places where previously we did a setlogin().
+     Add default login.conf file and put root in the "daemon" login class.
+   - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/21 10:23:31
+     [session.c]
+     Fix incorrect PATH setting; noted by Markus.
 
 20000818
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS changes:
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index ff34c493..4ceef704 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS=@INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS@
 
 TARGETS=ssh sshd ssh-add ssh-keygen ssh-agent scp $(EXTRA_TARGETS)
 
-LIBSSH_OBJS=atomicio.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o buffer.o canohost.o channels.o cipher.o compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o dispatch.o dsa.o fingerprint.o hmac.o hostfile.o key.o kex.o log.o match.o mpaux.o nchan.o packet.o radix.o entropy.o readpass.o rsa.o tildexpand.o ttymodes.o uidswap.o util.o uuencode.o xmalloc.o 
+LIBSSH_OBJS=atomicio.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o buffer.o canohost.o channels.o cipher.o compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o dispatch.o dsa.o hmac.o hostfile.o key.o kex.o log.o match.o mpaux.o nchan.o packet.o radix.o entropy.o readpass.o rsa.o tildexpand.o ttymodes.o uidswap.o util.o uuencode.o xmalloc.o 
 
 LIBOPENBSD_COMPAT_OBJS=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-base64.o bsd-bindresvport.o bsd-daemon.o bsd-inet_aton.o bsd-inet_ntoa.o bsd-misc.o bsd-mktemp.o bsd-rresvport.o bsd-setenv.o bsd-sigaction.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-strlcat.o bsd-strlcpy.o bsd-strsep.o fake-getaddrinfo.o fake-getnameinfo.o next-posix.o
 
diff --git a/TODO b/TODO
index 1d46ae1c..ecfd21e3 100644
--- a/TODO
+++ b/TODO
@@ -14,3 +14,5 @@
   underlying shell.
 
 - utmp/wtmp logging does not work on NeXT
+
+- Complete Tru64 SIA support
diff --git a/acconfig.h b/acconfig.h
index 601dc16f..eeee4eaf 100644
--- a/acconfig.h
+++ b/acconfig.h
@@ -6,6 +6,13 @@
 
 @TOP@
 
+/* If your header files don't define LOGIN_PROGRAM, then use this (detected) */
+/* from environment and PATH */
+#undef LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK
+
+/* Define if your password has a pw_class field */
+#undef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
+
 /* Define if your socketpair() has bugs */
 #undef USE_PIPES
 
diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c
index d8f2652e..b043e8a9 100644
--- a/auth1.c
+++ b/auth1.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.2 2000/04/29 18:11:52 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.3 2000/08/20 18:42:40 millert Exp $");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
@@ -480,6 +480,9 @@ do_authentication()
 	pwcopy.pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd);
 	pwcopy.pw_uid = pw->pw_uid;
 	pwcopy.pw_gid = pw->pw_gid;
+#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
+	pwcopy.pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class);
+#endif
 	pwcopy.pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
 	pwcopy.pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
 	pw = &pwcopy;
diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
index 4926ff8a..7769046f 100644
--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.12 2000/07/07 03:55:03 todd Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.13 2000/08/20 18:42:40 millert Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/dsa.h>
 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
@@ -411,6 +411,9 @@ auth_set_user(char *u, char *s)
 		copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd);
 		copy->pw_uid = pw->pw_uid;
 		copy->pw_gid = pw->pw_gid;
+#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
+		copy->pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class);
+#endif
 		copy->pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
 		copy->pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
 		authctxt->valid = 1;
diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c
index a34e111a..d9427d37 100644
--- a/authfd.c
+++ b/authfd.c
@@ -11,10 +11,13 @@
  *
  * Functions for connecting the local authentication agent.
  *
+ * SSH2 implementation,
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.24 2000/08/15 19:20:46 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.25 2000/08/19 21:34:42 markus Exp $");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "rsa.h"
@@ -29,6 +32,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.24 2000/08/15 19:20:46 markus Exp $");
 #include "key.h"
 #include "authfd.h"
 #include "kex.h"
+#include "dsa.h"
 
 /* helper */
 int	decode_reply(int type);
@@ -71,8 +75,7 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket()
 }
 
 int
-ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
-    Buffer *request, Buffer *reply)
+ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply)
 {
 	int l, len;
 	char buf[1024];
@@ -162,7 +165,6 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection()
 
 	auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
 	auth->fd = sock;
-	buffer_init(&auth->packet);
 	buffer_init(&auth->identities);
 	auth->howmany = 0;
 
@@ -175,46 +177,57 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection()
  */
 
 void
-ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *ac)
+ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *auth)
 {
-	buffer_free(&ac->packet);
-	buffer_free(&ac->identities);
-	close(ac->fd);
-	xfree(ac);
+	buffer_free(&auth->identities);
+	close(auth->fd);
+	xfree(auth);
 }
 
 /*
  * Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent.
- * Returns true if an identity is available, 0 otherwise.
- * The caller must initialize the integers before the call, and free the
- * comment after a successful call (before calling ssh_get_next_identity).
  */
 
-int
-ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
-    BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment)
+Key *
+ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
 {
+	int type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0;
 	Buffer request;
-	int type;
+
+	switch(version){
+	case 1:
+		code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES;
+		code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		code1 = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES;
+		code2 = SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return NULL;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the
 	 * identities it can represent.
 	 */
 	buffer_init(&request);
-	buffer_put_char(&request, SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES);
+	buffer_put_char(&request, code1);
 
 	buffer_clear(&auth->identities);
 	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &request, &auth->identities) == 0) {
 		buffer_free(&request);
-		return 0;
+		return NULL;
 	}
 	buffer_free(&request);
 
 	/* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */
 	type = buffer_get_char(&auth->identities);
-	if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)
+	if (type == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) {
+		return NULL;
+	} else if (type != code2) {
 		fatal("Bad authentication reply message type: %d", type);
+	}
 
 	/* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */
 	auth->howmany = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
@@ -223,43 +236,49 @@ ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
 		    auth->howmany);
 
 	/* Return the first entry (if any). */
-	return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, e, n, comment);
+	return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, comment, version);
 }
 
-/*
- * Returns the next authentication identity for the agent.  Other functions
- * can be called between this and ssh_get_first_identity or two calls of this
- * function.  This returns 0 if there are no more identities.  The caller
- * must free comment after a successful return.
- */
-
-int
-ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
-    BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment)
+Key *
+ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version)
 {
 	unsigned int bits;
+	unsigned char *blob;
+	unsigned int blen;
+	Key *key = NULL;
 
 	/* Return failure if no more entries. */
 	if (auth->howmany <= 0)
-		return 0;
+		return NULL;
 
 	/*
 	 * Get the next entry from the packet.  These will abort with a fatal
 	 * error if the packet is too short or contains corrupt data.
 	 */
-	bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
-	buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, e);
-	buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, n);
-	*comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
-
-	if (bits != BN_num_bits(n))
-		log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
-		    BN_num_bits(n), bits);
-
+	switch(version){
+	case 1:
+		key = key_new(KEY_RSA);
+		bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
+		buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->e);
+		buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n);
+		*comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
+		if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))
+			log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
+			    BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		blob = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, &blen);
+		*comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
+		key = dsa_key_from_blob(blob, blen);
+		xfree(blob);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return NULL;
+		break;
+	}
 	/* Decrement the number of remaining entries. */
 	auth->howmany--;
-
-	return 1;
+	return key;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -272,7 +291,7 @@ ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
 
 int
 ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
-    BIGNUM* e, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *challenge,
+    Key* key, BIGNUM *challenge,
     unsigned char session_id[16],
     unsigned int response_type,
     unsigned char response[16])
@@ -282,15 +301,17 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
 	int i;
 	int type;
 
-	if (response_type == 0)
-		fatal("Compatibility with ssh protocol version "
-		    "1.0 no longer supported.");
-
+	if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
+		return 0;
+	if (response_type == 0) {
+		log("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported.");
+		return 0;
+	}
 	buffer_init(&buffer);
 	buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE);
-	buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(n));
-	buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, e);
-	buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, n);
+	buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
+	buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->e);
+	buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->n);
 	buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, challenge);
 	buffer_append(&buffer, (char *) session_id, 16);
 	buffer_put_int(&buffer, response_type);
@@ -318,6 +339,45 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
 	return success;
 }
 
+/* ask agent to sign data, returns -1 on error, 0 on success */
+int
+ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
+    Key *key,
+    unsigned char **sigp, int *lenp,
+    unsigned char *data, int datalen)
+{
+	Buffer msg;
+	unsigned char *blob;
+	unsigned int blen;
+	int type;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	if (dsa_make_key_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST);
+	buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
+	buffer_put_string(&msg, data, datalen);
+	xfree(blob);
+
+	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+		buffer_free(&msg);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+	if (type == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) {
+		log("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key.");
+	} else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
+		fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type);
+	} else {
+		ret = 0;
+		*sigp = buffer_get_string(&msg, lenp);
+	}
+	buffer_free(&msg);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /* Encode key for a message to the agent. */
 
 void
@@ -358,29 +418,29 @@ ssh_encode_identity_dsa(Buffer *b, DSA *key, const char *comment)
 int
 ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment)
 {
-	Buffer buffer;
+	Buffer msg;
 	int type;
 
-	buffer_init(&buffer);
+	buffer_init(&msg);
 
 	switch (key->type) {
 	case KEY_RSA:
-		ssh_encode_identity_rsa(&buffer, key->rsa, comment);
+		ssh_encode_identity_rsa(&msg, key->rsa, comment);
 		break;
 	case KEY_DSA:
-		ssh_encode_identity_dsa(&buffer, key->dsa, comment);
+		ssh_encode_identity_dsa(&msg, key->dsa, comment);
 		break;
 	default:
-		buffer_free(&buffer);
+		buffer_free(&msg);
 		return 0;
 		break;
 	}
-	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) {
-		buffer_free(&buffer);
+	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+		buffer_free(&msg);
 		return 0;
 	}
-	type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
-	buffer_free(&buffer);
+	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
 	return decode_reply(type);
 }
 
@@ -390,23 +450,35 @@ ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment)
  */
 
 int
-ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, RSA *key)
+ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key)
 {
-	Buffer buffer;
+	Buffer msg;
 	int type;
-
-	buffer_init(&buffer);
-	buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY);
-	buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->n));
-	buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->e);
-	buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->n);
-
-	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) {
-		buffer_free(&buffer);
+	unsigned char *blob;
+	unsigned int blen;
+
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+
+	if (key->type == KEY_RSA) {
+		buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY);
+		buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
+		buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->e);
+		buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->n);
+	} else if (key->type == KEY_DSA) {
+		dsa_make_key_blob(key, &blob, &blen);
+		buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY);
+		buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
+		xfree(blob);
+	} else {
+		buffer_free(&msg);
 		return 0;
 	}
-	type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
-	buffer_free(&buffer);
+	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+		buffer_free(&msg);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
 	return decode_reply(type);
 }
 
@@ -416,20 +488,23 @@ ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, RSA *key)
  */
 
 int
-ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth)
+ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version)
 {
-	Buffer buffer;
+	Buffer msg;
 	int type;
+	int code = (version==1) ?
+		SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES :
+		SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES;
 
-	buffer_init(&buffer);
-	buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES);
+	buffer_init(&msg);
+	buffer_put_char(&msg, code);
 
-	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) {
-		buffer_free(&buffer);
+	if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+		buffer_free(&msg);
 		return 0;
 	}
-	type = buffer_get_char(&buffer);
-	buffer_free(&buffer);
+	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+	buffer_free(&msg);
 	return decode_reply(type);
 }
 
diff --git a/authfd.h b/authfd.h
index 14b9bee9..5819b913 100644
--- a/authfd.h
+++ b/authfd.h
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  *
  */
 
-/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.9 2000/07/16 08:27:21 markus Exp $"); */
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.10 2000/08/19 21:34:43 markus Exp $"); */
 
 #ifndef AUTHFD_H
 #define AUTHFD_H
@@ -35,18 +35,16 @@
 #define SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER		12
 #define SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST		13
 #define SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE		14
-#define SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE			SSH_AGENT_FAILURE
-#define SSH2_AGENT_SUCCESS			SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS
 #define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY		17
 #define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY		18
 #define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES	19
 
 typedef struct {
 	int     fd;
-	Buffer  packet;
 	Buffer  identities;
 	int     howmany;
 }       AuthenticationConnection;
+
 /* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */
 int     ssh_get_authentication_socket();
 
@@ -69,44 +67,48 @@ AuthenticationConnection *ssh_get_authentication_connection();
  * Closes the connection to the authentication agent and frees any associated
  * memory.
  */
-void    ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection * ac);
+void    ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *auth);
 
 /*
- * Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent. Returns true
- * if an identity is available, 0 otherwise. The caller must initialize the
- * integers before the call, and free the comment after a successful call
- * (before calling ssh_get_next_identity).
+ * Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent or NULL if
+ * no identies are available. Caller must free comment and key.
+ * Note that you cannot mix calls with different versions.
  */
-int
-ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection * connection,
-    BIGNUM * e, BIGNUM * n, char **comment);
+Key	*ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version);
 
 /*
  * Returns the next authentication identity for the agent.  Other functions
  * can be called between this and ssh_get_first_identity or two calls of this
- * function.  This returns 0 if there are no more identities.  The caller
- * must free comment after a successful return.
+ * function.  This returns NULL if there are no more identities.  The caller
+ * must free key and comment after a successful return.
  */
-int
-ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection * connection,
-    BIGNUM * e, BIGNUM * n, char **comment);
+Key	*ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version);
 
-/* Requests the agent to decrypt the given challenge.  Returns true if
-   the agent claims it was able to decrypt it. */
+/*
+ * Requests the agent to decrypt the given challenge.  Returns true if the
+ * agent claims it was able to decrypt it.
+ */
 int
-ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection * auth,
-    BIGNUM * e, BIGNUM * n, BIGNUM * challenge,
+ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
+    Key *key, BIGNUM * challenge,
     unsigned char session_id[16],
     unsigned int response_type,
     unsigned char response[16]);
 
+/* Requests the agent to sign data using key */
+int
+ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
+    Key *key,
+    unsigned char **sigp, int *lenp,
+    unsigned char *data, int datalen);
+
 /*
  * Adds an identity to the authentication server.  This call is not meant to
  * be used by normal applications.  This returns true if the identity was
  * successfully added.
  */
 int
-ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection * connection, Key *key,
+ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key,
     const char *comment);
 
 /*
@@ -114,16 +116,13 @@ ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection * connection, Key *key,
  * meant to be used by normal applications.  This returns true if the
  * identity was successfully added.
  */
-int     ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection * connection, RSA * key);
+int     ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key);
 
 /*
  * Removes all identities from the authentication agent.  This call is not
  * meant to be used by normal applications.  This returns true if the
  * operation was successful.
  */
-int     ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection * connection);
-
-/* Closes the connection to the authentication agent. */
-void    ssh_close_authentication(AuthenticationConnection * connection);
+int     ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version);
 
 #endif				/* AUTHFD_H */
diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
index ea395293..c77f6b96 100644
--- a/channels.c
+++ b/channels.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.64 2000/07/16 08:27:21 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.66 2000/08/19 21:55:51 markus Exp $");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "packet.h"
@@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
 	c->cb_arg = NULL;
 	c->cb_event = 0;
 	c->dettach_user = NULL;
+	c->input_filter = NULL;
 	debug("channel %d: new [%s]", found, remote_name);
 	return found;
 }
@@ -665,7 +666,14 @@ channel_handle_rfd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 			}
 			return -1;
 		}
-		buffer_append(&c->input, buf, len);
+		if(c->input_filter != NULL) {
+			if (c->input_filter(c, buf, len) == -1) {
+				debug("filter stops channel %d", c->self);
+				chan_read_failed(c);
+			}
+		} else {
+			buffer_append(&c->input, buf, len);
+		}
 	}
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -2309,6 +2317,16 @@ channel_cancel_cleanup(int id)
 	}
 	c->dettach_user = NULL;
 }
+void   
+channel_register_filter(int id, channel_filter_fn *fn)
+{
+	Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		log("channel_register_filter: %d: bad id", id);
+		return;
+	}
+	c->input_filter = fn;
+}
 
 void
 channel_set_fds(int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, int extusage)
diff --git a/channels.h b/channels.h
index 9629124b..9acdf581 100644
--- a/channels.h
+++ b/channels.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.14 2000/06/20 01:39:40 markus Exp $"); */
+/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.16 2000/08/19 21:55:51 markus Exp $"); */
 
 #ifndef CHANNELS_H
 #define CHANNELS_H
@@ -21,9 +21,13 @@
  * Data structure for channel data.  This is iniailized in channel_allocate
  * and cleared in channel_free.
  */
+struct Channel;
+typedef struct Channel Channel;
+
 typedef void channel_callback_fn(int id, void *arg);
+typedef int channel_filter_fn(struct Channel *c, char *buf, int len);
 
-typedef struct Channel {
+struct Channel {
 	int     type;		/* channel type/state */
 	int     self;		/* my own channel identifier */
 	int     remote_id;	/* channel identifier for remote peer */
@@ -61,7 +65,10 @@ typedef struct Channel {
 	void	*cb_arg;
 	int	cb_event;
 	channel_callback_fn	*d