diff options
author | Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> | 2000-08-23 10:46:23 +1000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> | 2000-08-23 10:46:23 +1000 |
commit | ad833b3e65c1887674714d514eb818d862bb499a (patch) | |
tree | 16fa75fe42aede072c5d3edac562c2870d1bb0e5 | |
parent | b078567bf5de1dcf12d265d98acb4dc9eba8b325 (diff) |
- (djm) Pick up LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment or PATH if not set by headers
- (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates:
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:07:23
[ssh.c]
accept remsh as a valid name as well; roman@buildpoint.com
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:17:13
[deattack.c crc32.c packet.c]
rename crc32() to ssh_crc32() to avoid zlib name clash. do not move to
libz crc32 function yet, because it has ugly "long"'s in it;
oneill@cs.sfu.ca
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:26:08
[scp.1 scp.c]
-S prog support; tv@debian.org
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:50:07
[scp.c]
knf
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:57:33
[log-client.c]
shorten
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 12:48:11
[channels.c channels.h clientloop.c ssh.c ssh.h]
support for ~. in ssh2
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:29:40
[crc32.h]
proper prototype
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:34:44
[authfd.c authfd.h key.c key.h ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1]
[ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c Makefile]
[fingerprint.c fingerprint.h]
add SSH2/DSA support to the agent and some other DSA related cleanups.
(note that we cannot talk to ssh.com's ssh2 agents)
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:55:52
[channels.c channels.h clientloop.c]
more ~ support for ssh2
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 16:21:19
[clientloop.c]
oops
- millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:25:53
[session.c]
We have to stash the result of get_remote_name_or_ip() before we
close our socket or getpeername() will get EBADF and the process
will exit. Only a problem for "UseLogin yes".
- millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:30:59
[session.c]
Only check /etc/nologin if "UseLogin no" since login(1) may have its
own policy on determining who is allowed to login when /etc/nologin
is present. Also use the _PATH_NOLOGIN define.
- millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:42:43
[auth1.c auth2.c session.c ssh.c]
Add calls to setusercontext() and login_get*(). We basically call
setusercontext() in most places where previously we did a setlogin().
Add default login.conf file and put root in the "daemon" login class.
- millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/21 10:23:31
[session.c]
Fix incorrect PATH setting; noted by Markus.
-rw-r--r-- | ChangeLog | 55 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Makefile.in | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | TODO | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | acconfig.h | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | auth1.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | auth2.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | authfd.c | 235 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | authfd.h | 53 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | channels.c | 22 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | channels.h | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | clientloop.c | 340 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | configure.in | 41 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crc32.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crc32.h | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | deattack.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | defines.h | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fingerprint.c | 69 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fingerprint.h | 34 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | key.c | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | log-client.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | packet.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | scp.1 | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | scp.c | 137 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | session.c | 120 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssh-add.1 | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssh-add.c | 81 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssh-agent.1 | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssh-agent.c | 514 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssh-keygen.c | 19 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssh.c | 28 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | ssh.h | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sshconnect1.c | 40 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | sshconnect2.c | 78 |
33 files changed, 1178 insertions, 811 deletions
@@ -3,6 +3,61 @@ Avoids "scp never exits" problem. Reports from Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> and Tamito KAJIYAMA <kajiyama@grad.sccs.chukyo-u.ac.jp> + - (djm) Pick up LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment or PATH if not set by headers + - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates: + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:07:23 + [ssh.c] + accept remsh as a valid name as well; roman@buildpoint.com + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:17:13 + [deattack.c crc32.c packet.c] + rename crc32() to ssh_crc32() to avoid zlib name clash. do not move to + libz crc32 function yet, because it has ugly "long"'s in it; + oneill@cs.sfu.ca + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:26:08 + [scp.1 scp.c] + -S prog support; tv@debian.org + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:50:07 + [scp.c] + knf + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:57:33 + [log-client.c] + shorten + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 12:48:11 + [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c ssh.c ssh.h] + support for ~. in ssh2 + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:29:40 + [crc32.h] + proper prototype + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:34:44 + [authfd.c authfd.h key.c key.h ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1] + [ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c Makefile] + [fingerprint.c fingerprint.h] + add SSH2/DSA support to the agent and some other DSA related cleanups. + (note that we cannot talk to ssh.com's ssh2 agents) + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:55:52 + [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c] + more ~ support for ssh2 + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 16:21:19 + [clientloop.c] + oops + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:25:53 + [session.c] + We have to stash the result of get_remote_name_or_ip() before we + close our socket or getpeername() will get EBADF and the process + will exit. Only a problem for "UseLogin yes". + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:30:59 + [session.c] + Only check /etc/nologin if "UseLogin no" since login(1) may have its + own policy on determining who is allowed to login when /etc/nologin + is present. Also use the _PATH_NOLOGIN define. + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:42:43 + [auth1.c auth2.c session.c ssh.c] + Add calls to setusercontext() and login_get*(). We basically call + setusercontext() in most places where previously we did a setlogin(). + Add default login.conf file and put root in the "daemon" login class. + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/21 10:23:31 + [session.c] + Fix incorrect PATH setting; noted by Markus. 20000818 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS changes: diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in index ff34c493..4ceef704 100644 --- a/Makefile.in +++ b/Makefile.in @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS=@INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS@ TARGETS=ssh sshd ssh-add ssh-keygen ssh-agent scp $(EXTRA_TARGETS) -LIBSSH_OBJS=atomicio.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o buffer.o canohost.o channels.o cipher.o compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o dispatch.o dsa.o fingerprint.o hmac.o hostfile.o key.o kex.o log.o match.o mpaux.o nchan.o packet.o radix.o entropy.o readpass.o rsa.o tildexpand.o ttymodes.o uidswap.o util.o uuencode.o xmalloc.o +LIBSSH_OBJS=atomicio.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o buffer.o canohost.o channels.o cipher.o compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o dispatch.o dsa.o hmac.o hostfile.o key.o kex.o log.o match.o mpaux.o nchan.o packet.o radix.o entropy.o readpass.o rsa.o tildexpand.o ttymodes.o uidswap.o util.o uuencode.o xmalloc.o LIBOPENBSD_COMPAT_OBJS=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-base64.o bsd-bindresvport.o bsd-daemon.o bsd-inet_aton.o bsd-inet_ntoa.o bsd-misc.o bsd-mktemp.o bsd-rresvport.o bsd-setenv.o bsd-sigaction.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-strlcat.o bsd-strlcpy.o bsd-strsep.o fake-getaddrinfo.o fake-getnameinfo.o next-posix.o @@ -14,3 +14,5 @@ underlying shell. - utmp/wtmp logging does not work on NeXT + +- Complete Tru64 SIA support @@ -6,6 +6,13 @@ @TOP@ +/* If your header files don't define LOGIN_PROGRAM, then use this (detected) */ +/* from environment and PATH */ +#undef LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK + +/* Define if your password has a pw_class field */ +#undef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD + /* Define if your socketpair() has bugs */ #undef USE_PIPES @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.2 2000/04/29 18:11:52 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.3 2000/08/20 18:42:40 millert Exp $"); #include "xmalloc.h" #include "rsa.h" @@ -480,6 +480,9 @@ do_authentication() pwcopy.pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd); pwcopy.pw_uid = pw->pw_uid; pwcopy.pw_gid = pw->pw_gid; +#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD + pwcopy.pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class); +#endif pwcopy.pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir); pwcopy.pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell); pw = &pwcopy; @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.12 2000/07/07 03:55:03 todd Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.13 2000/08/20 18:42:40 millert Exp $"); #include <openssl/dsa.h> #include <openssl/rsa.h> @@ -411,6 +411,9 @@ auth_set_user(char *u, char *s) copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd); copy->pw_uid = pw->pw_uid; copy->pw_gid = pw->pw_gid; +#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD + copy->pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class); +#endif copy->pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir); copy->pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell); authctxt->valid = 1; @@ -11,10 +11,13 @@ * * Functions for connecting the local authentication agent. * + * SSH2 implementation, + * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.24 2000/08/15 19:20:46 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.25 2000/08/19 21:34:42 markus Exp $"); #include "ssh.h" #include "rsa.h" @@ -29,6 +32,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.24 2000/08/15 19:20:46 markus Exp $"); #include "key.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "kex.h" +#include "dsa.h" /* helper */ int decode_reply(int type); @@ -71,8 +75,7 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket() } int -ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, - Buffer *request, Buffer *reply) +ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply) { int l, len; char buf[1024]; @@ -162,7 +165,6 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection() auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth)); auth->fd = sock; - buffer_init(&auth->packet); buffer_init(&auth->identities); auth->howmany = 0; @@ -175,46 +177,57 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection() */ void -ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *ac) +ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *auth) { - buffer_free(&ac->packet); - buffer_free(&ac->identities); - close(ac->fd); - xfree(ac); + buffer_free(&auth->identities); + close(auth->fd); + xfree(auth); } /* * Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent. - * Returns true if an identity is available, 0 otherwise. - * The caller must initialize the integers before the call, and free the - * comment after a successful call (before calling ssh_get_next_identity). */ -int -ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, - BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment) +Key * +ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version) { + int type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0; Buffer request; - int type; + + switch(version){ + case 1: + code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES; + code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER; + break; + case 2: + code1 = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES; + code2 = SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER; + break; + default: + return NULL; + } /* * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the * identities it can represent. */ buffer_init(&request); - buffer_put_char(&request, SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES); + buffer_put_char(&request, code1); buffer_clear(&auth->identities); if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &request, &auth->identities) == 0) { buffer_free(&request); - return 0; + return NULL; } buffer_free(&request); /* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */ type = buffer_get_char(&auth->identities); - if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) + if (type == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) { + return NULL; + } else if (type != code2) { fatal("Bad authentication reply message type: %d", type); + } /* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */ auth->howmany = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities); @@ -223,43 +236,49 @@ ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, auth->howmany); /* Return the first entry (if any). */ - return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, e, n, comment); + return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, comment, version); } -/* - * Returns the next authentication identity for the agent. Other functions - * can be called between this and ssh_get_first_identity or two calls of this - * function. This returns 0 if there are no more identities. The caller - * must free comment after a successful return. - */ - -int -ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, - BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *n, char **comment) +Key * +ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version) { unsigned int bits; + unsigned char *blob; + unsigned int blen; + Key *key = NULL; /* Return failure if no more entries. */ if (auth->howmany <= 0) - return 0; + return NULL; /* * Get the next entry from the packet. These will abort with a fatal * error if the packet is too short or contains corrupt data. */ - bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities); - buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, e); - buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, n); - *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL); - - if (bits != BN_num_bits(n)) - log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u", - BN_num_bits(n), bits); - + switch(version){ + case 1: + key = key_new(KEY_RSA); + bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities); + buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->e); + buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n); + *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL); + if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) + log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u", + BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits); + break; + case 2: + blob = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, &blen); + *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL); + key = dsa_key_from_blob(blob, blen); + xfree(blob); + break; + default: + return NULL; + break; + } /* Decrement the number of remaining entries. */ auth->howmany--; - - return 1; + return key; } /* @@ -272,7 +291,7 @@ ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth, - BIGNUM* e, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *challenge, + Key* key, BIGNUM *challenge, unsigned char session_id[16], unsigned int response_type, unsigned char response[16]) @@ -282,15 +301,17 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int i; int type; - if (response_type == 0) - fatal("Compatibility with ssh protocol version " - "1.0 no longer supported."); - + if (key->type != KEY_RSA) + return 0; + if (response_type == 0) { + log("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported."); + return 0; + } buffer_init(&buffer); buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE); - buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(n)); - buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, e); - buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, n); + buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)); + buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->e); + buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->n); buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, challenge); buffer_append(&buffer, (char *) session_id, 16); buffer_put_int(&buffer, response_type); @@ -318,6 +339,45 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth, return success; } +/* ask agent to sign data, returns -1 on error, 0 on success */ +int +ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth, + Key *key, + unsigned char **sigp, int *lenp, + unsigned char *data, int datalen) +{ + Buffer msg; + unsigned char *blob; + unsigned int blen; + int type; + int ret = -1; + + if (dsa_make_key_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0) + return -1; + + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST); + buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); + buffer_put_string(&msg, data, datalen); + xfree(blob); + + if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { + buffer_free(&msg); + return -1; + } + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + if (type == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) { + log("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key."); + } else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) { + fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type); + } else { + ret = 0; + *sigp = buffer_get_string(&msg, lenp); + } + buffer_free(&msg); + return ret; +} + /* Encode key for a message to the agent. */ void @@ -358,29 +418,29 @@ ssh_encode_identity_dsa(Buffer *b, DSA *key, const char *comment) int ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment) { - Buffer buffer; + Buffer msg; int type; - buffer_init(&buffer); + buffer_init(&msg); switch (key->type) { case KEY_RSA: - ssh_encode_identity_rsa(&buffer, key->rsa, comment); + ssh_encode_identity_rsa(&msg, key->rsa, comment); break; case KEY_DSA: - ssh_encode_identity_dsa(&buffer, key->dsa, comment); + ssh_encode_identity_dsa(&msg, key->dsa, comment); break; default: - buffer_free(&buffer); + buffer_free(&msg); return 0; break; } - if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) { - buffer_free(&buffer); + if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { + buffer_free(&msg); return 0; } - type = buffer_get_char(&buffer); - buffer_free(&buffer); + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); return decode_reply(type); } @@ -390,23 +450,35 @@ ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment) */ int -ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, RSA *key) +ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key) { - Buffer buffer; + Buffer msg; int type; - - buffer_init(&buffer); - buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY); - buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->n)); - buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->e); - buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->n); - - if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) { - buffer_free(&buffer); + unsigned char *blob; + unsigned int blen; + + buffer_init(&msg); + + if (key->type == KEY_RSA) { + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY); + buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)); + buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->e); + buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->n); + } else if (key->type == KEY_DSA) { + dsa_make_key_blob(key, &blob, &blen); + buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY); + buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); + xfree(blob); + } else { + buffer_free(&msg); return 0; } - type = buffer_get_char(&buffer); - buffer_free(&buffer); + if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { + buffer_free(&msg); + return 0; + } + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); return decode_reply(type); } @@ -416,20 +488,23 @@ ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, RSA *key) */ int -ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth) +ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version) { - Buffer buffer; + Buffer msg; int type; + int code = (version==1) ? + SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES : + SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES; - buffer_init(&buffer); - buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES); + buffer_init(&msg); + buffer_put_char(&msg, code); - if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) { - buffer_free(&buffer); + if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { + buffer_free(&msg); return 0; } - type = buffer_get_char(&buffer); - buffer_free(&buffer); + type = buffer_get_char(&msg); + buffer_free(&msg); return decode_reply(type); } @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ * */ -/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.9 2000/07/16 08:27:21 markus Exp $"); */ +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.10 2000/08/19 21:34:43 markus Exp $"); */ #ifndef AUTHFD_H #define AUTHFD_H @@ -35,18 +35,16 @@ #define SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12 #define SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST 13 #define SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE 14 -#define SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE SSH_AGENT_FAILURE -#define SSH2_AGENT_SUCCESS SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS #define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY 17 #define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18 #define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19 typedef struct { int fd; - Buffer packet; Buffer identities; int howmany; } AuthenticationConnection; + /* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */ int ssh_get_authentication_socket(); @@ -69,44 +67,48 @@ AuthenticationConnection *ssh_get_authentication_connection(); * Closes the connection to the authentication agent and frees any associated * memory. */ -void ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection * ac); +void ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *auth); /* - * Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent. Returns true - * if an identity is available, 0 otherwise. The caller must initialize the - * integers before the call, and free the comment after a successful call - * (before calling ssh_get_next_identity). + * Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent or NULL if + * no identies are available. Caller must free comment and key. + * Note that you cannot mix calls with different versions. */ -int -ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection * connection, - BIGNUM * e, BIGNUM * n, char **comment); +Key *ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version); /* * Returns the next authentication identity for the agent. Other functions * can be called between this and ssh_get_first_identity or two calls of this - * function. This returns 0 if there are no more identities. The caller - * must free comment after a successful return. + * function. This returns NULL if there are no more identities. The caller + * must free key and comment after a successful return. */ -int -ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection * connection, - BIGNUM * e, BIGNUM * n, char **comment); +Key *ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version); -/* Requests the agent to decrypt the given challenge. Returns true if - the agent claims it was able to decrypt it. */ +/* + * Requests the agent to decrypt the given challenge. Returns true if the + * agent claims it was able to decrypt it. + */ int -ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection * auth, - BIGNUM * e, BIGNUM * n, BIGNUM * challenge, +ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth, + Key *key, BIGNUM * challenge, unsigned char session_id[16], unsigned int response_type, unsigned char response[16]); +/* Requests the agent to sign data using key */ +int +ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth, + Key *key, + unsigned char **sigp, int *lenp, + unsigned char *data, int datalen); + /* * Adds an identity to the authentication server. This call is not meant to * be used by normal applications. This returns true if the identity was * successfully added. */ int -ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection * connection, Key *key, +ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment); /* @@ -114,16 +116,13 @@ ssh_add_identity(AuthenticationConnection * connection, Key *key, * meant to be used by normal applications. This returns true if the * identity was successfully added. */ -int ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection * connection, RSA * key); +int ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key); /* * Removes all identities from the authentication agent. This call is not * meant to be used by normal applications. This returns true if the * operation was successful. */ -int ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection * connection); - -/* Closes the connection to the authentication agent. */ -void ssh_close_authentication(AuthenticationConnection * connection); +int ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version); #endif /* AUTHFD_H */ @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ */ #include "includes.h" -RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.64 2000/07/16 08:27:21 markus Exp $"); +RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.66 2000/08/19 21:55:51 markus Exp $"); #include "ssh.h" #include "packet.h" @@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, c->cb_arg = NULL; c->cb_event = 0; c->dettach_user = NULL; + c->input_filter = NULL; debug("channel %d: new [%s]", found, remote_name); return found; } @@ -665,7 +666,14 @@ channel_handle_rfd(Channel *c, fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset) } return -1; } - buffer_append(&c->input, buf, len); + if(c->input_filter != NULL) { + if (c->input_filter(c, buf, len) == -1) { + debug("filter stops channel %d", c->self); + chan_read_failed(c); + } + } else { + buffer_append(&c->input, buf, len); + } } return 1; } @@ -2309,6 +2317,16 @@ channel_cancel_cleanup(int id) } c->dettach_user = NULL; } +void +channel_register_filter(int id, channel_filter_fn *fn) +{ + Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); + if (c == NULL) { + log("channel_register_filter: %d: bad id", id); + return; + } + c->input_filter = fn; +} void channel_set_fds(int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, int extusage) @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.14 2000/06/20 01:39:40 markus Exp $"); */ +/* RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.16 2000/08/19 21:55:51 markus Exp $"); */ #ifndef CHANNELS_H #define CHANNELS_H @@ -21,9 +21,13 @@ * Data structure for channel data. This is iniailized in channel_allocate * and cleared in channel_free. */ +struct Channel; +typedef struct Channel Channel; + typedef void channel_callback_fn(int id, void *arg); +typedef int channel_filter_fn(struct Channel *c, char *buf, int len); -typedef struct Channel { +struct Channel { int type; /* channel type/state */ int self; /* my own channel identifier */ int remote_id; /* channel identifier for remote peer */ @@ -61,7 +65,10 @@ typedef struct Channel { void *cb_arg; int cb_event; |