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authorDaniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>2019-05-26 18:15:55 -0400
committerDavid Bremner <david@tethera.net>2019-05-29 08:02:45 -0300
commita6b0772b60d9191fcc291358eec3d78bfea31f1c (patch)
treeecaecc73958232fb50fd30dae97dc59afbe2a5ca /util
parent80728a95e6fd8bd1c4a4f8dd8040984ab5c4b04a (diff)
util/crypto: add information about the payload part
When walking the MIME tree, if we discover that we are at the cryptographic payload, then we would like to record at least the Subject header of the current MIME part. In the future, we might want to record many other headers as well, but for now we will stick with just the Subject. See https://dkg.fifthhorseman.net/blog/e-mail-cryptography.html#cryptographic-envelope for more description of the Cryptographic Payload vs. the Cryptographic Envelope. Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'util')
-rw-r--r--util/crypto.c37
-rw-r--r--util/crypto.h5
2 files changed, 42 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/util/crypto.c b/util/crypto.c
index 3f8ac25a..9e185e03 100644
--- a/util/crypto.c
+++ b/util/crypto.c
@@ -90,6 +90,8 @@ _notmuch_message_crypto_destructor (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto)
return 0;
if (msg_crypto->sig_list)
g_object_unref (msg_crypto->sig_list);
+ if (msg_crypto->payload_subject)
+ talloc_free (msg_crypto->payload_subject);
return 0;
}
@@ -133,6 +135,10 @@ _notmuch_message_crypto_potential_sig_list (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypt
notmuch_status_t
_notmuch_message_crypto_potential_payload (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto, GMimeObject *payload, GMimeObject *parent, int childnum)
{
+ const char *protected_headers = NULL;
+ const char *forwarded = NULL;
+ const char *subject = NULL;
+
if (!msg_crypto || !payload)
return NOTMUCH_STATUS_NULL_POINTER;
@@ -156,6 +162,37 @@ _notmuch_message_crypto_potential_payload (_notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto
msg_crypto->payload_encountered = true;
+ /* don't bother recording anything if there is no cryptographic
+ * envelope: */
+ if ((msg_crypto->decryption_status != NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_FULL) &&
+ (msg_crypto->sig_list == NULL))
+ return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+
+ /* Verify that this payload has headers that are intended to be
+ * exported to the larger message: */
+
+ /* Consider a payload that uses Alexei Melinkov's forwarded="no" for
+ * message/global or message/rfc822:
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-melnikov-smime-header-signing-05#section-4 */
+ forwarded = g_mime_object_get_content_type_parameter (payload, "forwarded");
+ if (GMIME_IS_MESSAGE_PART (payload) && forwarded && strcmp (forwarded, "no") == 0) {
+ GMimeMessage *message = g_mime_message_part_get_message (GMIME_MESSAGE_PART (payload));
+ subject = g_mime_message_get_subject (message);
+ /* FIXME: handle more than just Subject: at some point */
+ } else {
+ /* Consider "memoryhole"-style protected headers as practiced by Enigmail and K-9 */
+ protected_headers = g_mime_object_get_content_type_parameter (payload, "protected-headers");
+ if (protected_headers && strcasecmp("v1", protected_headers) == 0)
+ subject = g_mime_object_get_header (payload, "Subject");
+ /* FIXME: handle more than just Subject: at some point */
+ }
+
+ if (subject) {
+ if (msg_crypto->payload_subject)
+ talloc_free (msg_crypto->payload_subject);
+ msg_crypto->payload_subject = talloc_strdup (msg_crypto, subject);
+ }
+
return NOTMUCH_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
diff --git a/util/crypto.h b/util/crypto.h
index c6fa7f4b..fdbb5da5 100644
--- a/util/crypto.h
+++ b/util/crypto.h
@@ -59,6 +59,11 @@ typedef struct _notmuch_message_crypto {
* is not part of the cryptographic envelope) */
bool payload_encountered;
+ /* the value of any "Subject:" header in the cryptographic payload
+ * (the top level part within the crypto envelope), converted to
+ * UTF-8 */
+ char * payload_subject;
+
/* if both signed and encrypted, was the signature encrypted? */
bool signature_encrypted;
} _notmuch_message_crypto_t;