diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.4/0003-UBUNTU-SAUCE-apparmor-Add-the-ability-to-mediate-mou.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.4/0003-UBUNTU-SAUCE-apparmor-Add-the-ability-to-mediate-mou.patch | 957 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 957 deletions
diff --git a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.4/0003-UBUNTU-SAUCE-apparmor-Add-the-ability-to-mediate-mou.patch b/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.4/0003-UBUNTU-SAUCE-apparmor-Add-the-ability-to-mediate-mou.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 48b34343e0b8..000000000000 --- a/pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.4/0003-UBUNTU-SAUCE-apparmor-Add-the-ability-to-mediate-mou.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,957 +0,0 @@ -From a94d5e11c0484af59e5feebf144cc48c186892ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> -Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 10:58:05 -0700 -Subject: [PATCH 3/3] UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor: Add the ability to mediate - mount - -Add the ability for apparmor to do mediation of mount operations. Mount -rules require an updated apparmor_parser (2.8 series) for policy compilation. - -The basic form of the rules are. - - [audit] [deny] mount [conds]* [device] [ -> [conds] path], - [audit] [deny] remount [conds]* [path], - [audit] [deny] umount [conds]* [path], - [audit] [deny] pivotroot [oldroot=<value>] <path> - - remount is just a short cut for mount options=remount - - where [conds] can be - fstype=<expr> - options=<expr> - -Example mount commands - mount, # allow all mounts, but not umount or pivotroot - - mount fstype=procfs, # allow mounting procfs anywhere - - mount options=(bind, ro) /foo -> /bar, # readonly bind mount - - mount /dev/sda -> /mnt, - - mount /dev/sd** -> /mnt/**, - - mount fstype=overlayfs options=(rw,upperdir=/tmp/upper/,lowerdir=/) -> /mnt/ - - umount, - - umount /m*, - -See the apparmor userspace for full documentation - -Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> -Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com> ---- - security/apparmor/Makefile | 2 +- - security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 13 + - security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 + - security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +- - security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +- - security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 11 + - security/apparmor/include/domain.h | 2 + - security/apparmor/include/mount.h | 54 +++ - security/apparmor/lsm.c | 59 ++++ - security/apparmor/mount.c | 620 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ - 10 files changed, 767 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) - create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/mount.h - create mode 100644 security/apparmor/mount.c - -diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile -index 19daa85..63e0a4c 100644 ---- a/security/apparmor/Makefile -+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile -@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o - - apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \ - path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \ -- resource.o sid.o file.o net.o -+ resource.o sid.o file.o net.o mount.o - - clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h - -diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c -index c66315d..ff19009 100644 ---- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c -+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c -@@ -424,10 +424,23 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = { - { } - }; - -+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_mount[] = { -+ AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", "mount umount"), -+ { } -+}; -+ -+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_namespaces[] = { -+ AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("profile", 1), -+ AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root", 1), -+ { } -+}; -+ - static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = { - AA_FS_DIR("domain", aa_fs_entry_domain), - AA_FS_DIR("file", aa_fs_entry_file), - AA_FS_DIR("network", aa_fs_entry_network), -+ AA_FS_DIR("mount", aa_fs_entry_mount), -+ AA_FS_DIR("namespaces", aa_fs_entry_namespaces), - AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability", VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK), - AA_FS_DIR("rlimit", aa_fs_entry_rlimit), - { } -diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c -index cc3520d..b9f5ee9 100644 ---- a/security/apparmor/audit.c -+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c -@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ const char *const op_table[] = { - "file_mmap", - "file_mprotect", - -+ "pivotroot", -+ "mount", -+ "umount", -+ - "create", - "post_create", - "bind", -diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c -index 6327685..dfdc47b 100644 ---- a/security/apparmor/domain.c -+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c -@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name) - * - * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL) - */ --static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex) -+struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex) - { - struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL; - struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns; -diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h -index 40aedd9..e243d96 100644 ---- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h -+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h -@@ -29,8 +29,9 @@ - #define AA_CLASS_NET 4 - #define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS 5 - #define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN 6 -+#define AA_CLASS_MOUNT 7 - --#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_DOMAIN -+#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_MOUNT - - /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */ - extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; -diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h -index c1ff09c..7b90900c 100644 ---- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h -+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h -@@ -73,6 +73,10 @@ enum aa_ops { - OP_FMMAP, - OP_FMPROT, - -+ OP_PIVOTROOT, -+ OP_MOUNT, -+ OP_UMOUNT, -+ - OP_CREATE, - OP_POST_CREATE, - OP_BIND, -@@ -121,6 +125,13 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data { - unsigned long max; - } rlim; - struct { -+ const char *src_name; -+ const char *type; -+ const char *trans; -+ const char *data; -+ unsigned long flags; -+ } mnt; -+ struct { - const char *target; - u32 request; - u32 denied; -diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h -index de04464..a3f70c5 100644 ---- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h -+++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h -@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ struct aa_domain { - char **table; - }; - -+struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex); -+ - int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); - int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm); - void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); -diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..bc17a53 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h -@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ -+/* -+ * AppArmor security module -+ * -+ * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions. -+ * -+ * Copyright 2012 Canonical Ltd. -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as -+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the -+ * License. -+ */ -+ -+#ifndef __AA_MOUNT_H -+#define __AA_MOUNT_H -+ -+#include <linux/fs.h> -+#include <linux/path.h> -+ -+#include "domain.h" -+#include "policy.h" -+ -+/* mount perms */ -+#define AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT 0x01 -+#define AA_MAY_MOUNT 0x02 -+#define AA_MAY_UMOUNT 0x04 -+#define AA_AUDIT_DATA 0x40 -+#define AA_CONT_MATCH 0x40 -+ -+#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN) -+ -+int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, -+ unsigned long flags, void *data); -+ -+int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, -+ const char *old_name, unsigned long flags); -+ -+ -+int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, -+ unsigned long flags); -+ -+int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, -+ const char *old_name); -+ -+int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *dev_name, -+ struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags, -+ void *data); -+ -+int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags); -+ -+int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *old_path, -+ struct path *new_path); -+ -+#endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */ -diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c -index 3cde194..4512cc6 100644 ---- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c -+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c -@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ - #include "include/path.h" - #include "include/policy.h" - #include "include/procattr.h" -+#include "include/mount.h" - - /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */ - int apparmor_initialized __initdata; -@@ -512,6 +513,60 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, - !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0); - } - -+static int apparmor_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, char *type, -+ unsigned long flags, void *data) -+{ -+ struct aa_profile *profile; -+ int error = 0; -+ -+ /* Discard magic */ -+ if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL) -+ flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK; -+ -+ flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK; -+ -+ profile = __aa_current_profile(); -+ if (!unconfined(profile)) { -+ if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) -+ error = aa_remount(profile, path, flags, data); -+ else if (flags & MS_BIND) -+ error = aa_bind_mount(profile, path, dev_name, flags); -+ else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | -+ MS_UNBINDABLE)) -+ error = aa_mount_change_type(profile, path, flags); -+ else if (flags & MS_MOVE) -+ error = aa_move_mount(profile, path, dev_name); -+ else -+ error = aa_new_mount(profile, dev_name, path, type, -+ flags, data); -+ } -+ return error; -+} -+ -+static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) -+{ -+ struct aa_profile *profile; -+ int error = 0; -+ -+ profile = __aa_current_profile(); -+ if (!unconfined(profile)) -+ error = aa_umount(profile, mnt, flags); -+ -+ return error; -+} -+ -+static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path) -+{ -+ struct aa_profile *profile; -+ int error = 0; -+ -+ profile = __aa_current_profile(); -+ if (!unconfined(profile)) -+ error = aa_pivotroot(profile, old_path, new_path); -+ -+ return error; -+} -+ - static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, - char **value) - { -@@ -729,6 +784,10 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = { - .capget = apparmor_capget, - .capable = apparmor_capable, - -+ .sb_mount = apparmor_sb_mount, -+ .sb_umount = apparmor_sb_umount, -+ .sb_pivotroot = apparmor_sb_pivotroot, -+ - .path_link = apparmor_path_link, - .path_unlink = apparmor_path_unlink, - .path_symlink = apparmor_path_symlink, -diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c -new file mode 100644 -index 0000000..63d8493 ---- /dev/null -+++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c -@@ -0,0 +1,620 @@ -+/* -+ * AppArmor security module -+ * -+ * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files -+ * -+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE -+ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd. -+ * -+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or -+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as -+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the -+ * License. -+ */ -+ -+#include <linux/fs.h> -+#include <linux/mount.h> -+#include <linux/namei.h> -+ -+#include "include/apparmor.h" -+#include "include/audit.h" -+#include "include/context.h" -+#include "include/domain.h" -+#include "include/file.h" -+#include "include/match.h" -+#include "include/mount.h" -+#include "include/path.h" -+#include "include/policy.h" -+ -+ -+static void audit_mnt_flags(struct audit_buffer *ab, unsigned long flags) -+{ -+ if (flags & MS_RDONLY) -+ audit_log_format(ab, "ro"); -+ else -+ audit_log_format(ab, "rw"); -+ if (flags & MS_NOSUID) -+ audit_log_format(ab, ", nosuid"); -+ if (flags & MS_NODEV) -+ audit_log_format(ab, ", nodev"); -+ if (flags & MS_NOEXEC) -+ audit_log_format(ab, ", noexec"); -+ if (flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS) -+ audit_log_format(ab, ", sync"); -+ if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) -+ audit_log_format(ab, ", remount"); -+ if (flags & MS_MANDLOCK) -+ audit_log_format(ab, ", mand"); -+ if (flags & MS_DIRSYNC) -+ audit_log_format(ab, ", dirsync"); -+ if (flags & MS_NOATIME) -+ audit_log_format(ab, ", noatime"); -+ if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME) -+ audit_log_format(ab, ", nodiratime"); -+ if (flags & MS_BIND) -+ audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rbind" : ", bind"); -+ if (flags & MS_MOVE) -+ audit_log_format(ab, ", move"); -+ if (flags & MS_SILENT) -+ audit_log_format(ab, ", silent"); -+ if (flags & MS_POSIXACL) -+ audit_log_format(ab, ", acl"); -+ if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE) -+ audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", runbindable" : -+ ", unbindable"); -+ if (flags & MS_PRIVATE) -+ audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rprivate" : -+ ", private"); -+ if (flags & MS_SLAVE) -+ audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rslave" : -+ ", slave"); -+ if (flags & MS_SHARED) -+ audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rshared" : -+ ", shared"); -+ if (flags & MS_RELATIME) -+ audit_log_format(ab, ", relatime"); -+ if (flags & MS_I_VERSION) -+ audit_log_format(ab, ", iversion"); -+ if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME) -+ audit_log_format(ab, ", strictatime"); -+ if (flags & MS_NOUSER) -+ audit_log_format(ab, ", nouser"); -+} -+ -+/** -+ * audit_cb - call back for mount specific audit fields -+ * @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL) -+ * @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL) -+ */ -+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) -+{ -+ struct common_audit_data *sa = va; -+ -+ if (sa->aad->mnt.type) { -+ audit_log_format(ab, " fstype="); -+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.type); -+ } -+ if (sa->aad->mnt.src_name) { -+ audit_log_format(ab, " srcname="); -+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.src_name); -+ } -+ if (sa->aad->mnt.trans) { -+ audit_log_format(ab, " trans="); -+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.trans); -+ } -+ if (sa->aad->mnt.flags || sa->aad->op == OP_MOUNT) { -+ audit_log_format(ab, " flags=\""); -+ audit_mnt_flags(ab, sa->aad->mnt.flags); -+ audit_log_format(ab, "\""); -+ } -+ if (sa->aad->mnt.data) { -+ audit_log_format(ab, " options="); -+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.data); -+ } -+} -+ -+/** -+ * audit_mount - handle the auditing of mount operations -+ * @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL) -+ * @gfp: allocation flags -+ * @op: operation being mediated (NOT NULL) -+ * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL) -+ * @src_name: src_name of object being mediated (MAYBE_NULL) -+ * @type: type of filesystem (MAYBE_NULL) -+ * @trans: name of trans (MAYBE NULL) -+ * @flags: filesystem idependent mount flags -+ * @data: filesystem mount flags -+ * @request: permissions requested -+ * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL) -+ * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL) -+ * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code -+ * -+ * Returns: %0 or error on failure -+ */ -+static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, int op, -+ const char *name, const char *src_name, -+ const char *type, const char *trans, -+ unsigned long flags, const void *data, u32 request, -+ struct file_perms *perms, const char *info, int error) -+{ -+ int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; -+ struct common_audit_data sa; -+ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { }; -+ -+ if (likely(!error)) { -+ u32 mask = perms->audit; -+ -+ if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL)) -+ mask = 0xffff; -+ -+ /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */ -+ request &= mask; -+ -+ if (likely(!request)) -+ return 0; -+ audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; -+ } else { -+ /* only report permissions that were denied */ -+ request = request & ~perms->allow; -+ -+ if (request & perms->kill) -+ audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL; -+ -+ /* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */ -+ if ((request & perms->quiet) && -+ AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET && -+ AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) -+ request &= ~perms->quiet; -+ -+ if (!request) -+ return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? -+ complain_error(error) : error; -+ } -+ -+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); -+ sa.aad = &aad; -+ sa.aad->op = op; -+ sa.aad->name = name; -+ sa.aad->mnt.src_name = src_name; -+ sa.aad->mnt.type = type; -+ sa.aad->mnt.trans = trans; -+ sa.aad->mnt.flags = flags; -+ if (data && (perms->audit & AA_AUDIT_DATA)) -+ sa.aad->mnt.data = data; -+ sa.aad->info = info; -+ sa.aad->error = error; -+ -+ return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, gfp, &sa, audit_cb); -+} -+ -+/** -+ * match_mnt_flags - Do an ordered match on mount flags -+ * @dfa: dfa to match against -+ * @state: state to start in -+ * @flags: mount flags to match against -+ * -+ * Mount flags are encoded as an ordered match. This is done instead of -+ * checking against a simple bitmask, to allow for logical operations -+ * on the flags. -+ * -+ * Returns: next state after flags match -+ */ -+static unsigned int match_mnt_flags(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, -+ unsigned long flags) -+{ -+ unsigned int i; -+ -+ for (i = 0; i <= 31 ; ++i) { -+ if ((1 << i) & flags) -+ state = aa_dfa_next(dfa, state, i + 1); -+ } -+ -+ return state; -+} -+ -+/** -+ * compute_mnt_perms - compute mount permission associated with @state -+ * @dfa: dfa to match against (NOT NULL) -+ * @state: state match finished in -+ * -+ * Returns: mount permissions -+ */ -+static struct file_perms compute_mnt_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, -+ unsigned int state) -+{ -+ struct file_perms perms; -+ -+ perms.kill = 0; -+ perms.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state); -+ perms.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state); -+ perms.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state); -+ perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state); -+ -+ return perms; -+} -+ -+static const char const *mnt_info_table[] = { -+ "match succeeded", -+ "failed mntpnt match", -+ "failed srcname match", -+ "failed type match", -+ "failed flags match", -+ "failed data match" -+}; -+ -+/* -+ * Returns 0 on success else element that match failed in, this is the -+ * index into the mnt_info_table above -+ */ -+static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, -+ const char *mntpnt, const char *devname, -+ const char *type, unsigned long flags, -+ void *data, bool binary, struct file_perms *perms) -+{ -+ unsigned int state; -+ -+ state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, mntpnt); -+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state); -+ if (!state) -+ return 1; -+ -+ if (devname) -+ state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, devname); -+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state); -+ if (!state) -+ return 2; -+ -+ if (type) -+ state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, type); -+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state); -+ if (!state) -+ return 3; -+ -+ state = match_mnt_flags(dfa, state, flags); -+ if (!state) -+ return 4; -+ *perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state); -+ if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT) -+ return 0; -+ -+ /* only match data if not binary and the DFA flags data is expected */ -+ if (data && !binary && (perms->allow & AA_CONT_MATCH)) { -+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state); -+ if (!state) -+ return 4; -+ -+ state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, data); -+ if (!state) -+ return 5; -+ *perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state); -+ if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT) -+ return 0; -+ } -+ -+ /* failed at end of flags match */ -+ return 4; -+} -+ -+/** -+ * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount -+ * @profile: the confining profile -+ * @mntpnt: string for the mntpnt (NOT NULL) -+ * @devname: string for the devname/src_name (MAYBE NULL) -+ * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL) -+ * @flags: mount flags to match -+ * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL) -+ * @binary: whether @data is binary -+ * @perms: Returns: permission found by the match -+ * @info: Returns: infomation string about the match for logging -+ * -+ * Returns: 0 on success else error -+ */ -+static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *mntpnt, -+ const char *devname, const char *type, -+ unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary, -+ struct file_perms *perms, const char **info) -+{ -+ int pos; -+ -+ if (!profile->policy.dfa) -+ return -EACCES; -+ -+ pos = do_match_mnt(profile->policy.dfa, -+ profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT], -+ mntpnt, devname, type, flags, data, binary, perms); -+ if (pos) { -+ *info = mnt_info_table[pos]; -+ return -EACCES; -+ } -+ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path) -+{ -+ return profile->path_flags | -+ S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0; -+} -+ -+int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, -+ unsigned long flags, void *data) -+{ -+ struct file_perms perms = { }; -+ const char *name, *info = NULL; -+ char *buffer = NULL; -+ int binary, error; -+ -+ binary = path->dentry->d_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA; -+ -+ error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name, -+ &info); -+ if (error) -+ goto audit; -+ -+ error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, data, binary, -+ &perms, &info); -+ -+audit: -+ error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL, -+ NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info, -+ error); -+ kfree(buffer); -+ -+ return error; -+} -+ -+int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, -+ const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags) -+{ -+ struct file_perms perms = { }; -+ char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL; -+ const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL; -+ struct path old_path; -+ int error; -+ -+ if (!dev_name || !*dev_name) -+ return -EINVAL; -+ -+ flags &= MS_REC | MS_BIND; -+ -+ error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name, -+ &info); -+ if (error) -+ goto audit; -+ -+ error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path); -+ if (error) -+ goto audit; -+ -+ error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path), -+ &old_buffer, &old_name, &info); -+ path_put(&old_path); -+ if (error) -+ goto audit; -+ -+ error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, flags, NULL, 0, -+ &perms, &info); -+ -+audit: -+ error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name, -+ NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, -+ info, error); -+ kfree(buffer); -+ kfree(old_buffer); -+ -+ return error; -+} -+ -+int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, -+ unsigned long flags) -+{ -+ struct file_perms perms = { }; -+ char *buffer = NULL; -+ const char *name, *info = NULL; -+ int error; -+ -+ /* These are the flags allowed by do_change_type() */ -+ flags &= (MS_REC | MS_SILENT | MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | -+ MS_UNBINDABLE); -+ -+ error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name, -+ &info); -+ if (error) -+ goto audit; -+ -+ error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, 0, &perms, -+ &info); -+ -+audit: -+ error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL, -+ NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info, -+ error); -+ kfree(buffer); -+ -+ return error; -+} -+ -+int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, -+ const char *orig_name) -+{ -+ struct file_perms perms = { }; -+ char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL; -+ const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL; -+ struct path old_path; -+ int error; -+ -+ if (!orig_name || !*orig_name) -+ return -EINVAL; -+ -+ error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name, -+ &info); -+ if (error) -+ goto audit; -+ -+ error = kern_path(orig_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path); -+ if (error) -+ goto audit; -+ -+ error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path), -+ &old_buffer, &old_name, &info); -+ path_put(&old_path); -+ if (error) -+ goto audit; -+ -+ error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, 0, -+ &perms, &info); -+ -+audit: -+ error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name, -+ NULL, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, -+ info, error); -+ kfree(buffer); -+ kfree(old_buffer); -+ -+ return error; -+} -+ -+int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *orig_dev_name, -+ struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags, -+ void *data) -+{ -+ struct file_perms perms = { }; -+ char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL; -+ const char *name = NULL, *dev_name = NULL, *info = NULL; -+ int binary = 1; -+ int error; -+ -+ dev_name = orig_dev_name; -+ if (type) { -+ int requires_dev; -+ struct file_system_type *fstype = get_fs_type(type); -+ if (!fstype) -+ return -ENODEV; -+ -+ binary = fstype->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA; -+ requires_dev = fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV; -+ put_filesystem(fstype); -+ -+ if (requires_dev) { -+ struct path dev_path; -+ -+ if (!dev_name || !*dev_name) { -+ error = -ENOENT; -+ goto out; -+ } -+ -+ error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &dev_path); -+ if (error) -+ goto audit; -+ -+ error = aa_path_name(&dev_path, -+ path_flags(profile, &dev_path), -+ &dev_buffer, &dev_name, &info); -+ path_put(&dev_path); -+ if (error) -+ goto audit; -+ } -+ } -+ -+ error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name, -+ &info); -+ if (error) -+ goto audit; -+ -+ error = match_mnt(profile, name, dev_name, type, flags, data, binary, -+ &perms, &info); -+ -+audit: -+ error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, dev_name, -+ type, NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info, -+ error); -+ kfree(buffer); -+ kfree(dev_buffer); -+ -+out: -+ return error; -+ -+} -+ -+int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) -+{ -+ struct file_perms perms = { }; -+ char *buffer = NULL; -+ const char *name, *info = NULL; -+ int error; -+ -+ struct path path = { mnt, mnt->mnt_root }; -+ error = aa_path_name(&path, path_flags(profile, &path), &buffer, &name, -+ &info); -+ if (error) -+ goto audit; -+ -+ if (!error && profile->policy.dfa) { -+ unsigned int state; -+ state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, -+ profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT], -+ name); -+ perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state); -+ } -+ -+ if (AA_MAY_UMOUNT & ~perms.allow) -+ error = -EACCES; -+ -+audit: -+ error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL, -+ NULL, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_UMOUNT, &perms, info, error); -+ kfree(buffer); -+ -+ return error; -+} -+ -+int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *old_path, -+ struct path *new_path) -+{ -+ struct file_perms perms = { }; -+ struct aa_profile *target = NULL; -+ char *old_buffer = NULL, *new_buffer = NULL; -+ const char *old_name, *new_name = NULL, *info = NULL; -+ int error; -+ -+ error = aa_path_name(old_path, path_flags(profile, old_path), -+ &old_buffer, &old_name, &info); -+ if (error) -+ goto audit; -+ -+ error = aa_path_name(new_path, path_flags(profile, new_path), -+ &new_buffer, &new_name, &info); -+ if (error) -+ goto audit; -+ -+ if (profile->policy.dfa) { -+ unsigned int state; -+ state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, -+ profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT], -+ new_name); -+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa, state); -+ state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, old_name); -+ perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state); -+ } -+ -+ if (AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT & perms.allow) { -+ if ((perms.xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK) == AA_X_TABLE) { -+ target = x_table_lookup(profile, perms.xindex); -+ if (!target) -+ error = -ENOENT; -+ else -+ error = aa_replace_current_profile(target); -+ } -+ } else -+ error = -EACCES; -+ -+audit: -+ error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name, -+ old_name, NULL, target ? target->base.name : NULL, -+ 0, NULL, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &perms, info, error); -+ aa_put_profile(target); -+ kfree(old_buffer); -+ kfree(new_buffer); -+ -+ return error; -+} --- -1.7.9.5 - |