From b5beb07ad32ab533027aa988d96a44965ec116f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2018 04:57:39 -0800
Subject: apparmor: fix resource audit messages when auditing peer

Resource auditing is using the peer field which is not available
when the rlim data struct is used, because it is a different element
of the same union. Accessing peer during resource auditing could
cause garbage log entries or even oops the kernel.

Move the rlim data block into the same struct as the peer field
so they can be used together.

CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 86b92cb782b3 ("apparmor: move resource checks to using labels")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/apparmor/include')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index 4ac095118717..2ebc00a579fd 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -126,6 +126,10 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
 					const char *target;
 					kuid_t ouid;
 				} fs;
+				struct {
+					int rlim;
+					unsigned long max;
+				} rlim;
 				int signal;
 			};
 		};
@@ -134,10 +138,6 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
 			const char *ns;
 			long pos;
 		} iface;
-		struct {
-			int rlim;
-			unsigned long max;
-		} rlim;
 		struct {
 			const char *src_name;
 			const char *type;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 98cf5bbff413eadf1b9cb195a7b80cc61c72a50e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 11:24:10 +0100
Subject: apparmor: fix logging of the existence test for signals

The existence test is not being properly logged as the signal mapping
maps it to the last entry in the named signal table. This is done
to help catch bugs by making the 0 mapped signal value invalid so
that we can catch the signal value not being filled in.

When fixing the off-by-one comparision logic the reporting of the
existence test was broken, because the logic behind the mapped named
table was hidden. Fix this by adding a define for the name lookup
and using it.

Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: f7dc4c9a855a1 ("apparmor: fix off-by-one comparison on MAXMAPPED_SIG")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security/apparmor/include')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h b/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h
index 92e62fe95292..5ca47c50dfa7 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 
 #define SIGUNKNOWN 0
 #define MAXMAPPED_SIG 35
+#define MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME (MAXMAPPED_SIG + 1)
+
 /* provide a mapping of arch signal to internal signal # for mediation
  * those that are always an alias SIGCLD for SIGCLHD and SIGPOLL for SIGIO
  * map to the same entry those that may/or may not get a separate entry
@@ -56,7 +58,7 @@ static const int sig_map[MAXMAPPED_SIG] = {
 };
 
 /* this table is ordered post sig_map[sig] mapping */
-static const char *const sig_names[MAXMAPPED_SIG + 1] = {
+static const char *const sig_names[MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME] = {
 	"unknown",
 	"hup",
 	"int",
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a6a52579e52b55448326db88bd9a5740e7c1a037 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Sat, 3 Feb 2018 20:08:28 +0100
Subject: apparmor: split load data into management struct and data blob

Splitting the management struct from the actual data blob will allow
us in the future to do some sharing and other data reduction
techniques like replacing the the raw data with compressed data.

Prepare for this by separating the management struct from the data
blob.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security/apparmor/include')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h
index be6cd69ac319..8db4ab759e80 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ struct aa_loaddata {
 	int abi;
 	unsigned char *hash;
 
-	char data[];
+	char *data;
 };
 
 int aa_unpack(struct aa_loaddata *udata, struct list_head *lh, const char **ns);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From cf65fabc2a2c8c12031678d86a2bd4a660865011 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Sep 2017 02:53:15 -0700
Subject: apparmor: add first substr match to dfa

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/match.h | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security/apparmor/include')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
index add4c6726558..72b9b89670e6 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
@@ -129,6 +129,10 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 			  const char *str);
 unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
 			 const char c);
+unsigned int aa_dfa_match_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+				const char *str, const char **retpos);
+unsigned int aa_dfa_matchn_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+				 const char *str, int n, const char **retpos);
 
 void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref);
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 6e0654d20ed9679cbf75a0ff7cd786e364f7f09a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Sep 2017 14:57:59 -0700
Subject: apparmor: use the dfa to do label parse string splitting

The current split scheme is actually wrong in that it splits
  ///&

where that is invalid and should fail. Use the dfa to do a proper
bounded split without having to worry about getting the string
processing right in code.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/label.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/apparmor/include/match.h |  1 +
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security/apparmor/include')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/label.h b/security/apparmor/include/label.h
index af22dcbbcb8a..80e9ba9d172c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/label.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/label.h
@@ -330,6 +330,31 @@ void aa_label_printk(struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp);
 struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
 				gfp_t gfp, bool create, bool force_stack);
 
+static inline const char *aa_label_strn_split(const char *str, int n)
+{
+	const char *pos;
+	unsigned int state;
+
+	state = aa_dfa_matchn_until(stacksplitdfa, DFA_START, str, n, &pos);
+	if (!ACCEPT_TABLE(stacksplitdfa)[state])
+		return NULL;
+
+	return pos - 3;
+}
+
+static inline const char *aa_label_str_split(const char *str)
+{
+	const char *pos;
+	unsigned int state;
+
+	state = aa_dfa_match_until(stacksplitdfa, DFA_START, str, &pos);
+	if (!ACCEPT_TABLE(stacksplitdfa)[state])
+		return NULL;
+
+	return pos - 3;
+}
+
+
 
 struct aa_perms;
 int aa_label_match(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *label,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
index 72b9b89670e6..cd8aeab6ac57 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ struct aa_dfa {
 };
 
 extern struct aa_dfa *nulldfa;
+extern struct aa_dfa *stacksplitdfa;
 
 #define byte_to_byte(X) (X)
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 95652cac83605d96cf3849e80e3e3f4dce74f5da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Wed, 6 Sep 2017 16:33:56 -0700
Subject: apparmor: provide a bounded version of label_parse

some label/context sources might not be guaranteed to be null terminiated
provide a size bounded version of label parse to deal with these.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/label.h | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security/apparmor/include')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/label.h b/security/apparmor/include/label.h
index 80e9ba9d172c..d871e7ff0952 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/label.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/label.h
@@ -327,6 +327,9 @@ void aa_label_audit(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp);
 void aa_label_seq_print(struct seq_file *f, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp);
 void aa_label_printk(struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp);
 
+struct aa_label *aa_label_strn_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
+				     size_t n, gfp_t gfp, bool create,
+				     bool force_stack);
 struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str,
 				gfp_t gfp, bool create, bool force_stack);
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 3acfd5f54ca16c15c36ac2f218357f2707b7edb8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2018 12:32:02 +0100
Subject: apparmor: audit unknown signal numbers

Allow apparmor to audit the number of a signal that it does not
provide a mapping for and is currently being reported only as
unknown.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/audit.h     | 5 ++++-
 security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h | 1 +
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security/apparmor/include')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index 2ebc00a579fd..41ad2c947bf4 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -130,7 +130,10 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
 					int rlim;
 					unsigned long max;
 				} rlim;
-				int signal;
+				struct {
+					int signal;
+					int unmappedsig;
+				};
 			};
 		};
 		struct {
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h b/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h
index 5ca47c50dfa7..cbf7a997ed84 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #define SIGUNKNOWN 0
 #define MAXMAPPED_SIG 35
 #define MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME (MAXMAPPED_SIG + 1)
+#define SIGRT_BASE 128
 
 /* provide a mapping of arch signal to internal signal # for mediation
  * those that are always an alias SIGCLD for SIGCLHD and SIGPOLL for SIGIO
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 4d2f8ba3e3b76e34f84ae1de456934713e9e59af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2017 14:08:36 -0800
Subject: apparmor: rename task_ctx to the more accurate cred_ctx

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/context.h | 19 +++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/apparmor/include')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/context.h b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
index 6ae07e9aaa17..0622fcf2a695 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/context.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@
 #include "policy_ns.h"
 
 #define cred_ctx(X) ((X)->security)
-#define current_ctx() cred_ctx(current_cred())
+#define current_cred_ctx() cred_ctx(current_cred())
 
 /**
- * struct aa_task_ctx - primary label for confined tasks
+ * struct aa_cred_ctx - primary label for confined tasks
  * @label: the current label   (NOT NULL)
  * @exec: label to transition to on next exec  (MAYBE NULL)
  * @previous: label the task may return to     (MAYBE NULL)
@@ -37,17 +37,16 @@
  *
  * TODO: make so a task can be confined by a stack of contexts
  */
-struct aa_task_ctx {
+struct aa_cred_ctx {
 	struct aa_label *label;
 	struct aa_label *onexec;
 	struct aa_label *previous;
 	u64 token;
 };
 
-struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_context(gfp_t flags);
-void aa_free_task_context(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx);
-void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_ctx *new,
-			 const struct aa_task_ctx *old);
+struct aa_cred_ctx *aa_alloc_cred_ctx(gfp_t flags);
+void aa_free_cred_ctx(struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx);
+void aa_dup_cred_ctx(struct aa_cred_ctx *new, const struct aa_cred_ctx *old);
 int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label);
 int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack);
 int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token);
@@ -65,7 +64,7 @@ struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task);
  */
 static inline struct aa_label *aa_cred_raw_label(const struct cred *cred)
 {
-	struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = cred_ctx(cred);
+	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx = cred_ctx(cred);
 
 	AA_BUG(!ctx || !ctx->label);
 	return ctx->label;
@@ -214,10 +213,10 @@ static inline struct aa_ns *aa_get_current_ns(void)
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_clear_task_ctx_trans - clear transition tracking info from the ctx
+ * aa_clear_cred_ctx_trans - clear transition tracking info from the ctx
  * @ctx: task context to clear (NOT NULL)
  */
-static inline void aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
+static inline void aa_clear_cred_ctx_trans(struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
 	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 3b529a7600d834f450ac244f43a7c082687284b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2017 01:59:25 -0800
Subject: apparmor: move task domain change info to task security

The task domain change info is task specific and its and abuse of
the cred to store the information in there. Now that a task->security
field exists store it in the proper place.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/context.h | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/apparmor/include')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/context.h b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
index 0622fcf2a695..c3b51d88275b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/context.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
@@ -25,20 +25,24 @@
 #define cred_ctx(X) ((X)->security)
 #define current_cred_ctx() cred_ctx(current_cred())
 
+#define task_ctx(X) ((X)->security)
+#define current_task_ctx() (task_ctx(current))
+
 /**
  * struct aa_cred_ctx - primary label for confined tasks
  * @label: the current label   (NOT NULL)
- * @exec: label to transition to on next exec  (MAYBE NULL)
- * @previous: label the task may return to     (MAYBE NULL)
- * @token: magic value the task must know for returning to @previous
- *
- * Contains the task's current label (which could change due to
- * change_hat).  Plus the hat_magic needed during change_hat.
- *
- * TODO: make so a task can be confined by a stack of contexts
  */
 struct aa_cred_ctx {
 	struct aa_label *label;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct aa_task_ctx - information for current task label change
+ * @onexec: profile to transition to on next exec  (MAY BE NULL)
+ * @previous: profile the task may return to     (MAY BE NULL)
+ * @token: magic value the task must know for returning to @previous_profile
+ */
+struct aa_task_ctx {
 	struct aa_label *onexec;
 	struct aa_label *previous;
 	u64 token;
@@ -47,6 +51,11 @@ struct aa_cred_ctx {
 struct aa_cred_ctx *aa_alloc_cred_ctx(gfp_t flags);
 void aa_free_cred_ctx(struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx);
 void aa_dup_cred_ctx(struct aa_cred_ctx *new, const struct aa_cred_ctx *old);
+
+struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_ctx(gfp_t flags);
+void aa_free_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx);
+void aa_dup_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *new, const struct aa_task_ctx *old);
+
 int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label);
 int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack);
 int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token);
@@ -213,11 +222,13 @@ static inline struct aa_ns *aa_get_current_ns(void)
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_clear_cred_ctx_trans - clear transition tracking info from the ctx
+ * aa_clear_task_ctx_trans - clear transition tracking info from the ctx
  * @ctx: task context to clear (NOT NULL)
  */
-static inline void aa_clear_cred_ctx_trans(struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx)
+static inline void aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
 {
+	AA_BUG(!ctx);
+
 	aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
 	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
 	ctx->previous = NULL;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d9087c49d4388e3f35f09a5cf7ed6e09c9106604 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Fri, 27 Jan 2017 03:53:53 -0800
Subject: apparmor: drop cred_ctx and reference the label directly

With the task domain change information now stored in the task->security
context, the cred->security context only stores the label. We can get
rid of the cred_ctx and directly reference the label, removing a layer
of indirection, and unneeded extra allocations.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/context.h | 24 +++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/apparmor/include')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/context.h b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
index c3b51d88275b..8d36c14bc76d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/context.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
@@ -22,21 +22,11 @@
 #include "label.h"
 #include "policy_ns.h"
 
-#define cred_ctx(X) ((X)->security)
-#define current_cred_ctx() cred_ctx(current_cred())
-
 #define task_ctx(X) ((X)->security)
 #define current_task_ctx() (task_ctx(current))
+#define cred_label(X) ((X)->security)
 
-/**
- * struct aa_cred_ctx - primary label for confined tasks
- * @label: the current label   (NOT NULL)
- */
-struct aa_cred_ctx {
-	struct aa_label *label;
-};
-
-/**
+/*
  * struct aa_task_ctx - information for current task label change
  * @onexec: profile to transition to on next exec  (MAY BE NULL)
  * @previous: profile the task may return to     (MAY BE NULL)
@@ -48,10 +38,6 @@ struct aa_task_ctx {
 	u64 token;
 };
 
-struct aa_cred_ctx *aa_alloc_cred_ctx(gfp_t flags);
-void aa_free_cred_ctx(struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx);
-void aa_dup_cred_ctx(struct aa_cred_ctx *new, const struct aa_cred_ctx *old);
-
 struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_ctx(gfp_t flags);
 void aa_free_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx);
 void aa_dup_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *new, const struct aa_task_ctx *old);
@@ -73,10 +59,10 @@ struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task);
  */
 static inline struct aa_label *aa_cred_raw_label(const struct cred *cred)
 {
-	struct aa_cred_ctx *ctx = cred_ctx(cred);
+	struct aa_label *label = cred_label(cred);
 
-	AA_BUG(!ctx || !ctx->label);
-	return ctx->label;
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	return label;
 }
 
 /**
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d065f2f56522b9240acb8c5ea35e9ee25f1b33e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Sun, 8 Oct 2017 00:25:27 -0700
Subject: apparmor: cleanup, drop unused fn __aa_task_is_confined()

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/context.h | 11 -----------
 1 file changed, 11 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/apparmor/include')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/context.h b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
index 8d36c14bc76d..b2aeb1da7e77 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/context.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
@@ -89,17 +89,6 @@ static inline struct aa_label *__aa_task_raw_label(struct task_struct *task)
 	return aa_cred_raw_label(__task_cred(task));
 }
 
-/**
- * __aa_task_is_confined - determine if @task has any confinement
- * @task: task to check confinement of  (NOT NULL)
- *
- * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
- */
-static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task)
-{
-	return !unconfined(__aa_task_raw_label(task));
-}
-
 /**
  * aa_current_raw_label - find the current tasks confining label
  *
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From de62de59c27881c59c7df2e535cb9e1275cd52cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Sun, 8 Oct 2017 00:43:02 -0700
Subject: apparmor: move task related defines and fns to task.X files

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/context.h | 40 +----------------
 security/apparmor/include/task.h    | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/task.h

(limited to 'security/apparmor/include')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/context.h b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
index b2aeb1da7e77..e287b7d0d4be 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/context.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
@@ -21,33 +21,10 @@
 
 #include "label.h"
 #include "policy_ns.h"
+#include "task.h"
 
-#define task_ctx(X) ((X)->security)
-#define current_task_ctx() (task_ctx(current))
 #define cred_label(X) ((X)->security)
 
-/*
- * struct aa_task_ctx - information for current task label change
- * @onexec: profile to transition to on next exec  (MAY BE NULL)
- * @previous: profile the task may return to     (MAY BE NULL)
- * @token: magic value the task must know for returning to @previous_profile
- */
-struct aa_task_ctx {
-	struct aa_label *onexec;
-	struct aa_label *previous;
-	u64 token;
-};
-
-struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_ctx(gfp_t flags);
-void aa_free_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx);
-void aa_dup_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *new, const struct aa_task_ctx *old);
-
-int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label);
-int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack);
-int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token);
-int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 cookie);
-struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task);
-
 
 /**
  * aa_cred_raw_label - obtain cred's label
@@ -196,19 +173,4 @@ static inline struct aa_ns *aa_get_current_ns(void)
 	return ns;
 }
 
-/**
- * aa_clear_task_ctx_trans - clear transition tracking info from the ctx
- * @ctx: task context to clear (NOT NULL)
- */
-static inline void aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
-{
-	AA_BUG(!ctx);
-
-	aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
-	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
-	ctx->previous = NULL;
-	ctx->onexec = NULL;
-	ctx->token = 0;
-}
-
 #endif /* __AA_CONTEXT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/task.h b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d222197db299
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor task related definitions and mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright 2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_TASK_H
+#define __AA_TASK_H
+
+#define task_ctx(X) ((X)->security)
+
+/*
+ * struct aa_task_ctx - information for current task label change
+ * @onexec: profile to transition to on next exec  (MAY BE NULL)
+ * @previous: profile the task may return to     (MAY BE NULL)
+ * @token: magic value the task must know for returning to @previous_profile
+ */
+struct aa_task_ctx {
+	struct aa_label *onexec;
+	struct aa_label *previous;
+	u64 token;
+};
+
+int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label);
+int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack);
+int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token);
+int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 cookie);
+struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task);
+
+/**
+ * aa_alloc_task_ctx - allocate a new task_ctx
+ * @flags: gfp flags for allocation
+ *
+ * Returns: allocated buffer or NULL on failure
+ */
+static inline struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_ctx(gfp_t flags)
+{
+	return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_free_task_ctx - free a task_ctx
+ * @ctx: task_ctx to free (MAYBE NULL)
+ */
+static inline void aa_free_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx) {
+		aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
+		aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
+
+		kzfree(ctx);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dup_task_ctx - duplicate a task context, incrementing reference counts
+ * @new: a blank task context      (NOT NULL)
+ * @old: the task context to copy  (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static inline void aa_dup_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *new,
+				   const struct aa_task_ctx *old)
+{
+	*new = *old;
+	aa_get_label(new->previous);
+	aa_get_label(new->onexec);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_clear_task_ctx_trans - clear transition tracking info from the ctx
+ * @ctx: task context to clear (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static inline void aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	AA_BUG(!ctx);
+
+	aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
+	aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
+	ctx->previous = NULL;
+	ctx->onexec = NULL;
+	ctx->token = 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_TASK_H */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d8889d49e414b371eb235c08c3a759ab3e0cfa51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2017 01:04:48 -0700
Subject: apparmor: move context.h to cred.h

Now that file contexts have been moved into file, and task context
fns() and data have been split from the context, only the cred context
remains in context.h so rename to cred.h to better reflect what it
deals with.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/context.h | 176 ------------------------------------
 security/apparmor/include/cred.h    | 176 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 176 insertions(+), 176 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/context.h
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/cred.h

(limited to 'security/apparmor/include')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/context.h b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
deleted file mode 100644
index e287b7d0d4be..000000000000
--- a/security/apparmor/include/context.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * AppArmor security module
- *
- * This file contains AppArmor contexts used to associate "labels" to objects.
- *
- * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
- * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
- * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
- * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
- * License.
- */
-
-#ifndef __AA_CONTEXT_H
-#define __AA_CONTEXT_H
-
-#include <linux/cred.h>
-#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/sched.h>
-
-#include "label.h"
-#include "policy_ns.h"
-#include "task.h"
-
-#define cred_label(X) ((X)->security)
-
-
-/**
- * aa_cred_raw_label - obtain cred's label
- * @cred: cred to obtain label from  (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Returns: confining label
- *
- * does NOT increment reference count
- */
-static inline struct aa_label *aa_cred_raw_label(const struct cred *cred)
-{
-	struct aa_label *label = cred_label(cred);
-
-	AA_BUG(!label);
-	return label;
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_get_newest_cred_label - obtain the newest label on a cred
- * @cred: cred to obtain label from (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Returns: newest version of confining label
- */
-static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_newest_cred_label(const struct cred *cred)
-{
-	return aa_get_newest_label(aa_cred_raw_label(cred));
-}
-
-/**
- * __aa_task_raw_label - retrieve another task's label
- * @task: task to query  (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Returns: @task's label without incrementing its ref count
- *
- * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
- */
-static inline struct aa_label *__aa_task_raw_label(struct task_struct *task)
-{
-	return aa_cred_raw_label(__task_cred(task));
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_current_raw_label - find the current tasks confining label
- *
- * Returns: up to date confining label or the ns unconfined label (NOT NULL)
- *
- * This fn will not update the tasks cred to the most up to date version
- * of the label so it is safe to call when inside of locks.
- */
-static inline struct aa_label *aa_current_raw_label(void)
-{
-	return aa_cred_raw_label(current_cred());
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_get_current_label - get the newest version of the current tasks label
- *
- * Returns: newest version of confining label (NOT NULL)
- *
- * This fn will not update the tasks cred, so it is safe inside of locks
- *
- * The returned reference must be put with aa_put_label()
- */
-static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_current_label(void)
-{
-	struct aa_label *l = aa_current_raw_label();
-
-	if (label_is_stale(l))
-		return aa_get_newest_label(l);
-	return aa_get_label(l);
-}
-
-#define __end_current_label_crit_section(X) end_current_label_crit_section(X)
-
-/**
- * end_label_crit_section - put a reference found with begin_current_label..
- * @label: label reference to put
- *
- * Should only be used with a reference obtained with
- * begin_current_label_crit_section and never used in situations where the
- * task cred may be updated
- */
-static inline void end_current_label_crit_section(struct aa_label *label)
-{
-	if (label != aa_current_raw_label())
-		aa_put_label(label);
-}
-
-/**
- * __begin_current_label_crit_section - current's confining label
- *
- * Returns: up to date confining label or the ns unconfined label (NOT NULL)
- *
- * safe to call inside locks
- *
- * The returned reference must be put with __end_current_label_crit_section()
- * This must NOT be used if the task cred could be updated within the
- * critical section between __begin_current_label_crit_section() ..
- * __end_current_label_crit_section()
- */
-static inline struct aa_label *__begin_current_label_crit_section(void)
-{
-	struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
-
-	if (label_is_stale(label))
-		label = aa_get_newest_label(label);
-
-	return label;
-}
-
-/**
- * begin_current_label_crit_section - current's confining label and update it
- *
- * Returns: up to date confining label or the ns unconfined label (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Not safe to call inside locks
- *
- * The returned reference must be put with end_current_label_crit_section()
- * This must NOT be used if the task cred could be updated within the
- * critical section between begin_current_label_crit_section() ..
- * end_current_label_crit_section()
- */
-static inline struct aa_label *begin_current_label_crit_section(void)
-{
-	struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
-
-	if (label_is_stale(label)) {
-		label = aa_get_newest_label(label);
-		if (aa_replace_current_label(label) == 0)
-			/* task cred will keep the reference */
-			aa_put_label(label);
-	}
-
-	return label;
-}
-
-static inline struct aa_ns *aa_get_current_ns(void)
-{
-	struct aa_label *label;
-	struct aa_ns *ns;
-
-	label  = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
-	ns = aa_get_ns(labels_ns(label));
-	__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
-
-	return ns;
-}
-
-#endif /* __AA_CONTEXT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/cred.h b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e287b7d0d4be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/cred.h
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor contexts used to associate "labels" to objects.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_CONTEXT_H
+#define __AA_CONTEXT_H
+
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+
+#include "label.h"
+#include "policy_ns.h"
+#include "task.h"
+
+#define cred_label(X) ((X)->security)
+
+
+/**
+ * aa_cred_raw_label - obtain cred's label
+ * @cred: cred to obtain label from  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: confining label
+ *
+ * does NOT increment reference count
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *aa_cred_raw_label(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label = cred_label(cred);
+
+	AA_BUG(!label);
+	return label;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_newest_cred_label - obtain the newest label on a cred
+ * @cred: cred to obtain label from (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: newest version of confining label
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_newest_cred_label(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	return aa_get_newest_label(aa_cred_raw_label(cred));
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_task_raw_label - retrieve another task's label
+ * @task: task to query  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: @task's label without incrementing its ref count
+ *
+ * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *__aa_task_raw_label(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	return aa_cred_raw_label(__task_cred(task));
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_current_raw_label - find the current tasks confining label
+ *
+ * Returns: up to date confining label or the ns unconfined label (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * This fn will not update the tasks cred to the most up to date version
+ * of the label so it is safe to call when inside of locks.
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *aa_current_raw_label(void)
+{
+	return aa_cred_raw_label(current_cred());
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_get_current_label - get the newest version of the current tasks label
+ *
+ * Returns: newest version of confining label (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * This fn will not update the tasks cred, so it is safe inside of locks
+ *
+ * The returned reference must be put with aa_put_label()
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_current_label(void)
+{
+	struct aa_label *l = aa_current_raw_label();
+
+	if (label_is_stale(l))
+		return aa_get_newest_label(l);
+	return aa_get_label(l);
+}
+
+#define __end_current_label_crit_section(X) end_current_label_crit_section(X)
+
+/**
+ * end_label_crit_section - put a reference found with begin_current_label..
+ * @label: label reference to put
+ *
+ * Should only be used with a reference obtained with
+ * begin_current_label_crit_section and never used in situations where the
+ * task cred may be updated
+ */
+static inline void end_current_label_crit_section(struct aa_label *label)
+{
+	if (label != aa_current_raw_label())
+		aa_put_label(label);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __begin_current_label_crit_section - current's confining label
+ *
+ * Returns: up to date confining label or the ns unconfined label (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * safe to call inside locks
+ *
+ * The returned reference must be put with __end_current_label_crit_section()
+ * This must NOT be used if the task cred could be updated within the
+ * critical section between __begin_current_label_crit_section() ..
+ * __end_current_label_crit_section()
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *__begin_current_label_crit_section(void)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
+
+	if (label_is_stale(label))
+		label = aa_get_newest_label(label);
+
+	return label;
+}
+
+/**
+ * begin_current_label_crit_section - current's confining label and update it
+ *
+ * Returns: up to date confining label or the ns unconfined label (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Not safe to call inside locks
+ *
+ * The returned reference must be put with end_current_label_crit_section()
+ * This must NOT be used if the task cred could be updated within the
+ * critical section between begin_current_label_crit_section() ..
+ * end_current_label_crit_section()
+ */
+static inline struct aa_label *begin_current_label_crit_section(void)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
+
+	if (label_is_stale(label)) {
+		label = aa_get_newest_label(label);
+		if (aa_replace_current_label(label) == 0)
+			/* task cred will keep the reference */
+			aa_put_label(label);
+	}
+
+	return label;
+}
+
+static inline struct aa_ns *aa_get_current_ns(void)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	struct aa_ns *ns;
+
+	label  = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
+	ns = aa_get_ns(labels_ns(label));
+	__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
+
+	return ns;
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_CONTEXT_H */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 9fcf78cca198600b27c44b4e50f00f8af3927f17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Sun, 8 Oct 2017 18:26:19 -0700
Subject: apparmor: update domain transitions that are subsets of confinement
 at nnp

Domain transition so far have been largely blocked by no new privs,
unless the transition has been provably a subset of the previous
confinement. There was a couple problems with the previous
implementations,

- transitions that weren't explicitly a stack but resulted in a subset
  of confinement were disallowed

- confinement subsets were only calculated from the previous
  confinement instead of the confinement being enforced at the time of
  no new privs, so transitions would have to get progressively
  tighter.

Fix this by detecting and storing a reference to the task's
confinement at the "time" no new privs is set. This reference is then
used to determine whether a transition is a subsystem of the
confinement at the time no new privs was set.

Unfortunately the implementation is less than ideal in that we have to
detect no new privs after the fact when a task attempts a domain
transition. This is adequate for the currently but will not work in a
stacking situation where no new privs could be conceivably be set in
both the "host" and in the container.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/task.h | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security/apparmor/include')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/task.h b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
index d222197db299..55edaa1d83f8 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/task.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
@@ -18,11 +18,13 @@
 
 /*
  * struct aa_task_ctx - information for current task label change
+ * @nnp: snapshot of label at time of no_new_privs
  * @onexec: profile to transition to on next exec  (MAY BE NULL)
  * @previous: profile the task may return to     (MAY BE NULL)
  * @token: magic value the task must know for returning to @previous_profile
  */
 struct aa_task_ctx {
+	struct aa_label *nnp;
 	struct aa_label *onexec;
 	struct aa_label *previous;
 	u64 token;
@@ -52,6 +54,7 @@ static inline struct aa_task_ctx *aa_alloc_task_ctx(gfp_t flags)
 static inline void aa_free_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	if (ctx) {
+		aa_put_label(ctx->nnp);
 		aa_put_label(ctx->previous);
 		aa_put_label(ctx->onexec);
 
@@ -68,6 +71,7 @@ static inline void aa_dup_task_ctx(struct aa_task_ctx *new,
 				   const struct aa_task_ctx *old)
 {
 	*new = *old;
+	aa_get_label(new->nnp);
 	aa_get_label(new->previous);
 	aa_get_label(new->onexec);
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 031dcc8f4e84fea37dc6f78fdc7288aa7f8386c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2017 12:10:50 -0700
Subject: apparmor: dfa add support for state differential encoding

State differential encoding can provide better compression for
apparmor policy, without having significant impact on match time.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/match.h | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security/apparmor/include')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
index cd8aeab6ac57..e0de00bd16a8 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
  */
 
 #define YYTH_MAGIC	0x1B5E783D
+#define YYTH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE	1
 
 struct table_set_header {
 	u32 th_magic;		/* YYTH_MAGIC */
@@ -164,4 +165,7 @@ static inline void aa_put_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa)
 		kref_put(&dfa->count, aa_dfa_free_kref);
 }
 
+#define MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE 0x80000000
+#define MARK_DIFF_ENCODE 0x40000000
+
 #endif /* __AA_MATCH_H */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 8e51f9087f4024d20f70f4d9831e1f45d8088331 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2018 12:37:19 -0800
Subject: apparmor: Add support for attaching profiles via xattr, presence and
 value

Make it possible to tie Apparmor profiles to the presence of one or more
extended attributes, and optionally their values. An example usecase for
this is to automatically transition to a more privileged Apparmor profile
if an executable has a valid IMA signature, which can then be appraised
by the IMA subsystem.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/policy.h | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security/apparmor/include')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index 17fe41a9cac3..02bde92ebb5c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -148,6 +148,12 @@ struct aa_profile {
 	struct aa_policydb policy;
 	struct aa_file_rules file;
 	struct aa_caps caps;
+
+	int xattr_count;
+	char **xattrs;
+	size_t *xattr_lens;
+	char **xattr_values;
+
 	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
 
 	struct aa_loaddata *rawdata;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 73f488cd903938e78979d50e081a0314ad142351 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2017 15:28:05 -0800
Subject: apparmor: convert attaching profiles via xattrs to use dfa matching

This converts profile attachment based on xattrs to a fixed extended
conditional using dfa matching.

This has a couple of advantages
- pattern matching can be used for the xattr match

- xattrs can be optional for an attachment or marked as required

- the xattr attachment conditional will be able to be combined with
  other extended conditionals when the flexible extended conditional
  work lands.

The xattr fixed extended conditional is appended to the xmatch
conditional. If an xattr attachment is specified the profile xmatch
will be generated regardless of whether there is a pattern match on
the executable name.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/policy.h | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/apparmor/include')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index 02bde92ebb5c..c93b9ed55490 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -151,8 +151,6 @@ struct aa_profile {
 
 	int xattr_count;
 	char **xattrs;
-	size_t *xattr_lens;
-	char **xattr_values;
 
 	struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 21f606610502ef56f9180b1529fc7e02957564c8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Sat, 18 Nov 2017 19:43:13 -0800
Subject: apparmor: improve overlapping domain attachment resolution

Overlapping domain attachments using the current longest left exact
match fail in some simple cases, and with the fix to ensure consistent
behavior by failing unresolvable attachments it becomes important to
do a better job.

eg. under the current match the following are unresolvable where
the alternation is clearly a better match under the most specific
left match rule.
  /**
  /{bin/,}usr/

Use a counting match that detects when a loop in the state machine is
enter, and return the match count to provide a better specific left
match resolution.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/match.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)

(limited to 'security/apparmor/include')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
index e0de00bd16a8..958d2b52a7b7 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
@@ -138,6 +138,25 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_matchn_until(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 
 void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref);
 
+#define WB_HISTORY_SIZE 8
+struct match_workbuf {
+	unsigned int count;
+	unsigned int pos;
+	unsigned int len;
+	unsigned int size;	/* power of 2, same as history size */
+	unsigned int history[WB_HISTORY_SIZE];
+};
+#define DEFINE_MATCH_WB(N)		\
+struct match_workbuf N = {		\
+	.count = 0,			\
+	.pos = 0,			\
+	.len = 0,			\
+	.size = WB_HISTORY_SIZE,			\
+}
+
+unsigned int aa_dfa_leftmatch(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+			      const char *str, unsigned int *count);
+
 /**
  * aa_get_dfa - increment refcount on dfa @p
  * @dfa: dfa  (MAYBE NULL)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 56974a6fcfef69ee0825bd66ed13e92070ac5224 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2017 23:18:33 -0700
Subject: apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation

version 2 - Force an abi break. Network mediation will only be
            available in v8 abi complaint policy.

Provide a basic mediation of sockets. This is not a full net mediation
but just whether a spcific family of socket can be used by an
application, along with setting up some basic infrastructure for
network mediation to follow.

the user space rule hav the basic form of
  NETWORK RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'network' [ DOMAIN ]
                 [ TYPE | PROTOCOL ]

  DOMAIN = ( 'inet' | 'ax25' | 'ipx' | 'appletalk' | 'netrom' |
             'bridge' | 'atmpvc' | 'x25' | 'inet6' | 'rose' |
	     'netbeui' | 'security' | 'key' | 'packet' | 'ash' |
	     'econet' | 'atmsvc' | 'sna' | 'irda' | 'pppox' |
	     'wanpipe' | 'bluetooth' | 'netlink' | 'unix' | 'rds' |
	     'llc' | 'can' | 'tipc' | 'iucv' | 'rxrpc' | 'isdn' |
	     'phonet' | 'ieee802154' | 'caif' | 'alg' | 'nfc' |
	     'vsock' | 'mpls' | 'ib' | 'kcm' ) ','

  TYPE = ( 'stream' | 'dgram' | 'seqpacket' |  'rdm' | 'raw' |
           'packet' )

  PROTOCOL = ( 'tcp' | 'udp' | 'icmp' )

eg.
  network,
  network inet,

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h |   3 +-
 security/apparmor/include/audit.h    |   6 ++
 security/apparmor/include/net.h      | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/apparmor/include/perms.h    |   5 +-
 security/apparmor/include/policy.h   |  11 ++++
 5 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/net.h

(limited to 'security/apparmor/include')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
index 829082c35faa..73d63b58d875 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -24,12 +24,13 @@
 #define AA_CLASS_UNKNOWN	1
 #define AA_CLASS_FILE		2
 #define AA_CLASS_CAP		3
-#define AA_CLASS_NET		4
+#define AA_CLASS_DEPRECATED	4
 #define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS	5
 #define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN		6
 #define AA_CLASS_MOUNT		7
 #define AA_CLASS_PTRACE		9
 #define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL		10
+#define AA_CLASS_NET		14
 #define AA_CLASS_LABEL		16
 
 #define AA_CLASS_LAST		AA_CLASS_LABEL
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index 41ad2c947bf4..9c9be9c98c15 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -134,6 +134,12 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
 					int signal;
 					int unmappedsig;
 				};
+				struct {
+					int type, protocol;
+					struct sock *peer_sk;
+					void *addr;
+					int addrlen;
+				} net;
 			};
 		};
 		struct {
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ec7228e857a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_NET_H
+#define __AA_NET_H
+
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+
+#include "apparmorfs.h"
+#include "label.h"
+#include "perms.h"
+#include "policy.h"
+
+#define AA_MAY_SEND		AA_MAY_WRITE
+#define AA_MAY_RECEIVE		AA_MAY_READ
+
+#define AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN		AA_MAY_DELETE
+
+#define AA_MAY_CONNECT		AA_MAY_OPEN
+#define AA_MAY_ACCEPT		0x00100000
+
+#define AA_MAY_BIND		0x00200000
+#define AA_MAY_LISTEN		0x00400000
+
+#define AA_MAY_SETOPT		0x01000000
+#define AA_MAY_GETOPT		0x02000000
+
+#define NET_PERMS_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE |    \
+			AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_BIND | AA_MAY_LISTEN |	  \
+			AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_ACCEPT | AA_MAY_SETATTR | \
+			AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_SETOPT | AA_MAY_GETOPT)
+
+#define NET_FS_PERMS (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE |	\
+		      AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_RENAME |\
+		      AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_CHMOD |	\
+		      AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_CHGRP | AA_MAY_LOCK |	\
+		      AA_MAY_MPROT)
+
+#define NET_PEER_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CONNECT |	\
+		       AA_MAY_ACCEPT)
+struct aa_sk_ctx {
+	struct aa_label *label;
+	struct aa_label *peer;
+};
+
+#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
+#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
+#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P)				  \
+	struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK),		  \
+						  .family = (F)};	  \
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME,						  \
+			  ((SK) && (F) != AF_UNIX) ? LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET : \
+						     LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, \
+			  OP);						  \
+	NAME.u.net = &(NAME ## _net);					  \
+	aad(&NAME)->net.type = (T);					  \
+	aad(&NAME)->net.protocol = (P)
+
+#define DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(NAME, OP, SK)					\
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type,	\
+			 (SK)->sk_protocol)
+
+
+#define af_select(FAMILY, FN, DEF_FN)		\
+({						\
+	int __e;				\
+	switch ((FAMILY)) {			\
+	default:				\
+		__e = DEF_FN;			\
+	}					\
+	__e;					\
+})
+
+extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[];
+
+void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va);
+int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
+		       u32 request, u16 family, int type);
+int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
+	       int type, int protocol);
+static inline int aa_profile_af_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+					struct common_audit_data *sa,
+					u32 request,
+					struct sock *sk)
+{
+	return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, sa, request, sk->sk_family,
+				  sk->sk_type);
+}
+int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk);
+
+int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
+		      struct socket *sock);
+
+#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
index d7b7e7115160..38aa6247d00f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h
@@ -138,9 +138,10 @@ extern struct aa_perms allperms;
 
 
 void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask);
-void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask);
+void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names,
+			 u32 mask);
 void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs,
-			u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask);
+			u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask);
 void aa_apply_modes_to_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
 			     struct aa_perms *perms);
 void aa_compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index c93b9ed55490..ffe12a2366e0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include "file.h"
 #include "lib.h"
 #include "label.h"
+#include "net.h"
 #include "perms.h"
 #include "resource.h"
 
@@ -224,6 +225,16 @@ static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_SAFE(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_profile *profile,
+					       u16 AF) {
+	unsigned int state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET);
+	__be16 be_af = cpu_to_be16(AF);
+
+	if (!state)
+		return 0;
+	return aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &be_af, 2);
+}
+
 /**
  * aa_get_profile - increment refcount on profile @p
  * @p: profile  (MAYBE NULL)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From b9590ad4c4f2fedc364016613f2af74ea7758bea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Sat, 3 Mar 2018 01:59:02 -0800
Subject: apparmor: remove POLICY_MEDIATES_SAFE

The unpack code now makes sure every profile has a dfa so the safe
version of POLICY_MEDIATES is no longer needed.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
 security/apparmor/include/policy.h | 12 +-----------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 11 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security/apparmor/include')

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index ffe12a2366e0..ab64c6b5db5a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -214,17 +214,7 @@ static inline struct aa_profile *aa_get_newest_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
 	return labels_profile(aa_get_newest_label(&p->label));
 }
 
-#define PROFILE_MEDIATES(P, T)  ((P)->policy.start[(T)])
-/* safe version of POLICY_MEDIATES for full range input */
-static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_SAFE(struct aa_profile *profile,
-						 unsigned char class)
-{
-	if (profile->policy.dfa)
-		return aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa,
-					profile->policy.start[0], &class, 1);
-	return 0;
-}
-
+#define PROFILE_MEDIATES(P, T)  ((P)->policy.start[(unsigned char) (T)])
 static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_profile *profile,
 					       u16 AF) {
 	unsigned int state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3