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The asynchronous hash API allows initiating a hash calculation and
then performing other tasks, while waiting for the hash calculation
to complete.
This patch introduces usage of double buffering for simultaneous
hashing and reading of the next chunk of data from storage.
Changes in v3:
- better comments
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Use of multiple-page collect buffers reduces:
1) the number of block IO requests
2) the number of asynchronous hash update requests
Second is important for HW accelerated hashing, because significant
amount of time is spent for preparation of hash update operation,
which includes configuring acceleration HW, DMA engine, etc...
Thus, HW accelerators are more efficient when working on large
chunks of data.
This patch introduces usage of multi-page collect buffers. Buffer size
can be specified using 'ahash_bufsize' module parameter. Default buffer
size is 4096 bytes.
Changes in v3:
- kernel parameter replaced with module parameter
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Async hash API allows the use of HW acceleration for hash calculation.
It may give significant performance gain and/or reduce power consumption,
which might be very beneficial for battery powered devices.
This patch introduces hash calculation using ahash API. ahash performance
depends on the data size and the particular HW. Depending on the specific
system, shash performance may be better.
This patch defines 'ahash_minsize' module parameter, which is used to
define the minimal file size to use with ahash. If this minimum file size
is not set or the file is smaller than defined by the parameter, shash will
be used.
Changes in v3:
- kernel parameter replaced with module parameter
- pr_crit replaced with pr_crit_ratelimited
- more comment changes - Mimi
Changes in v2:
- ima_ahash_size became as ima_ahash
- ahash pre-allocation moved out from __init code to be able to use
ahash crypto modules. Ahash allocated once on the first use.
- hash calculation falls back to shash if ahash allocation/calculation fails
- complex initialization separated from variable declaration
- improved comments
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Replace spaces in op keyword labels in log output since userspace audit tools
can't parse orphaned keywords.
Reported-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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process_measurement() always calls ima_template_desc_current(),
including when an IMA policy has not been defined.
This patch delays template descriptor lookup until action is
determined.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Before 2.6.39 inode->i_readcount was maintained by IMA. It was not atomic
and protected using spinlock. For 2.6.39, i_readcount was converted to
atomic and maintaining was moved VFS layer. Spinlock for some unclear
reason was replaced by i_mutex.
After analyzing the code, we came to conclusion that i_mutex locking is
unnecessary, especially when an IMA policy has not been defined.
This patch removes i_mutex locking from ima_rdwr_violation_check().
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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into next
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The sock_graft() hook has special handling for AF_INET, AF_INET, and
AF_UNIX sockets as those address families have special hooks which
label the sock before it is attached its associated socket.
Unfortunately, the sock_graft() hook was missing a default approach
to labeling sockets which meant that any other address family which
made use of connections or the accept() syscall would find the
returned socket to be in an "unlabeled" state. This was recently
demonstrated by the kcrypto/AF_ALG subsystem and the newly released
cryptsetup package (cryptsetup v1.6.5 and later).
This patch preserves the special handling in selinux_sock_graft(),
but adds a default behavior - setting the sock's label equal to the
associated socket - which resolves the problem with AF_ALG and
presumably any other address family which makes use of accept().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
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Linux 3.15
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security
Pull more security layer updates from Serge Hallyn:
"A few more commits had previously failed to make it through
security-next into linux-next but this week made it into linux-next.
At least commit "ima: introduce ima_kernel_read()" was deemed critical
by Mimi to make this merge window.
This is a temporary tree just for this request. Mimi has pointed me
to some previous threads about keeping maintainer trees at the
previous release, which I'll certainly do for anything long-term,
after talking with James"
* 'serge-next-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security:
ima: introduce ima_kernel_read()
evm: prohibit userspace writing 'security.evm' HMAC value
ima: check inode integrity cache in violation check
ima: prevent unnecessary policy checking
evm: provide option to protect additional SMACK xattrs
evm: replace HMAC version with attribute mask
ima: prevent new digsig xattr from being replaced
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Commit 8aac62706 "move exit_task_namespaces() outside of exit_notify"
introduced the kernel opps since the kernel v3.10, which happens when
Apparmor and IMA-appraisal are enabled at the same time.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
[ 106.750167] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
0000000000000018
[ 106.750221] IP: [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
[ 106.750241] PGD 0
[ 106.750254] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 106.750272] Modules linked in: cuse parport_pc ppdev bnep rfcomm
bluetooth rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl nfs lockd sunrpc
fscache dm_crypt intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp
kvm_intel snd_hda_codec_hdmi kvm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul
ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw gf128mul
ablk_helper cryptd snd_hda_codec_realtek dcdbas snd_hda_intel
snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_page_alloc snd_seq_midi
snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi psmouse snd_seq microcode serio_raw
snd_timer snd_seq_device snd soundcore video lpc_ich coretemp mac_hid lp
parport mei_me mei nbd hid_generic e1000e usbhid ahci ptp hid libahci
pps_core
[ 106.750658] CPU: 6 PID: 1394 Comm: mysqld Not tainted 3.13.0-rc7-kds+ #15
[ 106.750673] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 9010/0M9KCM, BIOS A08
09/19/2012
[ 106.750689] task: ffff8800de804920 ti: ffff880400fca000 task.ti:
ffff880400fca000
[ 106.750704] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811ec7da>] [<ffffffff811ec7da>]
our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
[ 106.750725] RSP: 0018:ffff880400fcba60 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 106.750738] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000100 RCX:
ffff8800d51523e7
[ 106.750764] RDX: ffffffffffffffea RSI: ffff880400fcba34 RDI:
ffff880402d20020
[ 106.750791] RBP: ffff880400fcbae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
0000000000000001
[ 106.750817] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12:
ffff8800d5152300
[ 106.750844] R13: ffff8803eb8df510 R14: ffff880400fcbb28 R15:
ffff8800d51523e7
[ 106.750871] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88040d200000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 106.750910] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 106.750935] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000001c0e000 CR4:
00000000001407e0
[ 106.750962] Stack:
[ 106.750981] ffffffff813434eb ffff880400fcbb20 ffff880400fcbb18
0000000000000000
[ 106.751037] ffff8800de804920 ffffffff8101b9b9 0001800000000000
0000000000000100
[ 106.751093] 0000010000000000 0000000000000002 000000000000000e
ffff8803eb8df500
[ 106.751149] Call Trace:
[ 106.751172] [<ffffffff813434eb>] ? aa_path_name+0x2ab/0x430
[ 106.751199] [<ffffffff8101b9b9>] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
[ 106.751225] [<ffffffff8134a68d>] aa_path_perm+0x7d/0x170
[ 106.751250] [<ffffffff8101b945>] ? native_sched_clock+0x15/0x80
[ 106.751276] [<ffffffff8134aa73>] aa_file_perm+0x33/0x40
[ 106.751301] [<ffffffff81348c5e>] common_file_perm+0x8e/0xb0
[ 106.751327] [<ffffffff81348d78>] apparmor_file_permission+0x18/0x20
[ 106.751355] [<ffffffff8130c853>] security_file_permission+0x23/0xa0
[ 106.751382] [<ffffffff811c77a2>] rw_verify_area+0x52/0xe0
[ 106.751407] [<ffffffff811c789d>] vfs_read+0x6d/0x170
[ 106.751432] [<ffffffff811cda31>] kernel_read+0x41/0x60
[ 106.751457] [<ffffffff8134fd45>] ima_calc_file_hash+0x225/0x280
[ 106.751483] [<ffffffff8134fb52>] ? ima_calc_file_hash+0x32/0x280
[ 106.751509] [<ffffffff8135022d>] ima_collect_measurement+0x9d/0x160
[ 106.751536] [<ffffffff810b552d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 106.751562] [<ffffffff8134f07c>] ? ima_file_free+0x6c/0xd0
[ 106.751587] [<ffffffff81352824>] ima_update_xattr+0x34/0x60
[ 106.751612] [<ffffffff8134f0d0>] ima_file_free+0xc0/0xd0
[ 106.751637] [<ffffffff811c9635>] __fput+0xd5/0x300
[ 106.751662] [<ffffffff811c98ae>] ____fput+0xe/0x10
[ 106.751687] [<ffffffff81086774>] task_work_run+0xc4/0xe0
[ 106.751712] [<ffffffff81066fad>] do_exit+0x2bd/0xa90
[ 106.751738] [<ffffffff8173c958>] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b
[ 106.751763] [<ffffffff8106780c>] do_group_exit+0x4c/0xc0
[ 106.751788] [<ffffffff81067894>] SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20
[ 106.751814] [<ffffffff8174522d>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f
[ 106.751839] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 e8 22 fe ff ff 5d c3
0f 1f 44 00 00 55 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 c9 00 00 48 8b 80 28 06 00 00 48 89
e5 5d <48> 8b 40 18 48 39 87 c0 00 00 00 0f 94 c0 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00
[ 106.752185] RIP [<ffffffff811ec7da>] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
[ 106.752214] RSP <ffff880400fcba60>
[ 106.752236] CR2: 0000000000000018
[ 106.752258] ---[ end trace 3c520748b4732721 ]---
----------------------------------------------------------------------
The reason for the oops is that IMA-appraisal uses "kernel_read()" when
file is closed. kernel_read() honors LSM security hook which calls
Apparmor handler, which uses current->nsproxy->mnt_ns. The 'guilty'
commit changed the order of cleanup code so that nsproxy->mnt_ns was
not already available for Apparmor.
Discussion about the issue with Al Viro and Eric W. Biederman suggested
that kernel_read() is too high-level for IMA. Another issue, except
security checking, that was identified is mandatory locking. kernel_read
honors it as well and it might prevent IMA from calculating necessary hash.
It was suggested to use simplified version of the function without security
and locking checks.
This patch introduces special version ima_kernel_read(), which skips security
and mandatory locking checking. It prevents the kernel oops to happen.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Suggested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
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Calculating the 'security.evm' HMAC value requires access to the
EVM encrypted key. Only the kernel should have access to it. This
patch prevents userspace tools(eg. setfattr, cp --preserve=xattr)
from setting/modifying the 'security.evm' HMAC value directly.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
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When IMA did not support ima-appraisal, existance of the S_IMA flag
clearly indicated that the file was measured. With IMA appraisal S_IMA
flag indicates that file was measured and/or appraised. Because of
this, when measurement is not enabled by the policy, violations are
still reported.
To differentiate between measurement and appraisal policies this
patch checks the inode integrity cache flags. The IMA_MEASURED
flag indicates whether the file was actually measured, while the
IMA_MEASURE flag indicates whether the file should be measured.
Unfortunately, the IMA_MEASURED flag is reset to indicate the file
needs to be re-measured. Thus, this patch checks the IMA_MEASURE
flag.
This patch limits the false positive violation reports, but does
not fix it entirely. The IMA_MEASURE/IMA_MEASURED flags are
indications that, at some point in time, the file opened for read
was in policy, but might not be in policy now (eg. different uid).
Other changes would be needed to further limit false positive
violation reports.
Changelog:
- expanded patch description based on conversation with Roberto (Mimi)
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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ima_rdwr_violation_check is called for every file openning.
The function checks the policy even when violation condition
is not met. It causes unnecessary policy checking.
This patch does policy checking only if violation condition is met.
Changelog:
- check writecount is greater than zero (Mimi)
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Newer versions of SMACK introduced following security xattrs:
SMACK64EXEC, SMACK64TRANSMUTE and SMACK64MMAP.
To protect these xattrs, this patch includes them in the HMAC
calculation. However, for backwards compatibility with existing
labeled filesystems, including these xattrs needs to be
configurable.
Changelog:
- Add SMACK dependency on new option (Mimi)
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Using HMAC version limits the posibility to arbitrarily add new
attributes such as SMACK64EXEC to the hmac calculation.
This patch replaces hmac version with attribute mask.
Desired attributes can be enabled with configuration parameter.
It allows to build kernels which works with previously labeled
filesystems.
Currently supported attribute is 'fsuuid' which is equivalent of
the former version 2.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Even though a new xattr will only be appraised on the next access,
set the DIGSIG flag to prevent a signature from being replaced with
a hash on file close.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Seccomp BPF filters can now be JIT'd, from Alexei Starovoitov.
2) Multiqueue support in xen-netback and xen-netfront, from Andrew J
Benniston.
3) Allow tweaking of aggregation settings in cdc_ncm driver, from Bjørn
Mork.
4) BPF now has a "random" opcode, from Chema Gonzalez.
5) Add more BPF documentation and improve test framework, from Daniel
Borkmann.
6) Support TCP fastopen over ipv6, from Daniel Lee.
7) Add software TSO helper functions and use them to support software
TSO in mvneta and mv643xx_eth drivers. From Ezequiel Garcia.
8) Support software TSO in fec driver too, from Nimrod Andy.
9) Add Broadcom SYSTEMPORT driver, from Florian Fainelli.
10) Handle broadcasts more gracefully over macvlan when there are large
numbers of interfaces configured, from Herbert Xu.
11) Allow more control over fwmark used for non-socket based responses,
from Lorenzo Colitti.
12) Do TCP congestion window limiting based upon measurements, from Neal
Cardwell.
13) Support busy polling in SCTP, from Neal Horman.
14) Allow RSS key to be configured via ethtool, from Venkata Duvvuru.
15) Bridge promisc mode handling improvements from Vlad Yasevich.
16) Don't use inetpeer entries to implement ID generation any more, it
performs poorly, from Eric Dumazet.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1522 commits)
rtnetlink: fix userspace API breakage for iproute2 < v3.9.0
tcp: fixing TLP's FIN recovery
net: fec: Add software TSO support
net: fec: Add Scatter/gather support
net: fec: Increase buffer descriptor entry number
net: fec: Factorize feature setting
net: fec: Enable IP header hardware checksum
net: fec: Factorize the .xmit transmit function
bridge: fix compile error when compiling without IPv6 support
bridge: fix smatch warning / potential null pointer dereference
via-rhine: fix full-duplex with autoneg disable
bnx2x: Enlarge the dorq threshold for VFs
bnx2x: Check for UNDI in uncommon branch
bnx2x: Fix 1G-baseT link
bnx2x: Fix link for KR with swapped polarity lane
sctp: Fix sk_ack_backlog wrap-around problem
net/core: Add VF link state control policy
net/fsl: xgmac_mdio is dependent on OF_MDIO
net/fsl: Make xgmac_mdio read error message useful
net_sched: drr: warn when qdisc is not work conserving
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security
Pull security layer updates from Serge Hallyn:
"This is a merge of James Morris' security-next tree from 3.14 to
yesterday's master, plus four patches from Paul Moore which are in
linux-next, plus one patch from Mimi"
* 'serge-next-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security:
ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag
selinux: conditionally reschedule in hashtab_insert while loading selinux policy
selinux: conditionally reschedule in mls_convert_context while loading selinux policy
selinux: reject setexeccon() on MNT_NOSUID applications with -EACCES
selinux: Report permissive mode in avc: denied messages.
Warning in scanf string typing
Smack: Label cgroup files for systemd
Smack: Verify read access on file open - v3
security: Convert use of typedef ctl_table to struct ctl_table
Smack: bidirectional UDS connect check
Smack: Correctly remove SMACK64TRANSMUTE attribute
SMACK: Fix handling value==NULL in post setxattr
bugfix patch for SMACK
Smack: adds smackfs/ptrace interface
Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack
Smack: fix the subject/object order in smack_ptrace_traceme()
Minor improvement of 'smack_sb_kern_mount'
smack: fix key permission verification
KEYS: Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup
Pull cgroup updates from Tejun Heo:
"A lot of activities on cgroup side. Heavy restructuring including
locking simplification took place to improve the code base and enable
implementation of the unified hierarchy, which currently exists behind
a __DEVEL__ mount option. The core support is mostly complete but
individual controllers need further work. To explain the design and
rationales of the the unified hierarchy
Documentation/cgroups/unified-hierarchy.txt
is added.
Another notable change is css (cgroup_subsys_state - what each
controller uses to identify and interact with a cgroup) iteration
update. This is part of continuing updates on css object lifetime and
visibility. cgroup started with reference count draining on removal
way back and is now reaching a point where csses behave and are
iterated like normal refcnted objects albeit with some complexities to
allow distinguishing the state where they're being deleted. The css
iteration update isn't taken advantage of yet but is planned to be
used to simplify memcg significantly"
* 'for-3.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup: (77 commits)
cgroup: disallow disabled controllers on the default hierarchy
cgroup: don't destroy the default root
cgroup: disallow debug controller on the default hierarchy
cgroup: clean up MAINTAINERS entries
cgroup: implement css_tryget()
device_cgroup: use css_has_online_children() instead of has_children()
cgroup: convert cgroup_has_live_children() into css_has_online_children()
cgroup: use CSS_ONLINE instead of CGRP_DEAD
cgroup: iterate cgroup_subsys_states directly
cgroup: introduce CSS_RELEASED and reduce css iteration fallback window
cgroup: move cgroup->serial_nr into cgroup_subsys_state
cgroup: link all cgroup_subsys_states in their sibling lists
cgroup: move cgroup->sibling and ->children into cgroup_subsys_state
cgroup: remove cgroup->parent
device_cgroup: remove direct access to cgroup->children
memcg: update memcg_has_children() to use css_next_child()
memcg: remove tasks/children test from mem_cgroup_force_empty()
cgroup: remove css_parent()
cgroup: skip refcnting on normal root csses and cgrp_dfl_root self css
cgroup: use cgroup->self.refcnt for cgroup refcnting
...
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Files are measured or appraised based on the IMA policy. When a
file, in policy, is opened with the O_DIRECT flag, a deadlock
occurs.
The first attempt at resolving this lockdep temporarily removed the
O_DIRECT flag and restored it, after calculating the hash. The
second attempt introduced the O_DIRECT_HAVELOCK flag. Based on this
flag, do_blockdev_direct_IO() would skip taking the i_mutex a second
time. The third attempt, by Dmitry Kasatkin, resolves the i_mutex
locking issue, by re-introducing the IMA mutex, but uncovered
another problem. Reading a file with O_DIRECT flag set, writes
directly to userspace pages. A second patch allocates a user-space
like memory. This works for all IMA hooks, except ima_file_free(),
which is called on __fput() to recalculate the file hash.
Until this last issue is addressed, do not 'collect' the
measurement for measuring, appraising, or auditing files opened
with the O_DIRECT flag set. Based on policy, permit or deny file
access. This patch defines a new IMA policy rule option named
'permit_directio'. Policy rules could be defined, based on LSM
or other criteria, to permit specific applications to open files
with the O_DIRECT flag set.
Changelog v1:
- permit or deny file access based IMA policy rules
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
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After silencing the sleeping warning in mls_convert_context() I started
seeing similar traces from hashtab_insert. Do a cond_resched there too.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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selinux policy
On a slow machine (with debugging enabled), upgrading selinux policy may take
a considerable amount of time. Long enough that the softlockup detector
gets triggered.
The backtrace looks like this..
> BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 23s! [load_policy:19045]
> Call Trace:
> [<ffffffff81221ddf>] symcmp+0xf/0x20
> [<ffffffff81221c27>] hashtab_search+0x47/0x80
> [<ffffffff8122e96c>] mls_convert_context+0xdc/0x1c0
> [<ffffffff812294e8>] convert_context+0x378/0x460
> [<ffffffff81229170>] ? security_context_to_sid_core+0x240/0x240
> [<ffffffff812221b5>] sidtab_map+0x45/0x80
> [<ffffffff8122bb9f>] security_load_policy+0x3ff/0x580
> [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100
> [<ffffffff810786dd>] ? sched_clock_local+0x1d/0x80
> [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100
> [<ffffffff8103096a>] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr+0x82a/0xa50
> [<ffffffff810786dd>] ? sched_clock_local+0x1d/0x80
> [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100
> [<ffffffff8103096a>] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr+0x82a/0xa50
> [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100
> [<ffffffff81534ddc>] ? retint_restore_args+0xe/0xe
> [<ffffffff8109c82d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0
> [<ffffffff81279a2e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
> [<ffffffff810d28a8>] ? rcu_irq_exit+0x68/0xb0
> [<ffffffff81534ddc>] ? retint_restore_args+0xe/0xe
> [<ffffffff8121e947>] sel_write_load+0xa7/0x770
> [<ffffffff81139633>] ? vfs_write+0x1c3/0x200
> [<ffffffff81210e8e>] ? security_file_permission+0x1e/0xa0
> [<ffffffff8113952b>] vfs_write+0xbb/0x200
> [<ffffffff811581c7>] ? fget_light+0x397/0x4b0
> [<ffffffff81139c27>] SyS_write+0x47/0xa0
> [<ffffffff8153bde4>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
Stephen Smalley suggested:
> Maybe put a cond_resched() within the ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit()
> loop in mls_convert_context()?
That seems to do the trick. Tested by downgrading and re-upgrading selinux-policy-targeted.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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We presently prevent processes from using setexecon() to set the
security label of exec()'d processes when NO_NEW_PRIVS is enabled by
returning an error; however, we silently ignore setexeccon() when
exec()'ing from a nosuid mounted filesystem. This patch makes things
a bit more consistent by returning an error in the setexeccon()/nosuid
case.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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We cannot presently tell from an avc: denied message whether access was in
fact denied or was allowed due to global or per-domain permissive mode.
Add a permissive= field to the avc message to reflect this information.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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Conflicts:
drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c
drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_msgdma.c
drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_sgdma.c
net/ipv6/xfrm6_output.c
Several cases of overlapping changes.
The xfrm6_output.c has a bug fix which overlaps the renaming
of skb->local_df to skb->ignore_df.
In the Altera TSE driver cases, the register access cleanups
in net-next overlapped with bug fixes done in net.
Similarly a bug fix to send ALB packets in the bonding driver using
the right source address overlaps with cleanups in net-next.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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into next
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devcgroup_update_access() wants to know whether there are child
cgroups which are online and visible to userland and has_children()
may return false positive. Replace it with css_has_online_children().
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
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Currently, devcg::has_children() directly tests cgroup->children for
list emptiness. The field is not a published field and scheduled to
go away. In addition, the test isn't strictly correct as devcg should
only care about children which are visible to userland.
This patch converts has_children() to use css_next_child() instead.
The subtle incorrectness is noted and will be dealt with later.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
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cgroup in general is moving towards using cgroup_subsys_state as the
fundamental structural component and css_parent() was introduced to
convert from using cgroup->parent to css->parent. It was quite some
time ago and we're moving forward with making css more prominent.
This patch drops the trivial wrapper css_parent() and let the users
dereference css->parent. While at it, explicitly mark fields of css
which are public and immutable.
v2: New usage from device_cgroup.c converted.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
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After silencing the sleeping warning in mls_convert_context() I started
seeing similar traces from hashtab_insert. Do a cond_resched there too.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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selinux policy
On a slow machine (with debugging enabled), upgrading selinux policy may take
a considerable amount of time. Long enough that the softlockup detector
gets triggered.
The backtrace looks like this..
> BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 23s! [load_policy:19045]
> Call Trace:
> [<ffffffff81221ddf>] symcmp+0xf/0x20
> [<ffffffff81221c27>] hashtab_search+0x47/0x80
> [<ffffffff8122e96c>] mls_convert_context+0xdc/0x1c0
> [<ffffffff812294e8>] convert_context+0x378/0x460
> [<ffffffff81229170>] ? security_context_to_sid_core+0x240/0x240
> [<ffffffff812221b5>] sidtab_map+0x45/0x80
> [<ffffffff8122bb9f>] security_load_policy+0x3ff/0x580
> [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100
> [<ffffffff810786dd>] ? sched_clock_local+0x1d/0x80
> [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100
> [<ffffffff8103096a>] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr+0x82a/0xa50
> [<ffffffff810786dd>] ? sched_clock_local+0x1d/0x80
> [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100
> [<ffffffff8103096a>] ? __change_page_attr_set_clr+0x82a/0xa50
> [<ffffffff810788a8>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0xa8/0x100
> [<ffffffff81534ddc>] ? retint_restore_args+0xe/0xe
> [<ffffffff8109c82d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0
> [<ffffffff81279a2e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x3a/0x3f
> [<ffffffff810d28a8>] ? rcu_irq_exit+0x68/0xb0
> [<ffffffff81534ddc>] ? retint_restore_args+0xe/0xe
> [<ffffffff8121e947>] sel_write_load+0xa7/0x770
> [<ffffffff81139633>] ? vfs_write+0x1c3/0x200
> [<ffffffff81210e8e>] ? security_file_permission+0x1e/0xa0
> [<ffffffff8113952b>] vfs_write+0xbb/0x200
> [<ffffffff811581c7>] ? fget_light+0x397/0x4b0
> [<ffffffff81139c27>] SyS_write+0x47/0xa0
> [<ffffffff8153bde4>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
Stephen Smalley suggested:
> Maybe put a cond_resched() within the ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit()
> loop in mls_convert_context()?
That seems to do the trick. Tested by downgrading and re-upgrading selinux-policy-targeted.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
|
|
We presently prevent processes from using setexecon() to set the
security label of exec()'d processes when NO_NEW_PRIVS is enabled by
returning an error; however, we silently ignore setexeccon() when
exec()'ing from a nosuid mounted filesystem. This patch makes things
a bit more consistent by returning an error in the setexeccon()/nosuid
case.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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Convert all cftype->write_string() users to the new cftype->write()
which maps directly to kernfs write operation and has full access to
kernfs and cgroup contexts. The conversions are mostly mechanical.
* @css and @cft are accessed using of_css() and of_cft() accessors
respectively instead of being specified as arguments.
* Should return @nbytes on success instead of 0.
* @buf is not trimmed automatically. Trim if necessary. Note that
blkcg and netprio don't need this as the parsers already handle
whitespaces.
cftype->write_string() has no user left after the conversions and
removed.
While at it, remove unnecessary local variable @p in
cgroup_subtree_control_write() and stale comment about
CGROUP_LOCAL_BUFFER_SIZE in cgroup_freezer.c.
This patch doesn't introduce any visible behavior changes.
v2: netprio was missing from conversion. Converted.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Aristeu Rozanski <arozansk@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup
Pull cgroup fixes from Tejun Heo:
"During recent restructuring, device_cgroup unified config input check
and enforcement logic; unfortunately, it turned out to share too much.
Aristeu's patches fix the breakage and marked for -stable backport.
The other two patches are fallouts from kernfs conversion. The blkcg
change is temporary and will go away once kernfs internal locking gets
simplified (patches pending)"
* 'for-3.15-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
blkcg: use trylock on blkcg_pol_mutex in blkcg_reset_stats()
device_cgroup: check if exception removal is allowed
device_cgroup: fix the comment format for recently added functions
device_cgroup: rework device access check and exception checking
cgroup: fix the retry path of cgroup_mount()
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Conflicts:
drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_sgdma.c
net/netlink/af_netlink.c
net/sched/cls_api.c
net/sched/sch_api.c
The netlink conflict dealt with moving to netlink_capable() and
netlink_ns_capable() in the 'net' tree vs. supporting 'tc' operations
in non-init namespaces. These were simple transformations from
netlink_capable to netlink_ns_capable.
The Altera driver conflict was simply code removal overlapping some
void pointer cast cleanups in net-next.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs fixes from Al Viro:
"dcache fixes + kvfree() (uninlined, exported by mm/util.c) + posix_acl
bugfix from hch"
The dcache fixes are for a subtle LRU list corruption bug reported by
Miklos Szeredi, where people inside IBM saw list corruptions with the
LTP/host01 test.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
nick kvfree() from apparmor
posix_acl: handle NULL ACL in posix_acl_equiv_mode
dcache: don't need rcu in shrink_dentry_list()
more graceful recovery in umount_collect()
don't remove from shrink list in select_collect()
dentry_kill(): don't try to remove from shrink list
expand the call of dentry_lru_del() in dentry_kill()
new helper: dentry_free()
fold try_prune_one_dentry()
fold d_kill() and d_free()
fix races between __d_instantiate() and checks of dentry flags
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This fixes a warning about the mismatch of types between
the declared unsigned and integer.
Signed-off-by: Toralf Förster <toralf.foerster@gmx.de>
|
|
too many places open-code it
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
[PATCH v3 1/2] device_cgroup: check if exception removal is allowed
When the device cgroup hierarchy was introduced in
bd2953ebbb53 - devcg: propagate local changes down the hierarchy
a specific case was overlooked. Consider the hierarchy bellow:
A default policy: ALLOW, exceptions will deny access
\
B default policy: ALLOW, exceptions will deny access
There's no need to verify when an new exception is added to B because
in this case exceptions will deny access to further devices, which is
always fine. Hierarchy in device cgroup only makes sure B won't have
more access than A.
But when an exception is removed (by writing devices.allow), it isn't
checked if the user is in fact removing an inherited exception from A,
thus giving more access to B.
Example:
# echo 'a' >A/devices.allow
# echo 'c 1:3 rw' >A/devices.deny
# echo $$ >A/B/tasks
# echo >/dev/null
-bash: /dev/null: Operation not permitted
# echo 'c 1:3 w' >A/B/devices.allow
# echo >/dev/null
#
This shouldn't be allowed and this patch fixes it by making sure to never allow
exceptions in this case to be removed if the exception is partially or fully
present on the parent.
v3: missing '*' in function description
v2: improved log message and formatting fixes
Cc: cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aristeu Rozanski <arozansk@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
|
|
Moving more extensive explanations to the end of the comment.
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Aristeu Rozanski <arozansk@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
|
|
We cannot presently tell from an avc: denied message whether access was in
fact denied or was allowed due to global or per-domain permissive mode.
Add a permissive= field to the avc message to reflect this information.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
|
|
The cgroup filesystem isn't ready for an LSM to
properly use extented attributes. This patch makes
files created in the cgroup filesystem usable by
a system running Smack and systemd.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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|
Smack believes that many of the operatons that can
be performed on an open file descriptor are read operations.
The fstat and lseek system calls are examples.
An implication of this is that files shouldn't be open
if the task doesn't have read access even if it has
write access and the file is being opened write only.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
|
|
Register a netlink per-protocol bind fuction for audit to check userspace
process capabilities before allowing a multicast group connection.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
File-private locks have been merged into Linux for v3.15, and *now*
people are commenting that the name and macro definitions for the new
file-private locks suck.
...and I can't even disagree. The names and command macros do suck.
We're going to have to live with these for a long time, so it's
important that we be happy with the names before we're stuck with them.
The consensus on the lists so far is that they should be rechristened as
"open file description locks".
The name isn't a big deal for the kernel, but the command macros are not
visually distinct enough from the traditional POSIX lock macros. The
glibc and documentation folks are recommending that we change them to
look like F_OFD_{GETLK|SETLK|SETLKW}. That lessens the chance that a
programmer will typo one of the commands wrong, and also makes it easier
to spot this difference when reading code.
This patch makes the following changes that I think are necessary before
v3.15 ships:
1) rename the command macros to their new names. These end up in the uapi
headers and so are part of the external-facing API. It turns out that
glibc doesn't actually use the fcntl.h uapi header, but it's hard to
be sure that something else won't. Changing it now is safest.
2) make the the /proc/locks output display these as type "OFDLCK"
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Frank Filz <ffilzlnx@mindspring.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
|
|
Whenever a device file is opened and checked against current device
cgroup rules, it uses the same function (may_access()) as when a new
exception rule is added by writing devices.{allow,deny}. And in both
cases, the algorithm is the same, doesn't matter the behavior.
First problem is having device access to be considered the same as rule
checking. Consider the following structure:
A (default behavior: allow, exceptions disallow access)
\
B (default behavior: allow, exceptions disallow access)
A new exception is added to B by writing devices.deny:
c 12:34 rw
When checking if that exception is allowed in may_access():
if (dev_cgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) {
if (behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) {
/* the exception will deny access to certain devices */
return true;
Which is ok, since B is not getting more privileges than A, it doesn't
matter and the rule is accepted
Now, consider it's a device file open check and the process belongs to
cgroup B. The access will be generated as:
behavior: allow
exception: c 12:34 rw
The very same chunk of code will allow it, even if there's an explicit
exception telling to do otherwise.
A simple test case:
# mkdir new_group
# cd new_group
# echo $$ >tasks
# echo "c 1:3 w" >devices.deny
# echo >/dev/null
# echo $?
0
This is a serious bug and was introduced on
c39a2a3018f8 devcg: prepare may_access() for hierarchy support
To solve this problem, the device file open function was split from the
new exception check.
Second problem is how exceptions are processed by may_access(). The
first part of the said function tries to match fully with an existing
exception:
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) {
if ((refex->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEV_BLOCK))
continue;
if ((refex->type & DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEV_CHAR))
continue;
if (ex->major != ~0 && ex->major != refex->major)
continue;
if (ex->minor != ~0 && ex->minor != refex->minor)
continue;
if (refex->access & (~ex->access))
continue;
match = true;
break;
}
That means the new exception should be contained into an existing one to
be considered a match:
New exception Existing match? notes
b 12:34 rwm b 12:34 rwm yes
b 12:34 r b *:34 rw yes
b 12:34 rw b 12:34 w no extra "r"
b *:34 rw b 12:34 rw no too broad "*"
b *:34 rw b *:34 rwm yes
Which is fine in some cases. Consider:
A (default behavior: deny, exceptions allow access)
\
B (default behavior: deny, exceptions allow access)
In this case the full match makes sense, the new exception cannot add
more access than the parent allows
But this doesn't always work, consider:
A (default behavior: allow, exceptions disallow access)
\
B (default behavior: deny, exceptions allow access)
In this case, a new exception in B shouldn't match any of the exceptions
in A, after all you can't allow something that was forbidden by A. But
consider this scenario:
New exception Existing in A match? outcome
b 12:34 rw b 12:34 r no exception is accepted
Because the new exception has "w" as extra, it doesn't match, so it'll
be added to B's exception list.
The same problem can happen during a file access check. Consider a
cgroup with allow as default behavior:
Access Exception match?
b 12:34 rw b 12:34 r no
In this case, the access didn't match any of the exceptions in the
cgroup, which is required since exceptions will disallow access.
To solve this problem, two new functions were created to match an
exception either fully or partially. In the example above, a partial
check will be performed and it'll produce a match since at least
"b 12:34 r" from "b 12:34 rw" access matches.
Cc: cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aristeu Rozanski <arozansk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
|
|
This typedef is unnecessary and should just be removed.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next
|