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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Just three patches here. Other integrity changes are being upstreamed
via EFI (defines a common EFI secure and trusted boot IMA policy) and
BPF LSM (exporting the IMA file cache hash info based on inode).
The three patches included here:
- bug fix: fail calculating the file hash, when a file not opened for
read and the attempt to re-open it for read fails.
- defer processing the "ima_appraise" boot command line option to
avoid enabling different modes (e.g. fix, log) to when the secure
boot flag is available on arm.
- defines "ima-buf" as the default IMA buffer measurement template in
preparation for the builtin integrity "critical data" policy"
* tag 'integrity-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Don't modify file descriptor mode on the fly
ima: select ima-buf template for buffer measurement
ima: defer arch_ima_get_secureboot() call to IMA init time
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski:
"Core:
- support "prefer busy polling" NAPI operation mode, where we defer
softirq for some time expecting applications to periodically busy
poll
- AF_XDP: improve efficiency by more batching and hindering the
adjacency cache prefetcher
- af_packet: make packet_fanout.arr size configurable up to 64K
- tcp: optimize TCP zero copy receive in presence of partial or
unaligned reads making zero copy a performance win for much smaller
messages
- XDP: add bulk APIs for returning / freeing frames
- sched: support fragmenting IP packets as they come out of conntrack
- net: allow virtual netdevs to forward UDP L4 and fraglist GSO skbs
BPF:
- BPF switch from crude rlimit-based to memcg-based memory accounting
- BPF type format information for kernel modules and related tracing
enhancements
- BPF implement task local storage for BPF LSM
- allow the FENTRY/FEXIT/RAW_TP tracing programs to use
bpf_sk_storage
Protocols:
- mptcp: improve multiple xmit streams support, memory accounting and
many smaller improvements
- TLS: support CHACHA20-POLY1305 cipher
- seg6: add support for SRv6 End.DT4/DT6 behavior
- sctp: Implement RFC 6951: UDP Encapsulation of SCTP
- ppp_generic: add ability to bridge channels directly
- bridge: Connectivity Fault Management (CFM) support as is defined
in IEEE 802.1Q section 12.14.
Drivers:
- mlx5: make use of the new auxiliary bus to organize the driver
internals
- mlx5: more accurate port TX timestamping support
- mlxsw:
- improve the efficiency of offloaded next hop updates by using
the new nexthop object API
- support blackhole nexthops
- support IEEE 802.1ad (Q-in-Q) bridging
- rtw88: major bluetooth co-existance improvements
- iwlwifi: support new 6 GHz frequency band
- ath11k: Fast Initial Link Setup (FILS)
- mt7915: dual band concurrent (DBDC) support
- net: ipa: add basic support for IPA v4.5
Refactor:
- a few pieces of in_interrupt() cleanup work from Sebastian Andrzej
Siewior
- phy: add support for shared interrupts; get rid of multiple driver
APIs and have the drivers write a full IRQ handler, slight growth
of driver code should be compensated by the simpler API which also
allows shared IRQs
- add common code for handling netdev per-cpu counters
- move TX packet re-allocation from Ethernet switch tag drivers to a
central place
- improve efficiency and rename nla_strlcpy
- number of W=1 warning cleanups as we now catch those in a patchwork
build bot
Old code removal:
- wan: delete the DLCI / SDLA drivers
- wimax: move to staging
- wifi: remove old WDS wifi bridging support"
* tag 'net-next-5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1922 commits)
net: hns3: fix expression that is currently always true
net: fix proc_fs init handling in af_packet and tls
nfc: pn533: convert comma to semicolon
af_vsock: Assign the vsock transport considering the vsock address flags
af_vsock: Set VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST flag on the receive path
vsock_addr: Check for supported flag values
vm_sockets: Add VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST vsock flag
vm_sockets: Add flags field in the vsock address data structure
net: Disable NETIF_F_HW_TLS_TX when HW_CSUM is disabled
tcp: Add logic to check for SYN w/ data in tcp_simple_retransmit
net: mscc: ocelot: install MAC addresses in .ndo_set_rx_mode from process context
nfc: s3fwrn5: Release the nfc firmware
net: vxget: clean up sparse warnings
mlxsw: spectrum_router: Use eXtended mezzanine to offload IPv4 router
mlxsw: spectrum: Set KVH XLT cache mode for Spectrum2/3
mlxsw: spectrum_router_xm: Introduce basic XM cache flushing
mlxsw: reg: Add Router LPM Cache Enable Register
mlxsw: reg: Add Router LPM Cache ML Delete Register
mlxsw: spectrum_router_xm: Implement L-value tracking for M-index
mlxsw: reg: Add XM Router M Table Register
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Add speed testing on 1420-byte blocks for networking
Algorithms:
- Improve performance of chacha on ARM for network packets
- Improve performance of aegis128 on ARM for network packets
Drivers:
- Add support for Keem Bay OCS AES/SM4
- Add support for QAT 4xxx devices
- Enable crypto-engine retry mechanism in caam
- Enable support for crypto engine on sdm845 in qce
- Add HiSilicon PRNG driver support"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (161 commits)
crypto: qat - add capability detection logic in qat_4xxx
crypto: qat - add AES-XTS support for QAT GEN4 devices
crypto: qat - add AES-CTR support for QAT GEN4 devices
crypto: atmel-i2c - select CONFIG_BITREVERSE
crypto: hisilicon/trng - replace atomic_add_return()
crypto: keembay - Add support for Keem Bay OCS AES/SM4
dt-bindings: Add Keem Bay OCS AES bindings
crypto: aegis128 - avoid spurious references crypto_aegis128_update_simd
crypto: seed - remove trailing semicolon in macro definition
crypto: x86/poly1305 - Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg
crypto: x86/sha512 - Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg
crypto: aesni - Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg
crypto: cpt - Fix sparse warnings in cptpf
hwrng: ks-sa - Add dependency on IOMEM and OF
crypto: lib/blake2s - Move selftest prototype into header file
crypto: arm/aes-ce - work around Cortex-A57/A72 silion errata
crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()
crypto: ccree - rework cache parameters handling
crypto: cavium - Use dma_set_mask_and_coherent to simplify code
crypto: marvell/octeontx - Use dma_set_mask_and_coherent to simplify code
...
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Commit a408e4a86b36b ("ima: open a new file instance if no read
permissions") already introduced a second open to measure a file when the
original file descriptor does not allow it. However, it didn't remove the
existing method of changing the mode of the original file descriptor, which
is still necessary if the current process does not have enough privileges
to open a new one.
Changing the mode isn't really an option, as the filesystem might need to
do preliminary steps to make the read possible. Thus, this patch removes
the code and keeps the second open as the only option to measure a file
when it is unreadable with the original file descriptor.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.20.x: 0014cc04e8ec0 ima: Set file->f_mode
Fixes: 2fe5d6def1672 ("ima: integrity appraisal extension")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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This is in preparation to add a helper for BPF LSM programs to use
IMA hashes when attached to LSM hooks. There are LSM hooks like
inode_unlink which do not have a struct file * argument and cannot
use the existing ima_file_hash API.
An inode based API is, therefore, useful in LSM based detections like an
executable trying to delete itself which rely on the inode_unlink LSM
hook.
Moreover, the ima_file_hash function does nothing with the struct file
pointer apart from calling file_inode on it and converting it to an
inode.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201124151210.1081188-2-kpsingh@chromium.org
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The default IMA template used for all policy rules is the value set
for CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE if the policy rule does not specify
a template. The default IMA template for buffer measurements should be
'ima-buf' - so that the measured buffer is correctly included in the IMA
measurement log entry.
With the default template format, buffer measurements are added to
the measurement list, but do not include the buffer data, making it
difficult, if not impossible, to validate. Including 'ima-buf'
template records in the measurement list by default, should not impact
existing attestation servers without 'ima-buf' template support.
Initialize a global 'ima-buf' template and select that template,
by default, for buffer measurements.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Currently <crypto/sha.h> contains declarations for both SHA-1 and SHA-2,
and <crypto/sha3.h> contains declarations for SHA-3.
This organization is inconsistent, but more importantly SHA-1 is no
longer considered to be cryptographically secure. So to the extent
possible, SHA-1 shouldn't be grouped together with any of the other SHA
versions, and usage of it should be phased out.
Therefore, split <crypto/sha.h> into two headers <crypto/sha1.h> and
<crypto/sha2.h>, and make everyone explicitly specify whether they want
the declarations for SHA-1, SHA-2, or both.
This avoids making the SHA-1 declarations visible to files that don't
want anything to do with SHA-1. It also prepares for potentially moving
sha1.h into a new insecure/ or dangerous/ directory.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Chester reports that it is necessary to introduce a new way to pass
the EFI secure boot status between the EFI stub and the core kernel
on ARM systems. The usual way of obtaining this information is by
checking the SecureBoot and SetupMode EFI variables, but this can
only be done after the EFI variable workqueue is created, which
occurs in a subsys_initcall(), whereas arch_ima_get_secureboot()
is called much earlier by the IMA framework.
However, the IMA framework itself is started as a late_initcall,
and the only reason the call to arch_ima_get_secureboot() occurs
so early is because it happens in the context of a __setup()
callback that parses the ima_appraise= command line parameter.
So let's refactor this code a little bit, by using a core_param()
callback to capture the command line argument, and deferring any
reasoning based on its contents to the IMA init routine.
Cc: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20200904072905.25332-2-clin@suse.com/
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> [missing core_param()]
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: included linux/module.h]
Tested-by: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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There is a regular need in the kernel to provide a way to declare having a
dynamically sized set of trailing elements in a structure. Kernel code should
always use “flexible array members”[1] for these cases. The older style of
one-element or zero-length arrays should no longer be used[2].
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member
[2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.9-rc1/process/deprecated.html#zero-length-and-one-element-arrays
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Continuing IMA policy rule cleanup and validation in particular for
measuring keys, adding/removing/updating informational and error
messages (e.g. "ima_appraise" boot command line option), and other bug
fixes (e.g. minimal data size validation before use, return code and
NULL pointer checking)"
* tag 'integrity-v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Fix NULL pointer dereference in ima_file_hash
evm: Check size of security.evm before using it
ima: Remove semicolon at the end of ima_get_binary_runtime_size()
ima: Don't ignore errors from crypto_shash_update()
ima: Use kmemdup rather than kmalloc+memcpy
integrity: include keyring name for unknown key request
ima: limit secure boot feedback scope for appraise
integrity: invalid kernel parameters feedback
ima: add check for enforced appraise option
integrity: Use current_uid() in integrity_audit_message()
ima: Fail rule parsing when asymmetric key measurement isn't supportable
ima: Pre-parse the list of keyrings in a KEY_CHECK rule
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc
Pull char/misc driver updates from Greg KH:
"Here is the big set of char, misc, and other assorted driver subsystem
patches for 5.10-rc1.
There's a lot of different things in here, all over the drivers/
directory. Some summaries:
- soundwire driver updates
- habanalabs driver updates
- extcon driver updates
- nitro_enclaves new driver
- fsl-mc driver and core updates
- mhi core and bus updates
- nvmem driver updates
- eeprom driver updates
- binder driver updates and fixes
- vbox minor bugfixes
- fsi driver updates
- w1 driver updates
- coresight driver updates
- interconnect driver updates
- misc driver updates
- other minor driver updates
All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
issues"
* tag 'char-misc-5.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (396 commits)
binder: fix UAF when releasing todo list
docs: w1: w1_therm: Fix broken xref, mistakes, clarify text
misc: Kconfig: fix a HISI_HIKEY_USB dependency
LSM: Fix type of id parameter in kernel_post_load_data prototype
misc: Kconfig: add a new dependency for HISI_HIKEY_USB
firmware_loader: fix a kernel-doc markup
w1: w1_therm: make w1_poll_completion static
binder: simplify the return expression of binder_mmap
test_firmware: Test partial read support
firmware: Add request_partial_firmware_into_buf()
firmware: Store opt_flags in fw_priv
fs/kernel_file_read: Add "offset" arg for partial reads
IMA: Add support for file reads without contents
LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook
module: Call security_kernel_post_load_data()
firmware_loader: Use security_post_load_data()
LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook
fs/kernel_read_file: Add file_size output argument
fs/kernel_read_file: Switch buffer size arg to size_t
fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Allow DRBG testing through user-space af_alg
- Add tcrypt speed testing support for keyed hashes
- Add type-safe init/exit hooks for ahash
Algorithms:
- Mark arc4 as obsolete and pending for future removal
- Mark anubis, khazad, sead and tea as obsolete
- Improve boot-time xor benchmark
- Add OSCCA SM2 asymmetric cipher algorithm and use it for integrity
Drivers:
- Fixes and enhancement for XTS in caam
- Add support for XIP8001B hwrng in xiphera-trng
- Add RNG and hash support in sun8i-ce/sun8i-ss
- Allow imx-rngc to be used by kernel entropy pool
- Use crypto engine in omap-sham
- Add support for Ingenic X1830 with ingenic"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (205 commits)
X.509: Fix modular build of public_key_sm2
crypto: xor - Remove unused variable count in do_xor_speed
X.509: fix error return value on the failed path
crypto: bcm - Verify GCM/CCM key length in setkey
crypto: qat - drop input parameter from adf_enable_aer()
crypto: qat - fix function parameters descriptions
crypto: atmel-tdes - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
crypto: drivers - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
hwrng: mxc-rnga - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
hwrng: iproc-rng200 - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
hwrng: stm32 - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking
crypto: xor - defer load time benchmark to a later time
crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix the uninitalized 'curr_qm_qp_num'
crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix the return value when device is busy
crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix zero length input in GZIP decompress
crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix the uncleared debug registers
lib/mpi: Fix unused variable warnings
crypto: x86/poly1305 - Remove assignments with no effect
hwrng: npcm - modify readl to readb
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull EFI changes from Ingo Molnar:
- Preliminary RISC-V enablement - the bulk of it will arrive via the
RISCV tree.
- Relax decompressed image placement rules for 32-bit ARM
- Add support for passing MOK certificate table contents via a config
table rather than a EFI variable.
- Add support for 18 bit DIMM row IDs in the CPER records.
- Work around broken Dell firmware that passes the entire Boot####
variable contents as the command line
- Add definition of the EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO memory attribute so we
can identify it in the memory map listings.
- Don't abort the boot on arm64 if the EFI RNG protocol is available
but returns with an error
- Replace slashes with exclamation marks in efivarfs file names
- Split efi-pstore from the deprecated efivars sysfs code, so we can
disable the latter on !x86.
- Misc fixes, cleanups and updates.
* tag 'efi-core-2020-10-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (26 commits)
efi: mokvar: add missing include of asm/early_ioremap.h
efi: efivars: limit availability to X86 builds
efi: remove some false dependencies on CONFIG_EFI_VARS
efi: gsmi: fix false dependency on CONFIG_EFI_VARS
efi: efivars: un-export efivars_sysfs_init()
efi: pstore: move workqueue handling out of efivars
efi: pstore: disentangle from deprecated efivars module
efi: mokvar-table: fix some issues in new code
efi/arm64: libstub: Deal gracefully with EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL failure
efivarfs: Replace invalid slashes with exclamation marks in dentries.
efi: Delete deprecated parameter comments
efi/libstub: Fix missing-prototypes in string.c
efi: Add definition of EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO and ability to report it
cper,edac,efi: Memory Error Record: bank group/address and chip id
edac,ghes,cper: Add Row Extension to Memory Error Record
efi/x86: Add a quirk to support command line arguments on Dell EFI firmware
efi/libstub: Add efi_warn and *_once logging helpers
integrity: Load certs from the EFI MOK config table
integrity: Move import of MokListRT certs to a separate routine
efi: Support for MOK variable config table
...
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To perform partial reads, callers of kernel_read_file*() must have a
non-NULL file_size argument and a preallocated buffer. The new "offset"
argument can then be used to seek to specific locations in the file to
fill the buffer to, at most, "buf_size" per call.
Where possible, the LSM hooks can report whether a full file has been
read or not so that the contents can be reasoned about.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-14-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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When the kernel_read_file LSM hook is called with contents=false, IMA
can appraise the file directly, without requiring a filled buffer. When
such a buffer is available, though, IMA can continue to use it instead
of forcing a double read here.
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200706232309.12010-10-scott.branden@broadcom.com/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-13-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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As with the kernel_load_data LSM hook, add a "contents" flag to the
kernel_read_file LSM hook that indicates whether the LSM can expect
a matching call to the kernel_post_read_file LSM hook with the full
contents of the file. With the coming addition of partial file read
support for kernel_read_file*() API, the LSM will no longer be able
to always see the entire contents of a file during the read calls.
For cases where the LSM must read examine the complete file contents,
it will need to do so on its own every time the kernel_read_file
hook is called with contents=false (or reject such cases). Adjust all
existing LSMs to retain existing behavior.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-12-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Now that security_post_load_data() is wired up, use it instead
of the NULL file argument style of security_post_read_file(),
and update the security_kernel_load_data() call to indicate that a
security_kernel_post_load_data() call is expected.
Wire up the IMA check to match earlier logic. Perhaps a generalized
change to ima_post_load_data() might look something like this:
return process_buffer_measurement(buf, size,
kernel_load_data_id_str(load_id),
read_idmap[load_id] ?: FILE_CHECK,
0, NULL);
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-10-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have
visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or
read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the
buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such
hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data().
Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a
NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for
the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was
left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in
a subsequent patch.)
Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single
contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image
segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to
reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle
this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that
indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called
with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents
can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false
(which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true
they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook
once the buffer is loaded.
With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads
(e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen
in subsequent patches.
Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-9-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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In preparation for adding partial read support, add an optional output
argument to kernel_read_file*() that reports the file size so callers
can reason more easily about their reading progress.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-8-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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In preparation for further refactoring of kernel_read_file*(), rename
the "max_size" argument to the more accurate "buf_size", and correct
its type to size_t. Add kerndoc to explain the specifics of how the
arguments will be used. Note that with buf_size now size_t, it can no
longer be negative (and was never called with a negative value). Adjust
callers to use it as a "maximum size" when *buf is NULL.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-7-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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In preparation for refactoring kernel_read_file*(), remove the redundant
"size" argument which is not needed: it can be included in the return
code, with callers adjusted. (VFS reads already cannot be larger than
INT_MAX.)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-6-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Move kernel_read_file* out of linux/fs.h to its own linux/kernel_read_file.h
include file. That header gets pulled in just about everywhere
and doesn't really need functions not related to the general fs interface.
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706232309.12010-2-scott.branden@broadcom.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-4-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER is a "how", not a "what", and confuses the LSMs
that are interested in filtering between types of things. The "how"
should be an internal detail made uninteresting to the LSMs.
Fixes: a098ecd2fa7d ("firmware: support loading into a pre-allocated buffer")
Fixes: fd90bc559bfb ("ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer)")
Fixes: 4f0496d8ffa3 ("ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-2-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Asymmetric digsig supports SM2-with-SM3 algorithm combination,
so that IMA can also verify SM2's signature data.
Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Tested-by: Xufeng Zhang <yunbo.xufeng@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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ima_file_hash can be called when there is no iint->ima_hash available
even though the inode exists in the integrity cache. It is fairly
common for a file to not have a hash. (e.g. an mknodat, prior to the
file being closed).
Another example where this can happen (suggested by Jann Horn):
Process A does:
while(1) {
unlink("/tmp/imafoo");
fd = open("/tmp/imafoo", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0700);
if (fd == -1) {
perror("open");
continue;
}
write(fd, "A", 1);
close(fd);
}
and Process B does:
while (1) {
int fd = open("/tmp/imafoo", O_RDONLY);
if (fd == -1)
continue;
char *mapping = mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC,
MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
if (mapping != MAP_FAILED)
munmap(mapping, 0x1000);
close(fd);
}
Due to the race to get the iint->mutex between ima_file_hash and
process_measurement iint->ima_hash could still be NULL.
Fixes: 6beea7afcc72 ("ima: add the ability to query the cached hash of a given file")
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Because of system-specific EFI firmware limitations, EFI volatile
variables may not be capable of holding the required contents of
the Machine Owner Key (MOK) certificate store when the certificate
list grows above some size. Therefore, an EFI boot loader may pass
the MOK certs via a EFI configuration table created specifically for
this purpose to avoid this firmware limitation.
An EFI configuration table is a much more primitive mechanism
compared to EFI variables and is well suited for one-way passage
of static information from a pre-OS environment to the kernel.
This patch adds the support to load certs from the MokListRT
entry in the MOK variable configuration table, if it's present.
The pre-existing support to load certs from the MokListRT EFI
variable remains and is used if the EFI MOK configuration table
isn't present or can't be successfully used.
Signed-off-by: Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200905013107.10457-4-lszubowi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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Move the loading of certs from the UEFI MokListRT into a separate
routine to facilitate additional MokList functionality.
There is no visible functional change as a result of this patch.
Although the UEFI dbx certs are now loaded before the MokList certs,
they are loaded onto different key rings. So the order of the keys
on their respective key rings is the same.
Signed-off-by: Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200905013107.10457-3-lszubowi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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This patch checks the size for the EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG and
EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG types to ensure that the algorithm is read from
the buffer returned by vfs_getxattr_alloc().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19.x
Fixes: 5feeb61183dde ("evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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This patch removes the unnecessary semicolon at the end of
ima_get_binary_runtime_size().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d158847ae89a2 ("ima: maintain memory size needed for serializing the measurement list")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Errors returned by crypto_shash_update() are not checked in
ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm() and thus can be overwritten at the next
iteration of the loop. This patch adds a check after calling
crypto_shash_update() and returns immediately if the result is not zero.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3323eec921efd ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Issue identified with Coccinelle.
Signed-off-by: Alex Dewar <alex.dewar90@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Depending on the IMA policy rule a key may be searched for in multiple
keyrings (e.g. .ima and .platform) and possibly not found. This patch
improves feedback by including the keyring "description" (name) in the
error message.
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated commit message]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Only emit an unknown/invalid message when setting the IMA appraise mode
to anything other than "enforce", when secureboot is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated commit message]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Don't silently ignore unknown or invalid ima_{policy,appraise,hash} and evm
kernel boot command line options.
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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The "enforce" string is allowed as an option for ima_appraise= kernel
paramenter per kernel-paramenters.txt and should be considered on the
parameter setup checking as a matter of completeness. Also it allows futher
checking on the options being passed by the user.
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Modify integrity_audit_message() to use current_uid().
Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Measuring keys is currently only supported for asymmetric keys. In the
future, this might change.
For now, the "func=KEY_CHECK" and "keyrings=" options are only
appropriate when CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Make
this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that
these policy language constructs are supported.
Fixes: 2b60c0ecedf8 ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Fixes: 5808611cccb2 ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")
Suggested-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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The ima_keyrings buffer was used as a work buffer for strsep()-based
parsing of the "keyrings=" option of an IMA policy rule. This parsing
was re-performed each time an asymmetric key was added to a kernel
keyring for each loaded policy rule that contained a "keyrings=" option.
An example rule specifying this option is:
measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=a|b|c
The rule says to measure asymmetric keys added to any of the kernel
keyrings named "a", "b", or "c". The size of the buffer size was
equal to the size of the largest "keyrings=" value seen in a previously
loaded rule (5 + 1 for the NUL-terminator in the previous example) and
the buffer was pre-allocated at the time of policy load.
The pre-allocated buffer approach suffered from a couple bugs:
1) There was no locking around the use of the buffer so concurrent key
add operations, to two different keyrings, would result in the
strsep() loop of ima_match_keyring() to modify the buffer at the same
time. This resulted in unexpected results from ima_match_keyring()
and, therefore, could cause unintended keys to be measured or keys to
not be measured when IMA policy intended for them to be measured.
2) If the kstrdup() that initialized entry->keyrings in ima_parse_rule()
failed, the ima_keyrings buffer was freed and set to NULL even when a
valid KEY_CHECK rule was previously loaded. The next KEY_CHECK event
would trigger a call to strcpy() with a NULL destination pointer and
crash the kernel.
Remove the need for a pre-allocated global buffer by parsing the list of
keyrings in a KEY_CHECK rule at the time of policy load. The
ima_rule_entry will contain an array of string pointers which point to
the name of each keyring specified in the rule. No string processing
needs to happen at the time of asymmetric key add so iterating through
the list and doing a string comparison is all that's required at the
time of policy check.
In the process of changing how the "keyrings=" policy option is handled,
a couple additional bugs were fixed:
1) The rule parser accepted rules containing invalid "keyrings=" values
such as "a|b||c", "a|b|", or simply "|".
2) The /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy file did not display the entire
"keyrings=" value if the list of keyrings was longer than what could
fit in the fixed size tbuf buffer in ima_policy_show().
Fixes: 5c7bac9fb2c5 ("IMA: pre-allocate buffer to hold keyrings string")
Fixes: 2b60c0ecedf8 ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Replace the existing /* fall through */ comments and its variants with
the new pseudo-keyword macro fallthrough[1]. Also, remove unnecessary
fall-through markings when it is the case.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.7/process/deprecated.html?highlight=fallthrough#implicit-switch-case-fall-through
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"A couple of minor documentation updates only for this release"
* tag 'for-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
LSM: drop duplicated words in header file comments
Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones: security
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Rationale:
Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM
as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate.
Deterministic algorithm:
For each file:
If not .svg:
For each line:
If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`:
For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`:
If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions
return 200 OK and serve the same content:
Replace HTTP with HTTPS.
Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov <grandmaster@al2klimov.de>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"The nicest change is the IMA policy rule checking. The other changes
include allowing the kexec boot cmdline line measure policy rules to
be defined in terms of the inode associated with the kexec kernel
image, making the IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM, which governs the IMA
appraise mode (log, fix, enforce), a runtime decision based on the
secure boot mode of the system, and including errno in the audit log"
* tag 'integrity-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: remove redundant initialization of variable ret
ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime
ima: AppArmor satisfies the audit rule requirements
ima: Rename internal filter rule functions
ima: Support additional conditionals in the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function
ima: Use the common function to detect LSM conditionals in a rule
ima: Move comprehensive rule validation checks out of the token parser
ima: Use correct type for the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements
ima: Shallow copy the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements
ima: Fail rule parsing when appraise_flag=blacklist is unsupportable
ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEY_CHECK hook is combined with an invalid cond
ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook is combined with an invalid cond
ima: Fail rule parsing when buffer hook functions have an invalid action
ima: Free the entire rule if it fails to parse
ima: Free the entire rule when deleting a list of rules
ima: Have the LSM free its audit rule
IMA: Add audit log for failure conditions
integrity: Add errno field in audit message
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The variable ret is being initialized with a value that is never read
and it is being updated later with a new value. The initialization is
redundant and can be removed.
Fixes: eb5798f2e28f ("integrity: convert digsig to akcipher api")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Addresses-Coverity: ("Unused value")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different "ima_appraise="
modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but not when IMA architecture
specific policies are enabled. This prevents properly labeling the
filesystem on systems where secure boot is supported, but not enabled on the
platform. Only when secure boot is actually enabled should these IMA
appraise modes be disabled.
This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a runtime
decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
Test results as follows:
-> x86-64 with secure boot enabled
[ 0.015637] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
[ 0.015668] ima: Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=fix boot parameter option
-> powerpc with secure boot disabled
[ 0.000000] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
[ 0.000000] Secure boot mode disabled
-> Running the system without secure boot and with both options set:
CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM=y
CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY=y
Audit prompts "missing-hash" but still allow execution and, consequently,
filesystem labeling:
type=INTEGRITY_DATA msg=audit(07/09/2020 12:30:27.778:1691) : pid=4976
uid=root auid=root ses=2
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=appraise_data
cause=missing-hash comm=bash name=/usr/bin/evmctl dev="dm-0" ino=493150
res=no
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d958083a8f64 ("x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86")
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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AppArmor meets all the requirements for IMA in terms of audit rules
since commit e79c26d04043 ("apparmor: Add support for audit rule
filtering"). Update IMA's Kconfig section for CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES to
reflect this.
Fixes: e79c26d04043 ("apparmor: Add support for audit rule filtering")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Rename IMA's internal filter rule functions from security_filter_rule_*()
to ima_filter_rule_*(). This avoids polluting the security_* namespace,
which is typically reserved for general security subsystem
infrastructure.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: reword using the term "filter", not "audit"]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Take the properties of the kexec kernel's inode and the current task
ownership into consideration when matching a KEXEC_CMDLINE operation to
the rules in the IMA policy. This allows for some uniformity when
writing IMA policy rules for KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
and KEXEC_CMDLINE operations.
Prior to this patch, it was not possible to write a set of rules like
this:
dont_measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK obj_type=foo_t
dont_measure func=KEXEC_INITRA |