Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|
tc_ctl_action() has the ability to loop forever if tcf_action_add()
returns -EAGAIN.
This special case has been done in case a module needed to be loaded,
but it turns out that tcf_add_notify() could also return -EAGAIN
if the socket sk_rcvbuf limit is hit.
We need to separate the two cases, and only loop for the module
loading case.
While we are at it, add a limit of 10 attempts since unbounded
loops are always scary.
syzbot repro was something like :
socket(PF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW|SOCK_NONBLOCK, NETLINK_ROUTE) = 3
write(3, ..., 38) = 38
setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, [0], 4) = 0
sendmsg(3, {msg_name(0)=NULL, msg_iov(1)=[{..., 388}], msg_controllen=0, msg_flags=0x10}, ...)
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 PID: 1054 Comm: khungtaskd Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
nmi_cpu_backtrace.cold+0x70/0xb2 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:101
nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x23b/0x28b lib/nmi_backtrace.c:62
arch_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/apic/hw_nmi.c:38
trigger_all_cpu_backtrace include/linux/nmi.h:146 [inline]
check_hung_uninterruptible_tasks kernel/hung_task.c:205 [inline]
watchdog+0x9d0/0xef0 kernel/hung_task.c:289
kthread+0x361/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:255
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
Sending NMI from CPU 0 to CPUs 1:
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 PID: 8859 Comm: syz-executor910 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:arch_local_save_flags arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:751 [inline]
RIP: 0010:lockdep_hardirqs_off+0x1df/0x2e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3453
Code: 5c 08 00 00 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 48 c7 c0 58 1d f3 88 48 ba 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 10 00 0f 85 d3 00 00 00 <48> 83 3d 21 9e 99 07 00 0f 84 b9 00 00 00 9c 58 0f 1f 44 00 00 f6
RSP: 0018:ffff8880a6f3f1b8 EFLAGS: 00000046
RAX: 1ffffffff11e63ab RBX: ffff88808c9c6080 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88808c9c6914
RBP: ffff8880a6f3f1d0 R08: ffff88808c9c6080 R09: fffffbfff16be5d1
R10: fffffbfff16be5d0 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffffffff8746591f
R13: ffff88808c9c6080 R14: ffffffff8746591f R15: 0000000000000003
FS: 00000000011e4880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffff600400 CR3: 00000000a8920000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
trace_hardirqs_off+0x62/0x240 kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c:45
__raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:108 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x6f/0xcd kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
__wake_up_common_lock+0xc8/0x150 kernel/sched/wait.c:122
__wake_up+0xe/0x10 kernel/sched/wait.c:142
netlink_unlock_table net/netlink/af_netlink.c:466 [inline]
netlink_unlock_table net/netlink/af_netlink.c:463 [inline]
netlink_broadcast_filtered+0x705/0xb80 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1514
netlink_broadcast+0x3a/0x50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1534
rtnetlink_send+0xdd/0x110 net/core/rtnetlink.c:714
tcf_add_notify net/sched/act_api.c:1343 [inline]
tcf_action_add+0x243/0x370 net/sched/act_api.c:1362
tc_ctl_action+0x3b5/0x4bc net/sched/act_api.c:1410
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x463/0xb00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5386
netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5404
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x531/0x710 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
netlink_sendmsg+0x8a5/0xd60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:657
___sys_sendmsg+0x803/0x920 net/socket.c:2311
__sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2356
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2365 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2363 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2363
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x760 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x440939
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+cf0adbb9c28c8866c788@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
For TCA_ACT_KIND, we have to keep the backward compatibility too,
and rely on nla_strlcpy() to check and terminate the string with
a NUL.
Note for TC actions, nla_strcmp() is already used to compare kind
strings, so we don't need to fix other places.
Fixes: 199ce850ce11 ("net_sched: add policy validation for action attributes")
Reported-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
|
|
Similar to commit 8b4c3cdd9dd8
("net: sched: Add policy validation for tc attributes"), we need
to add proper policy validation for TC action attributes too.
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
|
|
idr_for_each_entry_ul() is buggy as it can't handle overflow
case correctly. When we have an ID == UINT_MAX, it becomes an
infinite loop. This happens when running on 32-bit CPU where
unsigned long has the same size with unsigned int.
There is no better way to fix this than casting it to a larger
integer, but we can't just 64 bit integer on 32 bit CPU. Instead
we could just use an additional integer to help us to detect this
overflow case, that is, adding a new parameter to this macro.
Fortunately tc action is its only user right now.
Fixes: 65a206c01e8e ("net/sched: Change act_api and act_xxx modules to use IDR")
Reported-by: Li Shuang <shuali@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Chris Mi <chrism@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core
Pull yet more SPDX updates from Greg KH:
"Here is another set of reviewed patches that adds SPDX tags to
different kernel files, based on a set of rules that are being used to
parse the comments to try to determine that the license of the file is
"GPL-2.0-or-later" or "GPL-2.0-only". Only the "obvious" versions of
these matches are included here, a number of "non-obvious" variants of
text have been found but those have been postponed for later review
and analysis.
There is also a patch in here to add the proper SPDX header to a bunch
of Kbuild files that we have missed in the past due to new files being
added and forgetting that Kbuild uses two different file names for
Makefiles. This issue was reported by the Kbuild maintainer.
These patches have been out for review on the linux-spdx@vger mailing
list, and while they were created by automatic tools, they were
hand-verified by a bunch of different people, all whom names are on
the patches are reviewers"
* tag 'spdx-5.2-rc3-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core: (82 commits)
treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Kbuild
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 225
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 224
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 223
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 222
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 221
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 220
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 218
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 217
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 216
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 215
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 214
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 213
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 211
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 210
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 209
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 207
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 206
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 203
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 201
...
|
|
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Function tcf_action_dump() relies on tc_action->order field when starting
nested nla to send action data to userspace. This approach breaks in
several cases:
- When multiple filters point to same shared action, tc_action->order field
is overwritten each time it is attached to filter. This causes filter
dump to output action with incorrect attribute for all filters that have
the action in different position (different order) from the last set
tc_action->order value.
- When action data is displayed using tc action API (RTM_GETACTION), action
order is overwritten by tca_action_gd() according to its position in
resulting array of nl attributes, which will break filter dump for all
filters attached to that shared action that expect it to have different
order value.
Don't rely on tc_action->order when dumping actions. Set nla according to
action position in resulting array of actions instead.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
We currently have two levels of strict validation:
1) liberal (default)
- undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted
- attribute length >= expected accepted
- garbage at end of message accepted
2) strict (opt-in)
- NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted
- attribute length >= expected accepted
Split out parsing strictness into four different options:
* TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing
attributes (in message or nested)
* MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type
* UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries
* STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size
The default for future things should be *everything*.
The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE,
and is renamed to _deprecated_strict().
The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to
*_parse_deprecated().
Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags
even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in
this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to
not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going
forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply
to the POLICY flag.
We end up with the following renames:
* nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated
* nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict
* nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated
* nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict
* nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated
* nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated
Using spatch, of course:
@@
expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT;
@@
-nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT)
+nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT)
@@
expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
@@
expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT)
@@
expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT;
@@
-nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT)
+nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT)
@@
expression START, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT)
@@
expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT;
@@
-nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT)
+nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT)
For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions
yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong.
Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a
common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication.
Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every
new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the
next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is.
In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Even if the NLA_F_NESTED flag was introduced more than 11 years ago, most
netlink based interfaces (including recently added ones) are still not
setting it in kernel generated messages. Without the flag, message parsers
not aware of attribute semantics (e.g. wireshark dissector or libmnl's
mnl_nlmsg_fprintf()) cannot recognize nested attributes and won't display
the structure of their contents.
Unfortunately we cannot just add the flag everywhere as there may be
userspace applications which check nlattr::nla_type directly rather than
through a helper masking out the flags. Therefore the patch renames
nla_nest_start() to nla_nest_start_noflag() and introduces nla_nest_start()
as a wrapper adding NLA_F_NESTED. The calls which add NLA_F_NESTED manually
are rewritten to use nla_nest_start().
Except for changes in include/net/netlink.h, the patch was generated using
this semantic patch:
@@ expression E1, E2; @@
-nla_nest_start(E1, E2)
+nla_nest_start_noflag(E1, E2)
@@ expression E1, E2; @@
-nla_nest_start_noflag(E1, E2 | NLA_F_NESTED)
+nla_nest_start(E1, E2)
Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
use RCU when accessing the action chain, to avoid use after free in the
traffic path when 'goto chain' is replaced on existing TC actions (see
script below). Since the control action is read in the traffic path
without holding the action spinlock, we need to explicitly ensure that
a->goto_chain is not NULL before dereferencing (i.e it's not sufficient
to rely on the value of TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN bits). Not doing so caused NULL
dereferences in tcf_action_goto_chain_exec() when the following script:
# tc chain add dev dd0 chain 42 ingress protocol ip flower \
> ip_proto udp action pass index 4
# tc filter add dev dd0 ingress protocol ip flower \
> ip_proto udp action csum udp goto chain 42 index 66
# tc chain del dev dd0 chain 42 ingress
(start UDP traffic towards dd0)
# tc action replace action csum udp pass index 66
was run repeatedly for several hours.
Suggested-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
- pass a pointer to struct tcf_proto in each actions's init() handler,
to allow validating the control action, checking whether the chain
exists and (eventually) refcounting it.
- remove code that validates the control action after a successful call
to the action's init() handler, and replace it with a test that forbids
addition of actions having 'goto_chain' and NULL goto_chain pointer at
the same time.
- add tcf_action_check_ctrlact(), that will validate the control action
and eventually allocate the action 'goto_chain' within the init()
handler.
- add tcf_action_set_ctrlact(), that will assign the control action and
swap the current 'goto_chain' pointer with the new given one.
This disallows 'goto_chain' on actions that don't initialize it properly
in their init() handler, i.e. calling tcf_action_check_ctrlact() after
successful IDR reservation and then calling tcf_action_set_ctrlact()
to assign 'goto_chain' and 'tcf_action' consistently.
By doing this, the kernel does not leak anymore refcounts when a valid
'goto chain' handle is replaced in TC actions, causing kmemleak splats
like the following one:
# tc chain add dev dd0 chain 42 ingress protocol ip flower \
> ip_proto tcp action drop
# tc chain add dev dd0 chain 43 ingress protocol ip flower \
> ip_proto udp action drop
# tc filter add dev dd0 ingress matchall \
> action gact goto chain 42 index 66
# tc filter replace dev dd0 ingress matchall \
> action gact goto chain 43 index 66
# echo scan >/sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
<...>
unreferenced object 0xffff93c0ee09f000 (size 1024):
comm "tc", pid 2565, jiffies 4295339808 (age 65.426s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 08 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<000000009b63f92d>] tc_ctl_chain+0x3d2/0x4c0
[<00000000683a8d72>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x263/0x2d0
[<00000000ddd88f8e>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x4a/0x110
[<000000006126a348>] netlink_unicast+0x1a0/0x250
[<00000000b3340877>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2c1/0x3c0
[<00000000a25a2171>] sock_sendmsg+0x36/0x40
[<00000000f19ee1ec>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x280/0x2f0
[<00000000d0422042>] __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0
[<000000007a6c61f9>] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x180
[<00000000ccd07542>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[<0000000013eaa334>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Fixes: db50514f9a9c ("net: sched: add termination action to allow goto chain")
Fixes: 97763dc0f401 ("net_sched: reject unknown tcfa_action values")
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Modify the kernel users of the TCA_ACT_* macros to use TCA_ID_*. For
example, use TCA_ID_GACT instead of TCA_ACT_GACT. This will align with
TCA_ID_POLICE and also differentiates these identifier, used in struct
tc_action_ops type field, from other macros starting with TCA_ACT_.
To make things clearer, we name the enum defining the TCA_ID_*
identifiers and also change the "type" field of struct tc_action to
id.
Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
The egdev mechanism was replaced by the TC indirect block notifications
platform.
Signed-off-by: Oz Shlomo <ozsh@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Eli Britstein <elibr@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: John Hurley <john.hurley@netronome.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
|
|
Make sure extack is passed to nlmsg_parse where easy to do so.
Most of these are dump handlers and leveraging the extack in
the netlink_callback.
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
In commit ec3ed293e766 ("net_sched: change tcf_del_walker() to take idrinfo->lock")
we move fl_hw_destroy_tmplt() to a workqueue to avoid blocking
with the spinlock held. Unfortunately, this causes a lot of
troubles here:
1. tcf_chain_destroy() could be called right after we queue the work
but before the work runs. This is a use-after-free.
2. The chain refcnt is already 0, we can't even just hold it again.
We can check refcnt==1 but it is ugly.
3. The chain with refcnt 0 is still visible in its block, which means
it could be still found and used!
4. The block has a refcnt too, we can't hold it without introducing a
proper API either.
We can make it working but the end result is ugly. Instead of wasting
time on reviewing it, let's just convert the troubling spinlock to
a mutex, which allows us to use non-atomic allocations too.
Fixes: ec3ed293e766 ("net_sched: change tcf_del_walker() to take idrinfo->lock")
Reported-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@idosch.org>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Add additional counters that will store the bytes/packets processed by
hardware. These will be exported through the netlink interface for
displaying by the iproute2 tc tool
Signed-off-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Action API was changed to work with actions and action_idr in concurrency
safe manner, however tcf_del_walker() still uses actions without taking a
reference or idrinfo->lock first, and deletes them directly, disregarding
possible concurrent delete.
Change tcf_del_walker() to take idrinfo->lock while iterating over actions
and use new tcf_idr_release_unsafe() to release them while holding the
lock.
And the blocking function fl_hw_destroy_tmplt() could be called when we
put a filter chain, so defer it to a work queue.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
[xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com: heavily modify the code and changelog]
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
|
|
Currently, tcf_action_delete() nulls actions array pointer after putting
and deleting it. However, if tcf_idr_delete_index() returns an error,
pointer to action is not set to null. That results it being released second
time in error handling code of tca_action_gd().
Kasan error:
[ 807.367755] ==================================================================
[ 807.375844] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tc_setup_cb_call+0x14e/0x250
[ 807.382763] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88033e636000 by task tc/2732
[ 807.391289] CPU: 0 PID: 2732 Comm: tc Tainted: G W 4.19.0-rc1+ #799
[ 807.399542] Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-2028TP-DECR/X10DRT-P, BIOS 2.0b 03/30/2017
[ 807.407948] Call Trace:
[ 807.410763] dump_stack+0x92/0xeb
[ 807.414456] print_address_description+0x70/0x360
[ 807.419549] kasan_report+0x14d/0x300
[ 807.423582] ? tc_setup_cb_call+0x14e/0x250
[ 807.428150] tc_setup_cb_call+0x14e/0x250
[ 807.432539] ? nla_put+0x65/0xe0
[ 807.436146] fl_dump+0x394/0x3f0 [cls_flower]
[ 807.440890] ? fl_tmplt_dump+0x140/0x140 [cls_flower]
[ 807.446327] ? lock_downgrade+0x320/0x320
[ 807.450702] ? lock_acquire+0xe2/0x220
[ 807.454819] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x5/0x140
[ 807.459475] ? memcpy+0x34/0x50
[ 807.462980] ? nla_put+0x65/0xe0
[ 807.466582] tcf_fill_node+0x341/0x430
[ 807.470717] ? tcf_block_put+0xe0/0xe0
[ 807.474859] tcf_node_dump+0xdb/0xf0
[ 807.478821] fl_walk+0x8e/0x170 [cls_flower]
[ 807.483474] tcf_chain_dump+0x35a/0x4d0
[ 807.487703] ? tfilter_notify+0x170/0x170
[ 807.492091] ? tcf_fill_node+0x430/0x430
[ 807.496411] tc_dump_tfilter+0x362/0x3f0
[ 807.500712] ? tc_del_tfilter+0x850/0x850
[ 807.505104] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x30/0x40
[ 807.509940] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xcf/0x410
[ 807.515031] netlink_dump+0x263/0x4f0
[ 807.519077] __netlink_dump_start+0x2a0/0x300
[ 807.523817] ? tc_del_tfilter+0x850/0x850
[ 807.528198] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x46a/0x6d0
[ 807.532671] ? rtnl_fdb_del+0x3f0/0x3f0
[ 807.536878] ? tc_del_tfilter+0x850/0x850
[ 807.541280] netlink_rcv_skb+0x18d/0x200
[ 807.545570] ? rtnl_fdb_del+0x3f0/0x3f0
[ 807.549773] ? netlink_ack+0x500/0x500
[ 807.553913] netlink_unicast+0x2d0/0x370
[ 807.558212] ? netlink_attachskb+0x340/0x340
[ 807.562855] ? _copy_from_iter_full+0xe9/0x3e0
[ 807.567677] ? import_iovec+0x11e/0x1c0
[ 807.571890] netlink_sendmsg+0x3b9/0x6a0
[ 807.576192] ? netlink_unicast+0x370/0x370
[ 807.580684] ? netlink_unicast+0x370/0x370
[ 807.585154] sock_sendmsg+0x6b/0x80
[ 807.589015] ___sys_sendmsg+0x4a1/0x520
[ 807.593230] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x210/0x210
[ 807.598232] ? do_wp_page+0x174/0x880
[ 807.602276] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x749/0x1c10
[ 807.607021] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x1046/0x1c10
[ 807.611849] ? __pmd_alloc+0x320/0x320
[ 807.615973] ? check_chain_key+0x140/0x1f0
[ 807.620450] ? check_chain_key+0x140/0x1f0
[ 807.624929] ? __fget_light+0xbc/0xd0
[ 807.628970] ? __sys_sendmsg+0xd7/0x150
[ 807.633172] __sys_sendmsg+0xd7/0x150
[ 807.637201] ? __ia32_sys_shutdown+0x30/0x30
[ 807.641846] ? up_read+0x53/0x90
[ 807.645442] ? __do_page_fault+0x484/0x780
[ 807.649949] ? do_syscall_64+0x1e/0x2c0
[ 807.654164] do_syscall_64+0x72/0x2c0
[ 807.658198] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 807.663625] RIP: 0033:0x7f42e9870150
[ 807.667568] Code: 8b 15 3c 7d 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb cd 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d b9 d5 2b 00 00 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 be cd 00 00 48 89 04 24
[ 807.687328] RSP: 002b:00007ffdbf595b58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
[ 807.695564] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f42e9870150
[ 807.703083] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffdbf595b80 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 807.710605] RBP: 00007ffdbf599d90 R08: 0000000000679bc0 R09: 000000000000000f
[ 807.718127] R10: 00000000000005e7 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffdbf599d88
[ 807.725651] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 807.735048] Allocated by task 2687:
[ 807.738902] kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
[ 807.742852] __kmalloc+0x118/0x2d0
[ 807.746615] tcf_idr_create+0x44/0x320
[ 807.750738] tcf_nat_init+0x41e/0x530 [act_nat]
[ 807.755638] tcf_action_init_1+0x4e0/0x650
[ 807.760104] tcf_action_init+0x1ce/0x2d0
[ 807.764395] tcf_exts_validate+0x1d8/0x200
[ 807.768861] fl_change+0x55a/0x26b4 [cls_flower]
[ 807.773845] tc_new_tfilter+0x748/0xa20
[ 807.778051] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x56a/0x6d0
[ 807.782517] netlink_rcv_skb+0x18d/0x200
[ 807.786804] netlink_unicast+0x2d0/0x370
[ 807.791095] netlink_sendmsg+0x3b9/0x6a0
[ 807.795387] sock_sendmsg+0x6b/0x80
[ 807.799240] ___sys_sendmsg+0x4a1/0x520
[ 807.803445] __sys_sendmsg+0xd7/0x150
[ 807.807473] do_syscall_64+0x72/0x2c0
[ 807.811506] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 807.818776] Freed by task 2728:
[ 807.822283] __kasan_slab_free+0x122/0x180
[ 807.826752] kfree+0xf4/0x2f0
[ 807.830080] __tcf_action_put+0x5a/0xb0
[ 807.834281] tcf_action_put_many+0x46/0x70
[ 807.838747] tca_action_gd+0x232/0xc40
[ 807.842862] tc_ctl_action+0x215/0x230
[ 807.846977] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x56a/0x6d0
[ 807.851444] netlink_rcv_skb+0x18d/0x200
[ 807.855731] netlink_unicast+0x2d0/0x370
[ 807.860021] netlink_sendmsg+0x3b9/0x6a0
[ 807.864312] sock_sendmsg+0x6b/0x80
[ 807.868166] ___sys_sendmsg+0x4a1/0x520
[ 807.872372] __sys_sendmsg+0xd7/0x150
[ 807.876401] do_syscall_64+0x72/0x2c0
[ 807.880431] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 807.887704] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88033e636000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256
[ 807.900909] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
256-byte region [ffff88033e636000, ffff88033e636100)
[ 807.913155] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 807.918322] page:ffffea000cf98d80 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88036f80ee00 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 807.928831] flags: 0x5fff8000008100(slab|head)
[ 807.933647] raw: 005fff8000008100 ffffea000db44f00 0000000400000004 ffff88036f80ee00
[ 807.942050] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 807.950456] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 807.958240] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 807.963405] ffff88033e635f00: fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fb
[ 807.971288] ffff88033e635f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 807.979166] >ffff88033e636000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 807.994882] ^
[ 807.998477] ffff88033e636080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 808.006352] ffff88033e636100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 808.014230] ==================================================================
[ 808.022108] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
Fixes: edfaf94fa705 ("net_sched: improve and refactor tcf_action_put_many()")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
This reverts commit 331a9295de23 ("net: sched: act: add extack for lookup callback").
This extack is never used after 6 months... In fact, it can be just
set in the caller, right after ->lookup().
Cc: Alexander Aring <aring@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
After the commit 802bfb19152c ("net/sched: user-space can't set
unknown tcfa_action values"), unknown tcfa_action values are
converted to TC_ACT_UNSPEC, but the common agreement is instead
rejecting such configurations.
This change also introduces a helper to simplify the destruction
of a single action, avoiding code duplication.
v1 -> v2:
- helper is now static and renamed according to act_* convention
- updated extack message, according to the new behavior
Fixes: 802bfb19152c ("net/sched: user-space can't set unknown tcfa_action values")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
After commit 90b73b77d08e, list_head is no longer needed.
Now we just need to convert the list iteration to array
iteration for drivers.
Fixes: 90b73b77d08e ("net: sched: change action API to use array of pointers to actions")
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
tcf_idr_check() is replaced by tcf_idr_check_alloc(),
and __tcf_idr_check() now can be folded into tcf_idr_search().
Fixes: 0190c1d452a9 ("net: sched: atomically check-allocate action")
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Fixes: 16af6067392c ("net: sched: implement reference counted action release")
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
All ops->delete() wants is getting the tn->idrinfo, but we already
have tc_action before calling ops->delete(), and tc_action has
a pointer ->idrinfo.
More importantly, each type of action does the same thing, that is,
just calling tcf_idr_delete_index().
So it can be just removed.
Fixes: b409074e6693 ("net: sched: add 'delete' function to action ops")
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
tcf_action_put_many() is mostly called to clean up actions on
failure path, but tcf_action_put_many(&actions[acts_deleted]) is
used in the ugliest way: it passes a slice of the array and
uses an additional NULL at the end to avoid out-of-bound
access.
acts_deleted is completely unnecessary since we can teach
tcf_action_put_many() scan the whole array and checks against
NULL pointer. Which also means tcf_action_delete() should
set deleted action pointers to NULL to avoid double free.
Fixes: 90b73b77d08e ("net: sched: change action API to use array of pointers to actions")
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Cc: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Currently, when initializing an action, the user-space can specify
and use arbitrary values for the tcfa_action field. If the value
is unknown by the kernel, is implicitly threaded as TC_ACT_UNSPEC.
This change explicitly checks for unknown values at action creation
time, and explicitly convert them to TC_ACT_UNSPEC. No functional
changes are introduced, but this will allow introducing tcfa_action
values not exposed to user-space in a later patch.
Note: we can't use the above to hide TC_ACT_REDIRECT from user-space,
as the latter is already part of uAPI.
v3 -> v4:
- use an helper to check for action validity (JiriP)
- emit an extack for invalid actions (JiriP)
v4 -> v5:
- keep messages on a single line, drop net_warn (Marcelo)
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
In case a chain is empty and not explicitly created by a user,
such chain should not exist. The only exception is if there is
an action "goto chain" pointing to it. In that case, don't show the
chain in the dump. Track the chain references held by actions and
use them to find out if a chain should or should not be shown
in chain dump.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Fix action attribute size calculation function to take rcu read lock and
access act_cookie pointer with rcu dereference.
Fixes: eec94fdb0480 ("net: sched: use rcu for action cookie update")
Reported-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
The kbuild test robot reports:
>> net/sched/act_api.c:71:15: sparse: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) @@ expected struct tc_cookie [noderef] <asn:4>*__ret @@ got [noderef] <asn:4>*__ret @@
net/sched/act_api.c:71:15: expected struct tc_cookie [noderef] <asn:4>*__ret
net/sched/act_api.c:71:15: got struct tc_cookie *new_cookie
>> net/sched/act_api.c:71:13: sparse: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) @@ expected struct tc_cookie *old @@ got struct tc_cookie [noderef] <struct tc_cookie *old @@
net/sched/act_api.c:71:13: expected struct tc_cookie *old
net/sched/act_api.c:71:13: got struct tc_cookie [noderef] <asn:4>*[assigned] __ret
>> net/sched/act_api.c:132:48: sparse: dereference of noderef expression
Handle this in the usual way by force casting away the __rcu annotation
when we are using xchg() on it.
Fixes: eec94fdb0480 ("net: sched: use rcu for action cookie update")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Act API used linked list to pass set of actions to functions. It is
intrusive data structure that stores list nodes inside action structure
itself, which means it is not safe to modify such list concurrently.
However, action API doesn't use any linked list specific operations on this
set of actions, so it can be safely refactored into plain pointer array.
Refactor action API to use array of pointers to tc_actions instead of
linked list. Change argument 'actions' type of exported action init,
destroy and dump functions.
Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Implement function that atomically checks if action exists and either takes
reference to it, or allocates idr slot for action index to prevent
concurrent allocations of actions with same index. Use EBUSY error pointer
to indicate that idr slot is reserved.
Implement cleanup helper function that removes temporary error pointer from
idr. (in case of error between idr allocation and insertion of newly
created action to specified index)
Refactor all action init functions to insert new action to idr using this
API.
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Change action API to assume that action init function always takes
reference to action, even when overwriting existing action. This is
necessary because action API continues to use action pointer after init
function is done. At this point action becomes accessible for concurrent
modifications, so user must always hold reference to it.
Implement helper put list function to atomically release list of actions
after action API init code is done using them.
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Return from action init function with reference to action taken,
even when overwriting existing action.
Action init API initializes its fourth argument (pointer to pointer to tc
action) to either existing action with same index or newly created action.
In case of existing index(and bind argument is zero), init function returns
without incrementing action reference counter. Caller of action init then
proceeds working with action, without actually holding reference to it.
This means that action could be deleted concurrently.
Change action init behavior to always take reference to action before
returning successfully, in order to protect from concurrent deletion.
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Implement helper delete function that uses new action ops 'delete', instead
of destroying action directly. This is required so act API could delete
actions by index, without holding any references to action that is being
deleted.
Implement function __tcf_action_put() that releases reference to action and
frees it, if necessary. Refactor action deletion code to use new put
function and not to rely on rtnl lock. Remove rtnl lock assertions that are
no longer needed.
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Implement new action API function that atomically finds and deletes action
from idr by index. Intended to be used by lockless actions that do not rely
on rtnl lock.
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Without rtnl lock protection it is no longer safe to use pointer to tc
action without holding reference to it. (it can be destroyed concurrently)
Remove unsafe action idr lookup function. Instead of it, implement safe tcf
idr check function that atomically looks up action in idr and increments
its reference and bind counters. Implement both action search and check
using new safe function
Reference taken by idr check is temporal and should not be accounted by
userspace clients (both logically and to preserver current API behavior).
Subtract temporal reference when dumping action to userspace using existing
tca_get_fill function arguments.
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Add additional 'rtnl_held' argument to act API init functions. It is
required to implement actions that need to release rtnl lock before loading
kernel module and reacquire if afterwards.
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Change type of action reference counter to refcount_t.
Change type of action bind counter to atomic_t.
This type is used to allow decrementing bind counter without testing
for 0 result.
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Implement functions to atomically update and free action cookie
using rcu mechanism.
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Initial net_device implementation used ingress_lock spinlock to synchronize
ingress path of device. This lock was used in both process and bh context.
In some code paths action map lock was obtained while holding ingress_lock.
Commit e1e992e52faa ("[NET_SCHED] protect action config/dump from irqs")
modified actions to always disable bh, while using action map lock, in
order to prevent deadlock on ingress_lock in softirq. This lock was removed
from net_device, so disabling bh, while accessing action map, is no longer
necessary.
Replace all action idr spinlock usage with regular calls that do not
disable bh.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Minor conflicts in drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rep.c,
we had some overlapping changes:
1) In 'net' MLX5E_PARAMS_LOG_{SQ,RQ}_SIZE -->
MLX5E_REP_PARAMS_LOG_{SQ,RQ}_SIZE
2) In 'net-next' params->log_rq_size is renamed to be
params->log_rq_mtu_frames.
3) In 'net-next' params->hard_mtu is added.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Synchronous pernet_operations are not allowed anymore.
All are asynchronous. So, drop the structure member.
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Fixes a bug in the tcf_dump_walker function that can cause some actions
to not be reported when dumping a large number of actions. This issue
became more aggrevated when cookies feature was added. In particular
this issue is manifest when large cookie values are assigned to the
actions and when enough actions are created that the resulting table
must be dumped in multiple batches.
The number of actions returned in each batch is limited by the total
number of actions and the memory buffer size. With small cookies
the numeric limit is reached before the buffer size limit, which avoids
the code path triggering this bug. When large cookies are used buffer
fills before the numeric limit, and the erroneous code path is hit.
For example after creating 32 csum actions with the cookie
aaaabbbbccccdddd
$ tc actions ls action csum
total acts 26
action order 0: csum (tcp) action continue
index 1 ref 1 bind 0
cookie aaaabbbbccccdddd
.....
action order 25: csum (tcp) action continue
index 26 ref 1 bind 0
cookie aaaabbbbccccdddd
total acts 6
action order 0: csum (tcp) action continue
index 28 ref 1 bind 0
cookie aaaabbbbccccdddd
......
action order 5: csum (tcp) action continue
index 32 ref 1 bind 0
cookie aaaabbbbccccdddd
Note that the action with index 27 is omitted from the report.
Fixes: 4b3550ef530c ("[NET_SCHED]: Use nla_nest_start/nla_nest_end")"
Signed-off-by: Craig Dillabaugh <cdillaba@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|