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Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Kill the no longer used task_struct->replacement_session_keyring, update
copy_creds() and exit_creds().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@redhat.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
Cc: "Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche@redhat.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman:
"This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can
reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete
implementation.
Highlights:
- Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and
code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe.
- Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the
config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable
user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission
checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe.
- All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial
user namespace before they are processed. Removing the need to add
an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared
uids remains the same.
- With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or
better than it is today.
- For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or
operationally with the user namespace enabled.
- The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1
billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code
enabled. This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to
164ns per stat operation).
- (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value.
Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially
anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause
entertaining failures in userspace.
- If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails.
I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I
could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and
handle the case where setuid fails.
- If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which
we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid. The LFS
experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be
better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I
can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we
can't map.
- Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it
safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities.
My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core
kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1."
Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits)
userns: Silence silly gcc warning.
cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock
userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq
userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq
userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate
userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids.
userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate.
userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe
userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns
userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces.
userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.
userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids
userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid
userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs
...
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cred.h and a few trivial users of struct cred are changed. The rest of the users
of struct cred are left for other patches as there are too many changes to make
in one go and leave the change reviewable. If the user namespace is disabled and
CONFIG_UIDGID_STRICT_TYPE_CHECKS are disabled the code will contiue to compile
and behave correctly.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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keyctl_session_to_parent(task) sets ->replacement_session_keyring,
it should be processed and cleared by key_replace_session_keyring().
However, this task can fork before it notices TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and
the new child gets the bogus ->replacement_session_keyring copied by
dup_task_struct(). This is obviously wrong and, if nothing else, this
leads to put_cred(already_freed_cred).
change copy_creds() to clear this member. If copy_process() fails
before this point the wrong ->replacement_session_keyring doesn't
matter, exit_creds() won't be called.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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struct user_struct will shortly loose it's user_ns reference
so make the cred user_ns reference a proper reference complete
with reference counting.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Trim security.h
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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The changed files were only including linux/module.h for the
EXPORT_SYMBOL infrastructure, and nothing else. Revector them
onto the isolated export header for faster compile times.
Nothing to see here but a whole lot of instances of:
-#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
This commit is only changing the kernel dir; next targets
will probably be mm, fs, the arch dirs, etc.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
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* 'next' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: (95 commits)
TOMOYO: Fix incomplete read after seek.
Smack: allow to access /smack/access as normal user
TOMOYO: Fix unused kernel config option.
Smack: fix: invalid length set for the result of /smack/access
Smack: compilation fix
Smack: fix for /smack/access output, use string instead of byte
Smack: domain transition protections (v3)
Smack: Provide information for UDS getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED)
Smack: Clean up comments
Smack: Repair processing of fcntl
Smack: Rule list lookup performance
Smack: check permissions from user space (v2)
TOMOYO: Fix quota and garbage collector.
TOMOYO: Remove redundant tasklist_lock.
TOMOYO: Fix domain transition failure warning.
TOMOYO: Remove tomoyo_policy_memory_lock spinlock.
TOMOYO: Simplify garbage collector.
TOMOYO: Fix make namespacecheck warnings.
target: check hex2bin result
encrypted-keys: check hex2bin result
...
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This patch adds CONFIG_KEYS guard for tgcred to fix below build error
if CONFIG_KEYS is not configured.
CC kernel/cred.o
kernel/cred.c: In function 'prepare_kernel_cred':
kernel/cred.c:657: error: 'tgcred' undeclared (first use in this function)
kernel/cred.c:657: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once
kernel/cred.c:657: error: for each function it appears in.)
make[1]: *** [kernel/cred.o] Error 1
make: *** [kernel] Error 2
Signed-off-by: Axel Lin <axel.lin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Fix prepare_kernel_cred() to provide a new, separate thread_group_cred struct
otherwise when using request_key() ____call_usermodehelper() calls
umh_keys_init() with the new creds pointing to init_tgcred, which
umh_keys_init() then blithely alters.
The problem can be demonstrated by:
# keyctl request2 user a debug:a @s
249681132
# grep req /proc/keys
079906a5 I--Q-- 1 perm 1f3f0000 0 0 keyring _req.249681132: 1/4
38ef1626 IR---- 1 expd 0b010000 0 0 .request_ key:ee1d4ec pid:4371 ci:1
The keyring _req.XXXX should have gone away, but something (init_tgcred) is
pinning it.
That key actually requested can then be removed and a new one created:
# keyctl unlink 249681132
1 links removed
[root@andromeda ~]# grep req /proc/keys
116cecac IR---- 1 expd 0b010000 0 0 .request_ key:eeb4911 pid:4379 ci:1
36d1cbf8 I--Q-- 1 perm 1f3f0000 0 0 keyring _req.250300689: 1/4
which causes the old _req keyring to go away and a new one to take its place.
This is a consequence of the changes in:
commit 879669961b11e7f40b518784863a259f735a72bf
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri Jun 17 11:25:59 2011 +0100
KEYS/DNS: Fix ____call_usermodehelper() to not lose the session keyring
and:
commit 17f60a7da150fdd0cfb9756f86a262daa72c835f
Author: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Fri Apr 1 17:07:50 2011 -0400
capabilites: allow the application of capability limits to usermode helpers
After this patch is applied, the _req keyring and the .request_key key are
cleaned up.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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The patch http://lkml.org/lkml/2003/7/13/226 introduced an RLIMIT_NPROC
check in set_user() to check for NPROC exceeding via setuid() and
similar functions.
Before the check there was a possibility to greatly exceed the allowed
number of processes by an unprivileged user if the program relied on
rlimit only. But the check created new security threat: many poorly
written programs simply don't check setuid() return code and believe it
cannot fail if executed with root privileges. So, the check is removed
in this patch because of too often privilege escalations related to
buggy programs.
The NPROC can still be enforced in the common code flow of daemons
spawning user processes. Most of daemons do fork()+setuid()+execve().
The check introduced in execve() (1) enforces the same limit as in
setuid() and (2) doesn't create similar security issues.
Neil Brown suggested to track what specific process has exceeded the
limit by setting PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED process flag. With the change only
this process would fail on execve(), and other processes' execve()
behaviour is not changed.
Solar Designer suggested to re-check whether NPROC limit is still
exceeded at the moment of execve(). If the process was sleeping for
days between set*uid() and execve(), and the NPROC counter step down
under the limit, the defered execve() failure because NPROC limit was
exceeded days ago would be unexpected. If the limit is not exceeded
anymore, we clear the flag on successful calls to execve() and fork().
The flag is also cleared on successful calls to set_user() as the limit
was exceeded for the previous user, not the current one.
Similar check was introduced in -ow patches (without the process flag).
v3 - clear PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED on successful calls to set_user().
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdunlap/linux-docs
* 'docs-move' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdunlap/linux-docs:
Create Documentation/security/, move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/ to Documentation/security/, add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file> to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
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move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/
to Documentation/security/,
add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and
update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file>
to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
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Conflicts:
include/linux/capability.h
Manually resolve merge conflict w/ thanks to Stephen Rothwell.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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If !CONFIG_USERNS, have current_user_ns() defined to (&init_user_ns).
Get rid of _current_user_ns. This requires nsown_capable() to be
defined in capability.c rather than as static inline in capability.h,
so do that.
Request_key needs init_user_ns defined at current_user_ns if
!CONFIG_USERNS, so forward-declare that in cred.h if !CONFIG_USERNS
at current_user_ns() define.
Compile-tested with and without CONFIG_USERNS.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
[ This makes a huge performance difference for acl_permission_check(),
up to 30%. And that is one of the hottest kernel functions for loads
that are pathname-lookup heavy. ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The CAP_INIT macros of INH, BSET, and EFF made sense at one point in time,
but now days they aren't helping. Just open code the logic in the
init_cred.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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- Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default
user namespace.
- Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default
user namespace.
The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new
namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with
only potential uid confusion issues left.
I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I
think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals.
Changelog:
11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor
12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces
Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have
capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we
were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps
he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether
he was the creator. Reverse those checks.
12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case
01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper
01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion
02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of
init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to
it! Fix the check in cap_capable().
02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable,
fixing a compile failure.
02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some
couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare
them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add
a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h
without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations
together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use
kernel-doc format.
02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable().
02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable.
(Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version
acked by him)
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs]
[serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge reason: pick up upstream fixes.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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In prepare_kernel_cred() since 2.6.29, put_cred(new) is called without
assigning new->usage when security_prepare_creds() returned an error. As a
result, memory for new and refcount for new->{user,group_info,tgcred} are
leaked because put_cred(new) won't call __put_cred() unless old->usage == 1.
Fix these leaks by assigning new->usage (and new->subscribers which was added
in 2.6.32) before calling security_prepare_creds().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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In cred_alloc_blank() since 2.6.32, abort_creds(new) is called with
new->security == NULL and new->magic == 0 when security_cred_alloc_blank()
returns an error. As a result, BUG() will be triggered if SELinux is enabled
or CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS=y.
If CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS=y, BUG() is called from __invalid_creds() because
cred->magic == 0. Failing that, BUG() is called from selinux_cred_free()
because selinux_cred_free() is not expecting cred->security == NULL. This does
not affect smack_cred_free(), tomoyo_cred_free() or apparmor_cred_free().
Fix these bugs by
(1) Set new->magic before calling security_cred_alloc_blank().
(2) Handle null cred->security in creds_are_invalid() and selinux_cred_free().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCK is deprecated. Use the lockdep capable variant
instead.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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Oleg Nesterov pointed out we have to prevent multiple-threads-inside-exec
itself and we can reuse ->cred_guard_mutex for it. Yes, concurrent
execve() has no worth.
Let's move ->cred_guard_mutex from task_struct to signal_struct. It
naturally prevent multiple-threads-inside-exec.
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Add a dummy printk function for the maintenance of unused printks through gcc
format checking, and also so that side-effect checking is maintained too.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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It's possible for get_task_cred() as it currently stands to 'corrupt' a set of
credentials by incrementing their usage count after their replacement by the
task being accessed.
What happens is that get_task_cred() can race with commit_creds():
TASK_1 TASK_2 RCU_CLEANER
-->get_task_cred(TASK_2)
rcu_read_lock()
__cred = __task_cred(TASK_2)
-->commit_creds()
old_cred = TASK_2->real_cred
TASK_2->real_cred = ...
put_cred(old_cred)
call_rcu(old_cred)
[__cred->usage == 0]
get_cred(__cred)
[__cred->usage == 1]
rcu_read_unlock()
-->put_cred_rcu()
[__cred->usage == 1]
panic()
However, since a tasks credentials are generally not changed very often, we can
reasonably make use of a loop involving reading the creds pointer and using
atomic_inc_not_zero() to attempt to increment it if it hasn't already hit zero.
If successful, we can safely return the credentials in the knowledge that, even
if the task we're accessing has released them, they haven't gone to the RCU
cleanup code.
We then change task_state() in procfs to use get_task_cred() rather than
calling get_cred() on the result of __task_cred(), as that suffers from the
same problem.
Without this change, a BUG_ON in __put_cred() or in put_cred_rcu() can be
tripped when it is noticed that the usage count is not zero as it ought to be,
for example:
kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:168!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file: /sys/kernel/mm/ksm/run
CPU 0
Pid: 2436, comm: master Not tainted 2.6.33.3-85.fc13.x86_64 #1 0HR330/OptiPlex
745
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81069881>] [<ffffffff81069881>] __put_cred+0xc/0x45
RSP: 0018:ffff88019e7e9eb8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff880161514480 RCX: 00000000ffffffff
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: ffff880140c690c0 RDI: ffff880140c690c0
RBP: ffff88019e7e9eb8 R08: 00000000000000d0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: ffff880140c690c0
R13: ffff88019e77aea0 R14: 00007fff336b0a5c R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007f12f50d97c0(0000) GS:ffff880007400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f8f461bc000 CR3: 00000001b26ce000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process master (pid: 2436, threadinfo ffff88019e7e8000, task ffff88019e77aea0)
Stack:
ffff88019e7e9ec8 ffffffff810698cd ffff88019e7e9ef8 ffffffff81069b45
<0> ffff880161514180 ffff880161514480 ffff880161514180 0000000000000000
<0> ffff88019e7e9f28 ffffffff8106aace 0000000000000001 0000000000000246
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810698cd>] put_cred+0x13/0x15
[<ffffffff81069b45>] commit_creds+0x16b/0x175
[<ffffffff8106aace>] set_current_groups+0x47/0x4e
[<ffffffff8106ac89>] sys_setgroups+0xf6/0x105
[<ffffffff81009b02>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 48 8d 71 ff e8 7e 4e 15 00 85 c0 78 0b 8b 75 ec 48 89 df e8 ef 4a 15 00
48 83 c4 18 5b c9 c3 55 8b 07 8b 07 48 89 e5 85 c0 74 04 <0f> 0b eb fe 65 48 8b
04 25 00 cc 00 00 48 3b b8 58 04 00 00 75
RIP [<ffffffff81069881>] __put_cred+0xc/0x45
RSP <ffff88019e7e9eb8>
---[ end trace df391256a100ebdd ]---
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Now that nobody ever changes subprocess_info->cred we can kill this member
and related code. ____call_usermodehelper() always runs in the context of
freshly forked kernel thread, it has the proper ->cred copied from its
parent kthread, keventd.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (61 commits)
KEYS: Return more accurate error codes
LSM: Add __init to fixup function.
TOMOYO: Add pathname grouping support.
ima: remove ACPI dependency
TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal
security/selinux/ss: Use kstrdup
TOMOYO: Use stack memory for pending entry.
Revert "ima: remove ACPI dependency"
Revert "TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal"
KEYS: Do preallocation for __key_link()
TOMOYO: Use mutex_lock_interruptible.
KEYS: Better handling of errors from construct_alloc_key()
KEYS: keyring_serialise_link_sem is only needed for keyring->keyring links
TOMOYO: Use GFP_NOFS rather than GFP_KERNEL.
ima: remove ACPI dependency
TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal
selinux: generalize disabling of execmem for plt-in-heap archs
LSM Audit: rename LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT to LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE
CRED: Holding a spinlock does not imply the holding of RCU read lock
SMACK: Don't #include Ext2 headers
...
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creds_are_invalid() reads both cred->usage and cred->subscribers and then
compares them to make sure the number of processes subscribed to a cred struct
never exceeds the refcount of that cred struct.
The problem is that this can cause a race with both copy_creds() and
exit_creds() as the two counters, whilst they are of atomic_t type, are only
atomic with respect to themselves, and not atomic with respect to each other.
This means that if creds_are_invalid() can read the values on one CPU whilst
they're being modified on another CPU, and so can observe an evolving state in
which the subscribers count now is greater than the usage count a moment
before.
Switching the order in which the counts are read cannot help, so the thing to
do is to remove that particular check.
I had considered rechecking the values to see if they're in flux if the test
fails, but I can't guarantee they won't appear the same, even if they've
changed several times in the meantime.
Note that this can only happen if CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS is enabled.
The problem is only likely to occur with multithreaded programs, and can be
tested by the tst-eintr1 program from glibc's "make check". The symptoms look
like:
CRED: Invalid credentials
CRED: At include/linux/cred.h:240
CRED: Specified credentials: ffff88003dda5878 [real][eff]
CRED: ->magic=43736564, put_addr=(null)
CRED: ->usage=766, subscr=766
CRED: ->*uid = { 0,0,0,0 }
CRED: ->*gid = { 0,0,0,0 }
CRED: ->security is ffff88003d72f538
CRED: ->security {359, 359}
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:850!
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81049889>] [<ffffffff81049889>] __invalid_creds+0x4e/0x52
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8104a37b>] copy_creds+0x6b/0x23f
Note the ->usage=766 and subscr=766. The values appear the same because
they've been re-read since the check was made.
Reported-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Patch 570b8fb505896e007fd3bb07573ba6640e51851d:
Author: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Date: Tue Mar 30 00:04:00 2010 +0100
Subject: CRED: Fix memory leak in error handling
attempts to fix a memory leak in the error handling by making the offending
return statement into a jump down to the bottom of the function where a
kfree(tgcred) is inserted.
This is, however, incorrect, as it does a kfree() after doing put_cred() if
security_prepare_creds() fails. That will result in a double free if 'error'
is jumped to as put_cred() will also attempt to free the new tgcred record by
virtue of it being pointed to by the new cred record.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Merge reason: merge the latest fixes, update to -rc4.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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Unused hook. Remove.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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This is left over from commit 7c9414385e ("sched: Remove USER_SCHED"")
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Dhaval Giani <dhaval.giani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
LKML-Reference: <4BA9A05F.7010407@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
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implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
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Fix a memory leak on an OOM condition in prepare_usermodehelper_creds().
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Free memory allocated using kmem_cache_zalloc using kmem_cache_free rather
than kfree.
The semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)
// <smpl>
@@
expression x,E,c;
@@
x = \(kmem_cache_alloc\|kmem_cache_zalloc\|kmem_cache_alloc_node\)(c,...)
... when != x = E
when != &x
?-kfree(x)
+kmem_cache_free(c,x)
// </smpl>
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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ERROR: "creds_are_invalid" [fs/cachefiles/cachefiles.ko] undefined!
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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mips allmodconfig:
include/linux/cred.h: In function `creds_are_invalid':
include/linux/cred.h:187: error: `PAGE_SIZE' undeclared (first use in this function)
include/linux/cred.h:187: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once
include/linux/cred.h:187: error: for each function it appears in.)
Fixes
commit b6dff3ec5e116e3af6f537d4caedcad6b9e5082a
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
AuthorDate: Fri Nov 14 10:39:16 2008 +1100
Commit: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CommitDate: Fri Nov 14 10:39:16 2008 +1100
CRED: Separate task security context from task_struct
I think.
It's way too large to be inlined anyway.
Dunno if this needs an EXPORT_SYMBOL() yet.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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put_cred() will oops if given a NULL groups list, but that is now possible with
the existence of cred_alloc_blank(), as used in keyctl_session_to_parent().
Added in commit:
commit ee18d64c1f632043a02e6f5ba5e045bb26a5465f
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Wed Sep 2 09:14:21 2009 +0100
KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]
Reported-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This
replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.
To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.
The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.
Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.
This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18
#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
key_serial_t keyring, key;
long ret;
keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");
key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
OSERROR(key, "add_key");
ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");
return 0;
}
Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello
340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Add a config option (CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS) to turn on some debug checking
for credential management. The additional code keeps track of the number of
pointers from task_structs to any given cred struct, and checks to see that
this number never exceeds the usage count of the cred struct (which includes
all references, not just those from task_structs).
Furthermore, if SELinux is enabled, the code also checks that the security
pointer in the cred struct is never seen to be invalid.
This attempts to catch the bug whereby inode_has_perm() faults in an nfsd
kernel thread on seeing cred->security be a NULL pointer (it appears that the
credential struct has been previously released):
http://www.kerneloops.org/oops.php?number=252883
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Rename cred_exec_mutex to reflect that it's a guard against foreign
intervention on a process's credential state, such as is made by ptrace(). The
attachment of a debugger to a process affects execve()'s calculation of the new
credential state - _and_ also setprocattr()'s calculation of that state.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6:
CRED: Fix commit_creds() on a process that has no mm
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The newly allocated creds in prepare_kernel_cred() must be initialised
before get_uid() and get_group_info() can access them. They should be
copied from the old credentials.
Reported-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Missing put_cred() in the error handling path of prepare_kernel_cred().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Fix commit_creds()'s handling of a process that has no mm (such as one that is
calling or has called daemonize()). commit_creds() should check to see if
task->mm is not NULL before calling set_dumpable() on it.
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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The user_ns is moved from nsproxy to user_struct, so that a struct
cred by itself is sufficient to determine access (which it otherwise
would not be). Corresponding ecryptfs fixes (by David Howells) are
here as well.
Fix refcounting. The following rules now apply:
1. The task pins the user struct.
2. The user struct pins its user namespace.
3. The user namespace pins the struct user which created it.
User namespaces are cloned during copy_creds(). Unsharing a new user_ns
is no longer possible. (We could re-add that, but it'll cause code
duplication and doesn't seem useful if PAM doesn't need to clone user
namespaces).
When a user namespace is created, its first user (uid 0) gets empty
keyrings and a clean group_info.
This incorporates a previous patch by David Howells. Here
is his original patch description:
>I suggest adding the attached incremental patch. It makes the following
>changes:
>
> (1) Provides a current_user_ns() macro to wrap accesses to current's user
> namespace.
>
> (2) Fixes eCryptFS.
>
> (3) Renames create_new_userns() to create_user_ns() to be more consistent
> with the other associated functions and because the 'new' in the name is
> superfluous.
>
> (4) Moves the argument and permission checks made for CLONE_NEWUSER to the
> beginning of do_fork() so that they're done prior to making any attempts
> at allocation.
>
> (5) Calls create_user_ns() after prepare_creds(), and gives it the new creds
> to fill in rather than have it return the new root user. I don't imagine
> the new root user being used for anything other than filling in a cred
> struct.
>
> This also permits me to get rid of a get_uid() and a free_uid(), as the
> reference the creds were holding on the old user_struct can just be
> transferred to the new namespace's creator pointer.
>
> (6) Makes create_user_ns() reset the UIDs and GIDs of the creds under
> preparation rather than doing it in copy_creds().
>
>David
>Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Changelog:
Oct 20: integrate dhowells comments
1. leave thread_keyring alone
2. use current_user_ns() in set_user()
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
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Allow kernel services to override LSM settings appropriate to the actions
performed by a task by duplicating a set of credentials, modifying it and then
using task_struct::cred to point to it when performing operations on behalf of
a task.
This is used, for example, by CacheFiles which has to transparently access the
cache on behalf of a process that thinks it is doing, say, NFS accesses with a
potentially inappropriate (with respect to accessing the cache) set of
credentials.
This patch provides two LSM hooks for modifying a task security record:
(*) security_kernel_act_as() which allows modification of the security datum
with which a task acts on other objects (most notably files).
(*) security_kernel_create_files_as() which allows modification of the
security datum that is used to initialise the security data on a file that
a task creates.
The patch |