Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|
This patch adds new BPF helper functions, bpf_sk_lookup_tcp() and
bpf_sk_lookup_udp() which allows BPF programs to find out if there is a
socket listening on this host, and returns a socket pointer which the
BPF program can then access to determine, for instance, whether to
forward or drop traffic. bpf_sk_lookup_xxx() may take a reference on the
socket, so when a BPF program makes use of this function, it must
subsequently pass the returned pointer into the newly added sk_release()
to return the reference.
By way of example, the following pseudocode would filter inbound
connections at XDP if there is no corresponding service listening for
the traffic:
struct bpf_sock_tuple tuple;
struct bpf_sock_ops *sk;
populate_tuple(ctx, &tuple); // Extract the 5tuple from the packet
sk = bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(ctx, &tuple, sizeof tuple, netns, 0);
if (!sk) {
// Couldn't find a socket listening for this traffic. Drop.
return TC_ACT_SHOT;
}
bpf_sk_release(sk, 0);
return TC_ACT_OK;
Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
|
Allow helper functions to acquire a reference and return it into a
register. Specific pointer types such as the PTR_TO_SOCKET will
implicitly represent such a reference. The verifier must ensure that
these references are released exactly once in each path through the
program.
To achieve this, this commit assigns an id to the pointer and tracks it
in the 'bpf_func_state', then when the function or program exits,
verifies that all of the acquired references have been freed. When the
pointer is passed to a function that frees the reference, it is removed
from the 'bpf_func_state` and all existing copies of the pointer in
registers are marked invalid.
Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
|
An upcoming commit will need very similar copy/realloc boilerplate, so
refactor the existing stack copy/realloc functions into macros to
simplify it.
Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
|
Teach the verifier a little bit about a new type of pointer, a
PTR_TO_SOCKET. This pointer type is accessed from BPF through the
'struct bpf_sock' structure.
Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
|
This check will be reused by an upcoming commit for conditional jump
checks for sockets. Refactor it a bit to simplify the later commit.
Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
|
The array "reg_type_str" provides canonical formatting of register
types, however a couple of places would previously check whether a
register represented the context and write the name "context" directly.
An upcoming commit will add another pointer type to these statements, so
to provide more accurate error messages in the verifier, update these
error messages to use "reg_type_str" instead.
Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
|
An upcoming commit will add another two pointer types that need very
similar behaviour, so generalise this function now.
Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
|
Add this iterator for spilled registers, it concentrates the details of
how to get the current frame's spilled registers into a single macro
while clarifying the intention of the code which is calling the macro.
Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joe@wand.net.nz>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
|
This commit introduced per-cpu cgroup local storage.
Per-cpu cgroup local storage is very similar to simple cgroup storage
(let's call it shared), except all the data is per-cpu.
The main goal of per-cpu variant is to implement super fast
counters (e.g. packet counters), which don't require neither
lookups, neither atomic operations.
>From userspace's point of view, accessing a per-cpu cgroup storage
is similar to other per-cpu map types (e.g. per-cpu hashmaps and
arrays).
Writing to a per-cpu cgroup storage is not atomic, but is performed
by copying longs, so some minimal atomicity is here, exactly
as with other per-cpu maps.
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
|
In order to introduce per-cpu cgroup storage, let's generalize
bpf cgroup core to support multiple cgroup storage types.
Potentially, per-node cgroup storage can be added later.
This commit is mostly a formal change that replaces
cgroup_storage pointer with a array of cgroup_storage pointers.
It doesn't actually introduce a new storage type,
it will be done later.
Each bpf program is now able to have one cgroup storage of each type.
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
|
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2018-09-25
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.
The main changes are:
1) Allow for RX stack hardening by implementing the kernel's flow
dissector in BPF. Idea was originally presented at netconf 2017 [0].
Quote from merge commit:
[...] Because of the rigorous checks of the BPF verifier, this
provides significant security guarantees. In particular, the BPF
flow dissector cannot get inside of an infinite loop, as with
CVE-2013-4348, because BPF programs are guaranteed to terminate.
It cannot read outside of packet bounds, because all memory accesses
are checked. Also, with BPF the administrator can decide which
protocols to support, reducing potential attack surface. Rarely
encountered protocols can be excluded from dissection and the
program can be updated without kernel recompile or reboot if a
bug is discovered. [...]
Also, a sample flow dissector has been implemented in BPF as part
of this work, from Petar and Willem.
[0] http://vger.kernel.org/netconf2017_files/rx_hardening_and_udp_gso.pdf
2) Add support for bpftool to list currently active attachment
points of BPF networking programs providing a quick overview
similar to bpftool's perf subcommand, from Yonghong.
3) Fix a verifier pruning instability bug where a union member
from the register state was not cleared properly leading to
branches not being pruned despite them being valid candidates,
from Alexei.
4) Various smaller fast-path optimizations in XDP's map redirect
code, from Jesper.
5) Enable to recognize BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY maps
in bpftool, from Roman.
6) Remove a duplicate check in libbpf that probes for function
storage, from Taeung.
7) Fix an issue in test_progs by avoid checking for errno since
on success its value should not be checked, from Mauricio.
8) Fix unused variable warning in bpf_getsockopt() helper when
CONFIG_INET is not configured, from Anders.
9) Fix a compilation failure in the BPF sample code's use of
bpf_flow_keys, from Prashant.
10) Minor cleanups in BPF code, from Yue and Zhong.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Two new tls tests added in parallel in both net and net-next.
Used Stephen Rothwell's linux-next resolution.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Adds a hook for programs of type BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR and
attach type BPF_FLOW_DISSECTOR that is executed in the flow dissector
path. The BPF program is per-network namespace.
Signed-off-by: Petar Penkov <ppenkov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
Subtraction of pointers was accidentally allowed for unpriv programs
by commit 82abbf8d2fc4. Revert that part of commit.
Fixes: 82abbf8d2fc4 ("bpf: do not allow root to mangle valid pointers")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
|
Edward Cree says:
In check_mem_access(), for the PTR_TO_CTX case, after check_ctx_access()
has supplied a reg_type, the other members of the register state are set
appropriately. Previously reg.range was set to 0, but as it is in a
union with reg.map_ptr, which is larger, upper bytes of the latter were
left in place. This then caused the memcmp() in regsafe() to fail,
preventing some branches from being pruned (and occasionally causing the
same program to take a varying number of processed insns on repeated
verifier runs).
Fix the instability by clearing bpf_reg_state in __mark_reg_[un]known()
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Debugged-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
If a stack slot does not hold a spilled register (STACK_SPILL), then each
of its eight bytes could potentially have a different slot_type. This
information can be important for debugging, and previously we either did
not print anything for the stack slot, or just printed fp-X=0 in the case
where its first byte was STACK_ZERO.
Instead, print eight characters with either 0 (STACK_ZERO), m (STACK_MISC)
or ? (STACK_INVALID) for any stack slot which is neither STACK_SPILL nor
entirely STACK_INVALID.
Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
By giving each register its own liveness chain, we elide the skip_callee()
logic. Instead, each register's parent is the state it inherits from;
both check_func_call() and prepare_func_exit() automatically connect
reg states to the correct chain since when they copy the reg state across
(r1-r5 into the callee as args, and r0 out as the return value) they also
copy the parent pointer.
Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
Commits 109980b894e9 ("bpf: don't select potentially stale ri->map
from buggy xdp progs") and 7c3001313396 ("bpf: fix ri->map_owner
pointer on bpf_prog_realloc") tried to mitigate that buggy programs
using bpf_redirect_map() helper call do not leave stale maps behind.
Idea was to add a map_owner cookie into the per CPU struct redirect_info
which was set to prog->aux by the prog making the helper call as a
proof that the map is not stale since the prog is implicitly holding
a reference to it. This owner cookie could later on get compared with
the program calling into BPF whether they match and therefore the
redirect could proceed with processing the map safely.
In (obvious) hindsight, this approach breaks down when tail calls are
involved since the original caller's prog->aux pointer does not have
to match the one from one of the progs out of the tail call chain,
and therefore the xdp buffer will be dropped instead of redirected.
A way around that would be to fix the issue differently (which also
allows to remove related work in fast path at the same time): once
the life-time of a redirect map has come to its end we use it's map
free callback where we need to wait on synchronize_rcu() for current
outstanding xdp buffers and remove such a map pointer from the
redirect info if found to be present. At that time no program is
using this map anymore so we simply invalidate the map pointers to
NULL iff they previously pointed to that instance while making sure
that the redirect path only reads out the map once.
Fixes: 97f91a7cf04f ("bpf: add bpf_redirect_map helper routine")
Fixes: 109980b894e9 ("bpf: don't select potentially stale ri->map from buggy xdp progs")
Reported-by: Sebastiano Miano <sebastiano.miano@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
This patch adds a BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT which can select
a SO_REUSEPORT sk from a BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_ARRAY. Like other
non SK_FILTER/CGROUP_SKB program, it requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT introduces "struct sk_reuseport_kern"
to store the bpf context instead of using the skb->cb[48].
At the SO_REUSEPORT sk lookup time, it is in the middle of transiting
from a lower layer (ipv4/ipv6) to a upper layer (udp/tcp). At this
point, it is not always clear where the bpf context can be appended
in the skb->cb[48] to avoid saving-and-restoring cb[]. Even putting
aside the difference between ipv4-vs-ipv6 and udp-vs-tcp. It is not
clear if the lower layer is only ipv4 and ipv6 in the future and
will it not touch the cb[] again before transiting to the upper
layer.
For example, in udp_gro_receive(), it uses the 48 byte NAPI_GRO_CB
instead of IP[6]CB and it may still modify the cb[] after calling
the udp[46]_lib_lookup_skb(). Because of the above reason, if
sk->cb is used for the bpf ctx, saving-and-restoring is needed
and likely the whole 48 bytes cb[] has to be saved and restored.
Instead of saving, setting and restoring the cb[], this patch opts
to create a new "struct sk_reuseport_kern" and setting the needed
values in there.
The new BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT and "struct sk_reuseport_(kern|md)"
will serve all ipv4/ipv6 + udp/tcp combinations. There is no protocol
specific usage at this point and it is also inline with the current
sock_reuseport.c implementation (i.e. no protocol specific requirement).
In "struct sk_reuseport_md", this patch exposes data/data_end/len
with semantic similar to other existing usages. Together
with "bpf_skb_load_bytes()" and "bpf_skb_load_bytes_relative()",
the bpf prog can peek anywhere in the skb. The "bind_inany" tells
the bpf prog that the reuseport group is bind-ed to a local
INANY address which cannot be learned from skb.
The new "bind_inany" is added to "struct sock_reuseport" which will be
used when running the new "BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_REUSEPORT" bpf prog in order
to avoid repeating the "bind INANY" test on
"sk_v6_rcv_saddr/sk->sk_rcv_saddr" every time a bpf prog is run. It can
only be properly initialized when a "sk->sk_reuseport" enabled sk is
adding to a hashtable (i.e. during "reuseport_alloc()" and
"reuseport_add_sock()").
The new "sk_select_reuseport()" is the main helper that the
bpf prog will use to select a SO_REUSEPORT sk. It is the only function
that can use the new BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_ARRAY. As mentioned in
the earlier patch, the validity of a selected sk is checked in
run time in "sk_select_reuseport()". Doing the check in
verification time is difficult and inflexible (consider the map-in-map
use case). The runtime check is to compare the selected sk's reuseport_id
with the reuseport_id that we want. This helper will return -EXXX if the
selected sk cannot serve the incoming request (e.g. reuseport_id
not match). The bpf prog can decide if it wants to do SK_DROP as its
discretion.
When the bpf prog returns SK_PASS, the kernel will check if a
valid sk has been selected (i.e. "reuse_kern->selected_sk != NULL").
If it does , it will use the selected sk. If not, the kernel
will select one from "reuse->socks[]" (as before this patch).
The SK_DROP and SK_PASS handling logic will be in the next patch.
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
|
The bpf_get_local_storage() helper function is used
to get a pointer to the bpf local storage from a bpf program.
It takes a pointer to a storage map and flags as arguments.
Right now it accepts only cgroup storage maps, and flags
argument has to be 0. Further it can be extended to support
other types of local storage: e.g. thread local storage etc.
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
|
BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE maps are special in a way
that the access from the bpf program side is lookup-free.
That means the result is guaranteed to be a valid
pointer to the cgroup storage; no NULL-check is required.
This patch introduces BPF_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE return type,
which is required to cause the verifier accept programs,
which are not checking the map value pointer for being NULL.
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
|
This commit introduces BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE maps:
a special type of maps which are implementing the cgroup storage.
>From the userspace point of view it's almost a generic
hash map with the (cgroup inode id, attachment type) pair
used as a key.
The only difference is that some operations are restricted:
1) a user can't create new entries,
2) a user can't remove existing entries.
The lookup from userspace is o(log(n)).
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
|
When check_alu_op() handles a BPF_MOV64 between two registers,
it calls check_reg_arg(DST_OP) on the dst register, marking it
as unbounded. If the src and dst register are the same, this
marks the src as unbounded, which can lead to unexpected errors
for further checks that rely on bounds info. For example:
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2),
BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
Results in:
"math between ctx pointer and register with unbounded
min value is not allowed"
check_alu_op() now uses check_reg_arg(DST_OP_NO_MARK), and MOVs
that need to mark the dst register (MOVIMM, MOV32) do so.
Added a test case for MOV64 dst == src, and dst != src.
Signed-off-by: Arthur Fabre <afabre@cloudflare.com>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
|
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2018-07-20
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.
The main changes are:
1) Add sharing of BPF objects within one ASIC: this allows for reuse of
the same program on multiple ports of a device, and therefore gains
better code store utilization. On top of that, this now also enables
sharing of maps between programs attached to different ports of a
device, from Jakub.
2) Cleanup in libbpf and bpftool's Makefile to reduce unneeded feature
detections and unused variable exports, also from Jakub.
3) First batch of RCU annotation fixes in prog array handling, i.e.
there are several __rcu markers which are not correct as well as
some of the RCU handling, from Roman.
4) Two fixes in BPF sample files related to checking of the prog_cnt
upper limit from sample loader, from Dan.
5) Minor cleanup in sockmap to remove a set but not used variable,
from Colin.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
A set of new API functions exported for the drivers will soon use
'bpf_offload_dev_' as a prefix. Rename the bpf_offload_dev_match()
which is internal to the core (used by the verifier) to avoid any
confusion.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin.monnet@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
|
syzkaller managed to trigger the following bug through fault injection:
[...]
[ 141.043668] verifier bug. No program starts at insn 3
[ 141.044648] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 4072 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1613
get_callee_stack_depth kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1612 [inline]
[ 141.044648] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 4072 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1613
fixup_call_args kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5587 [inline]
[ 141.044648] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 4072 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1613
bpf_check+0x525e/0x5e60 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5952
[ 141.047355] CPU: 3 PID: 4072 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.18.0-rc4+ #51
[ 141.048446] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
[ 141.049877] Call Trace:
[ 141.050324] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
[ 141.050324] dump_stack+0x1c9/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113
[ 141.050950] ? dump_stack_print_info.cold.2+0x52/0x52 lib/dump_stack.c:60
[ 141.051837] panic+0x238/0x4e7 kernel/panic.c:184
[ 141.052386] ? add_taint.cold.5+0x16/0x16 kernel/panic.c:385
[ 141.053101] ? __warn.cold.8+0x148/0x1ba kernel/panic.c:537
[ 141.053814] ? __warn.cold.8+0x117/0x1ba kernel/panic.c:530
[ 141.054506] ? get_callee_stack_depth kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1612 [inline]
[ 141.054506] ? fixup_call_args kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5587 [inline]
[ 141.054506] ? bpf_check+0x525e/0x5e60 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5952
[ 141.055163] __warn.cold.8+0x163/0x1ba kernel/panic.c:538
[ 141.055820] ? get_callee_stack_depth kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1612 [inline]
[ 141.055820] ? fixup_call_args kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5587 [inline]
[ 141.055820] ? bpf_check+0x525e/0x5e60 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:5952
[...]
What happens in jit_subprogs() is that kcalloc() for the subprog func
buffer is failing with NULL where we then bail out. Latter is a plain
return -ENOMEM, and this is definitely not okay since earlier in the
loop we are walking all subprogs and temporarily rewrite insn->off to
remember the subprog id as well as insn->imm to temporarily point the
call to __bpf_call_base + 1 for the initial JIT pass. Thus, bailing
out in such state and handing this over to the interpreter is troublesome
since later/subsequent e.g. find_subprog() lookups are based on wrong
insn->imm.
Therefore, once we hit this point, we need to jump to out_free path
where we undo all changes from earlier loop, so that interpreter can
work on unmodified insn->{off,imm}.
Another point is that should find_subprog() fail in jit_subprogs() due
to a verifier bug, then we also should not simply defer the program to
the interpreter since also here we did partial modifications. Instead
we should just bail out entirely and return an error to the user who is
trying to load the program.
Fixes: 1c2a088a6626 ("bpf: x64: add JIT support for multi-function programs")
Reported-by: syzbot+7d427828b2ea6e592804@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
The vzalloc() function has no 2-factor argument form, so multiplication
factors need to be wrapped in array_size(). This patch replaces cases of:
vzalloc(a * b)
with:
vzalloc(array_size(a, b))
as well as handling cases of:
vzalloc(a * b * c)
with:
vzalloc(array3_size(a, b, c))
This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:
vzalloc(4 * 1024)
though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.
Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.
The Coccinelle script used for this was:
// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@
(
vzalloc(
- (sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+ sizeof(TYPE) * E
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- (sizeof(THING)) * E
+ sizeof(THING) * E
, ...)
)
// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@
(
vzalloc(
- sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@
(
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+ array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+ array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+ array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+ array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+ array_size(COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+ array_size(COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@
vzalloc(
- SIZE * COUNT
+ array_size(COUNT, SIZE)
, ...)
// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@
(
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@
(
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@
(
vzalloc(
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
)
// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@
(
vzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- E1 * E2 * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
)
// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants.
@@
expression E1, E2;
constant C1, C2;
@@
(
vzalloc(C1 * C2, ...)
|
vzalloc(
- E1 * E2
+ array_size(E1, E2)
, ...)
)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
|
The kzalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kcalloc(). This
patch replaces cases of:
kzalloc(a * b, gfp)
with:
kcalloc(a * b, gfp)
as well as handling cases of:
kzalloc(a * b * c, gfp)
with:
kzalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp)
as it's slightly less ugly than:
kzalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp)
This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:
kzalloc(4 * 1024, gfp)
though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.
Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.
The Coccinelle script used for this was:
// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@
(
kzalloc(
- (sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+ sizeof(TYPE) * E
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- (sizeof(THING)) * E
+ sizeof(THING) * E
, ...)
)
// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@
(
kzalloc(
- sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+ COUNT
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@
(
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+ COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+ COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
)
// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- SIZE * COUNT
+ COUNT, SIZE
, ...)
// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@
(
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@
(
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+ array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
, ...)
)
// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@
(
kzalloc(
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+ array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
, ...)
)
// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products,
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@
(
kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- (E1) * E2 * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- (E1) * (E2) * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- (E1) * (E2) * (E3)
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
|
kzalloc(
- E1 * E2 * E3
+ array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
, ...)
)
// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants,
// keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument.
@@
expression THING, E1, E2;
type TYPE;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@
(
kzalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...)
|
kzalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...)
|
kzalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
kzalloc(C1 * C2, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * (E2)
+ E2, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(TYPE) * E2
+ E2, sizeof(TYPE)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(THING) * (E2)
+ E2, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- sizeof(THING) * E2
+ E2, sizeof(THING)
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- (E1) * E2
+ E1, E2
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- (E1) * (E2)
+ E1, E2
, ...)
|
- kzalloc
+ kcalloc
(
- E1 * E2
+ E1, E2
, ...)
)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
|
As commit 28e33f9d78ee ("bpf: disallow arithmetic operations on
context pointer") already describes, f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier:
rework value tracking") removed the specific white-listed cases
we had previously where we would allow for pointer arithmetic in
order to further generalize it, and allow e.g. context access via
modified registers. While the dereferencing of modified context
pointers had been forbidden through 28e33f9d78ee, syzkaller did
recently manage to trigger several KASAN splats for slab out of
bounds access and use after frees by simply passing a modified
context pointer to a helper function which would then do the bad
access since verifier allowed it in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals().
Rejecting arithmetic on ctx pointer in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals()
generally could break existing programs as there's a valid use
case in tracing in combination with passing the ctx to helpers as
bpf_probe_read(), where the register then becomes unknown at
verification time due to adding a non-constant offset to it. An
access sequence may look like the following:
offset = args->filename; /* field __data_loc filename */
bpf_probe_read(&dst, len, (char *)args + offset); // args is ctx
There are two options: i) we could special case the ctx and as
soon as we add a constant or bounded offset to it (hence ctx type
wouldn't change) we could turn the ctx into an unknown scalar, or
ii) we generalize the sanity test for ctx member access into a
small helper and assert it on the ctx register that was passed
as a function argument. Fwiw, latter is more obvious and less
complex at the same time, and one case that may potentially be
legitimate in future for ctx member access at least would be for
ctx to carry a const offset. Therefore, fix follows approach
from ii) and adds test cases to BPF kselftests.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Reported-by: syzbot+3d0b2441dbb71751615e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+c8504affd4fdd0c1b626@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+e5190cb881d8660fb1a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+efae31b384d5badbd620@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
Wang reported that all the testcases for BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT
program type in test_verifier report the following errors on x86_32:
172/p unpriv: spill/fill of different pointers ldx FAIL
Unexpected error message!
0: (bf) r6 = r10
1: (07) r6 += -8
2: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+3
R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R6=fp-8,call_-1 R10=fp0,call_-1
3: (bf) r2 = r10
4: (07) r2 += -76
5: (7b) *(u64 *)(r6 +0) = r2
6: (55) if r1 != 0x0 goto pc+1
R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2=fp-76,call_-1 R6=fp-8,call_-1 R10=fp0,call_-1 fp-8=fp
7: (7b) *(u64 *)(r6 +0) = r1
8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r6 +0)
9: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +68)
invalid bpf_context access off=68 size=8
378/p check bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period byte load permitted FAIL
Failed to load prog 'Permission denied'!
0: (b7) r0 = 0
1: (71) r0 = *(u8 *)(r1 +68)
invalid bpf_context access off=68 size=1
379/p check bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period half load permitted FAIL
Failed to load prog 'Permission denied'!
0: (b7) r0 = 0
1: (69) r0 = *(u16 *)(r1 +68)
invalid bpf_context access off=68 size=2
380/p check bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period word load permitted FAIL
Failed to load prog 'Permission denied'!
0: (b7) r0 = 0
1: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r1 +68)
invalid bpf_context access off=68 size=4
381/p check bpf_perf_event_data->sample_period dword load permitted FAIL
Failed to load prog 'Permission denied'!
0: (b7) r0 = 0
1: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 +68)
invalid bpf_context access off=68 size=8
Reason is that struct pt_regs on x86_32 doesn't fully align to 8 byte
boundary due to its size of 68 bytes. Therefore, bpf_ctx_narrow_access_ok()
will then bail out saying that off & (size_default - 1) which is 68 & 7
doesn't cleanly align in the case of sample_period access from struct
bpf_perf_event_data, hence verifier wrongly thinks we might be doing an
unaligned access here though underlying arch can handle it just fine.
Therefore adjust this down to machine size and check and rewrite the
offset for narrow access on that basis. We also need to fix corresponding
pe_prog_is_valid_access(), since we hit the check for off % size != 0
(e.g. 68 % 8 -> 4) in the first and last test. With that in place, progs
for tracing work on x86_32.
Reported-by: Wang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Wang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
While some of the BPF map lookup helpers provide a ->map_gen_lookup()
callback for inlining the map lookup altogether it is not available
for every map, so the remaining ones have to call bpf_map_lookup_elem()
helper which does a dispatch to map->ops->map_lookup_elem(). In
times of retpolines, this will control and trap speculative execution
rather than letting it do its work for the indirect call and will
therefore cause a slowdown. Likewise, bpf_map_update_elem() and
bpf_map_delete_elem() do not have an inlined version and need to call
into their map->ops->map_update_elem() resp. map->ops->map_delete_elem()
handlers.
Before:
# bpftool prog dump xlated id 1
0: (bf) r2 = r10
1: (07) r2 += -8
2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0
3: (18) r1 = map[id:1]
5: (85) call __htab_map_lookup_elem#232656
6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+4
7: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r0 +35)
8: (55) if r1 != 0x0 goto pc+1
9: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +35) = 1
10: (07) r0 += 56
11: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+4
12: (bf) r2 = r0
13: (18) r1 = map[id:1]
15: (85) call bpf_map_delete_elem#215008 <-- indirect call via
16: (95) exit helper
After:
# bpftool prog dump xlated id 1
0: (bf) r2 = r10
1: (07) r2 += -8
2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0
3: (18) r1 = map[id:1]
5: (85) call __htab_map_lookup_elem#233328
6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+4
7: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r0 +35)
8: (55) if r1 != 0x0 goto pc+1
9: (72) *(u8 *)(r0 +35) = 1
10: (07) r0 += 56
11: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+4
12: (bf) r2 = r0
13: (18) r1 = map[id:1]
15: (85) call htab_lru_map_delete_elem#238240 <-- direct call
16: (95) exit
In all three lookup/update/delete cases however we can use the actual
address of the map callback directly if we find that there's only a
single path with a map pointer leading to the helper call, meaning
when the map pointer has not been poisoned from verifier side.
Example code can be seen above for the delete case.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
Stating 'proprietary program' in the error is just silly since it
can also be a different open source license than that which is just
not compatible.
Reference: https://twitter.com/majek04/status/998531268039102465
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
|
|
Lots of easy overlapping changes in the confict
resolutions here.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
"Let's begin the holiday weekend with some networking fixes:
1) Whoops need to restrict cfg80211 wiphy names even more to 64
bytes. From Eric Biggers.
2) Fix flags being ignored when using kernel_connect() with SCTP,
from Xin Long.
3) Use after free in DCCP, from Alexey Kodanev.
4) Need to check rhltable_init() return value in ipmr code, from Eric
Dumazet.
5) XDP handling fixes in virtio_net from Jason Wang.
6) Missing RTA_TABLE in rtm_ipv4_policy[], from Roopa Prabhu.
7) Need to use IRQ disabling spinlocks in mlx4_qp_lookup(), from Jack
Morgenstein.
8) Prevent out-of-bounds speculation using indexes in BPF, from
Daniel Borkmann.
9) Fix regression added by AF_PACKET link layer cure, from Willem de
Bruijn.
10) Correct ENIC dma mask, from Govindarajulu Varadarajan.
11) Missing config options for PMTU tests, from Stefano Brivio"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (48 commits)
ibmvnic: Fix partial success login retries
selftests/net: Add missing config options for PMTU tests
mlx4_core: allocate ICM memory in page size chunks
enic: set DMA mask to 47 bit
ppp: remove the PPPIOCDETACH ioctl
ipv4: remove warning in ip_recv_error
net : sched: cls_api: deal with egdev path only if needed
vhost: synchronize IOTLB message with dev cleanup
packet: fix reserve calculation
net/mlx5: IPSec, Fix a race between concurrent sandbox QP commands
net/mlx5e: When RXFCS is set, add FCS data into checksum calculation
bpf: properly enforce index mask to prevent out-of-bounds speculation
net/mlx4: Fix irq-unsafe spinlock usage
net: phy: broadcom: Fix bcm_write_exp()
net: phy: broadcom: Fix auxiliary control register reads
net: ipv4: add missing RTA_TABLE to rtm_ipv4_policy
net/mlx4: fix spelling mistake: "Inrerface" -> "Interface" and rephrase message
ibmvnic: Only do H_EOI for mobility events
tuntap: correctly set SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE
virtio-net: fix leaking page for gso packet during mergeable XDP
...
|
|
While reviewing the verifier code, I recently noticed that the
following two program variants in relation to tail calls can be
loaded.
Variant 1:
# bpftool p d x i 15
0: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+3
1: (18) r2 = map[id:5]
3: (05) goto pc+2
4: (18) r2 = map[id:6]
6: (b7) r3 = 7
7: (35) if r3 >= 0xa0 goto pc+2
8: (54) (u32) r3 &= (u32) 255
9: (85) call bpf_tail_call#12
10: (b7) r0 = 1
11: (95) exit
# bpftool m s i 5
5: prog_array flags 0x0
key 4B value 4B max_entries 4 memlock 4096B
# bpftool m s i 6
6: prog_array flags 0x0
key 4B value 4B max_entries 160 memlock 4096B
Variant 2:
# bpftool p d x i 20
0: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+3
1: (18) r2 = map[id:8]
3: (05) goto pc+2
4: (18) r2 = map[id:7]
6: (b7) r3 = 7
7: (35) if r3 >= 0x4 goto pc+2
8: (54) (u32) r3 &= (u32) 3
9: (85) call bpf_tail_call#12
10: (b7) r0 = 1
11: (95) exit
# bpftool m s i 8
8: prog_array flags 0x0
key 4B value 4B max_entries 160 memlock 4096B
# bpftool m s i 7
7: prog_array flags 0x0
key 4B value 4B max_entries 4 memlock 4096B
In both cases the index masking inserted by the verifier in order
to control out of bounds speculation from a CPU via b2157399cc98
("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation") seems to be incorrect
in what it is enforcing. In the 1st variant, the mask is applied
from the map with the significantly larger number of entries where
we would allow to a certain degree out of bounds speculation for
the smaller map, and in the 2nd variant where the mask is applied
from the map with the smaller number of entries, we get buggy
behavior since we truncate the index of the larger map.
The original intent from commit b2157399cc98 is to reject such
occasions where two or more different tail call maps are used
in the same tail call helper invocation. However, the check on
the BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON is never hit since we never poisoned the
saved pointer in the first place! We do this explicitly for map
lookups but in case of tail calls we basically used the tail
call map in insn_aux_data that was processed in the most recent
path which the verifier walked. Thus any prior path that stored
a pointer in insn_aux_data at the helper location was always
overridden.
Fix it by moving the map pointer poison logic into a small helper
that covers both BPF helpers with the same logic. After that in
fixup_bpf_calls() the poison check is then hit for tail calls
and the program rejected. Latter only happens in unprivileged
case since this is the *only* occasion where a rewrite needs to
happen, and where such rewrite is specific to the map (max_entries,
index_mask). In the privileged case the rewrite is generic for
the insn->imm / insn->code update so multiple maps from different
paths can be handled just fine since all the remaining logic
happens in the instruction processing itself. This is similar
to the case of map lookups: in case there is a collision of
maps in fixup_bpf_calls() we must skip the inlined rewrite since
this will turn the generic instruction sequence into a non-
generic one. Thus the patch_call_imm will simply update the
insn->imm location where the bpf_map_lookup_elem() will later
take care of the dispatch. Given we need this 'poison' state
as a check, the information of whether a map is an unpriv_array
gets lost, so enforcing it prior to that needs an additional
state. In general this check is needed si |