Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD
KVM/arm fixes for 5.2, take #2
- SVE cleanup killing a warning with ancient GCC versions
- Don't report non-existent system registers to userspace
- Fix memory leak when freeing the vgic ITS
- Properly lower the interrupt on the emulated physical timer
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Commit 332d079735f5 ("KVM: nVMX: KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE - Tear down old EVMCS
state before setting new state", 2019-05-02) broke evmcs_test because the
eVMCS setup must be performed even if there is no VMXON region defined,
as long as the eVMCS bit is set in the assist page.
While the simplest possible fix would be to add a check on
kvm_state->flags & KVM_STATE_NESTED_EVMCS in the initial "if" that
covers kvm_state->hdr.vmx.vmxon_pa == -1ull, that is quite ugly.
Instead, this patch moves checks earlier in the function and
conditionalizes them on kvm_state->hdr.vmx.vmxon_pa, so that
vmx_set_nested_state always goes through vmx_leave_nested
and nested_enable_evmcs.
Fixes: 332d079735f5 ("KVM: nVMX: KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE - Tear down old EVMCS state before setting new state")
Cc: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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SVM's Nested Page Tables (NPT) reuses x86 paging for the host-controlled
page walk. For 32-bit KVM, this means PAE paging is used even when TDP
is enabled, i.e. the PAE root array needs to be allocated.
Fixes: ee6268ba3a68 ("KVM: x86: Skip pae_root shadow allocation if tdp enabled")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Jiri Palecek <jpalecek@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Improve the KVM_{GET,SET}_NESTED_STATE structs by detailing the format
of VMX nested state data in a struct.
In order to avoid changing the ioctl values of
KVM_{GET,SET}_NESTED_STATE, there is a need to preserve
sizeof(struct kvm_nested_state). This is done by defining the data
struct as "data.vmx[0]". It was the most elegant way I found to
preserve struct size while still keeping struct readable and easy to
maintain. It does have a misfortunate side-effect that now it has to be
accessed as "data.vmx[0]" rather than just "data.vmx".
Because we are already modifying these structs, I also modified the
following:
* Define the "format" field values as macros.
* Rename vmcs_pa to vmcs12_pa for better readability.
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
[Remove SVM stubs, add KVM_STATE_NESTED_VMX_VMCS12_SIZE. - Paolo]
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Unfortunately, a couple of mistakes were made while implementing
Enlightened VMCS support, in particular, wrong clean fields were
used in copy_enlightened_to_vmcs12():
- exception_bitmap is covered by CONTROL_EXCPN;
- vm_exit_controls/pin_based_vm_exec_control/secondary_vm_exec_control
are covered by CONTROL_GRP1.
Fixes: 945679e301ea0 ("KVM: nVMX: add enlightened VMCS state")
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Since commit d26c25a9d19b ("arm64: KVM: Tighten guest core register
access from userspace"), KVM_{GET,SET}_ONE_REG rejects register IDs
that do not correspond to a single underlying architectural register.
KVM_GET_REG_LIST was not changed to match however: instead, it
simply yields a list of 32-bit register IDs that together cover the
whole kvm_regs struct. This means that if userspace tries to use
the resulting list of IDs directly to drive calls to KVM_*_ONE_REG,
some of those calls will now fail.
This was not the intention. Instead, iterating KVM_*_ONE_REG over
the list of IDs returned by KVM_GET_REG_LIST should be guaranteed
to work.
This patch fixes the problem by splitting validate_core_offset()
into a backend core_reg_size_from_offset() which does all of the
work except for checking that the size field in the register ID
matches, and kvm_arm_copy_reg_indices() and num_core_regs() are
converted to use this to enumerate the valid offsets.
kvm_arm_copy_reg_indices() now also sets the register ID size field
appropriately based on the value returned, so the register ID
supplied to userspace is fully qualified for use with the register
access ioctls.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d26c25a9d19b ("arm64: KVM: Tighten guest core register access from userspace")
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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This routine is a one-liner and doesn't really need to be function and
can be implemented as a macro.
Suggested-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvms390/linux into kvm-master
KVM: s390: Fixes
- fix compilation for !CONFIG_PCI
- fix the output of KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID
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The sprgs are a set of 4 general purpose sprs provided for software use.
SPRG3 is special in that it can also be read from userspace. Thus it is
used on linux to store the cpu and numa id of the process to speed up
syscall access to this information.
This register is overwritten with the guest value on kvm guest entry,
and so needs to be restored on exit again. Thus restore the value on
the guest exit path in kvmhv_p9_guest_entry().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+
Fixes: 95a6432ce9038 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Streamlined guest entry/exit path on P9 for radix guests")
Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <sjitindarsingh@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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Commit 3309bec85e60 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix lockdep warning when
entering the guest") moved calls to trace_hardirqs_{on,off} in the
entry path used for HPT guests. Similar code exists in the new
streamlined entry path used for radix guests on POWER9. This makes
the same change there, so as to avoid lockdep warnings such as this:
[ 228.686461] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(current->hardirqs_enabled)
[ 228.686480] WARNING: CPU: 116 PID: 3803 at ../kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4219 check_flags.part.23+0x21c/0x270
[ 228.686544] Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle xt_MASQUERADE iptable_nat nf_nat
+xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 tun bridge stp llc ebtable_filter
+ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter fuse kvm_hv kvm at24 ipmi_powernv regmap_i2c ipmi_devintf
+uio_pdrv_genirq ofpart ipmi_msghandler uio powernv_flash mtd ibmpowernv opal_prd ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 btrfs
+zstd_decompress zstd_compress raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx libcrc32c xor
+raid6_pq raid1 raid0 ses sd_mod enclosure scsi_transport_sas ast i2c_opal i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea
+sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm i40e e1000e cxl aacraid tg3 drm_panel_orientation_quirks i2c_core
[ 228.686859] CPU: 116 PID: 3803 Comm: qemu-system-ppc Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.2.0-rc1-xive+ #42
[ 228.686911] NIP: c0000000001b394c LR: c0000000001b3948 CTR: c000000000bfad20
[ 228.686963] REGS: c000200cdb50f570 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.2.0-rc1-xive+)
[ 228.687001] MSR: 9000000002823033 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 48222222 XER: 20040000
[ 228.687060] CFAR: c000000000116db0 IRQMASK: 1
[ 228.687060] GPR00: c0000000001b3948 c000200cdb50f800 c0000000015e7600 000000000000002e
[ 228.687060] GPR04: 0000000000000001 c0000000001c71a0 000000006e655f73 72727563284e4f5f
[ 228.687060] GPR08: 0000200e60680000 0000000000000000 c000200cdb486180 0000000000000000
[ 228.687060] GPR12: 0000000000002000 c000200fff61a680 0000000000000000 00007fffb75c0000
[ 228.687060] GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000000017d6900 c000000001124900
[ 228.687060] GPR20: 0000000000000074 c008000006916f68 0000000000000074 0000000000000074
[ 228.687060] GPR24: ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000003 c000200d4b600000
[ 228.687060] GPR28: c000000001627e58 c000000001489908 c000000001627e58 c000000002304de0
[ 228.687377] NIP [c0000000001b394c] check_flags.part.23+0x21c/0x270
[ 228.687415] LR [c0000000001b3948] check_flags.part.23+0x218/0x270
[ 228.687466] Call Trace:
[ 228.687488] [c000200cdb50f800] [c0000000001b3948] check_flags.part.23+0x218/0x270 (unreliable)
[ 228.687542] [c000200cdb50f870] [c0000000001b6548] lock_is_held_type+0x188/0x1c0
[ 228.687595] [c000200cdb50f8d0] [c0000000001d939c] rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xdc/0x100
[ 228.687646] [c000200cdb50f900] [c0000000001dd704] rcu_note_context_switch+0x304/0x340
[ 228.687701] [c000200cdb50f940] [c0080000068fcc58] kvmhv_run_single_vcpu+0xdb0/0x1120 [kvm_hv]
[ 228.687756] [c000200cdb50fa20] [c0080000068fd5b0] kvmppc_vcpu_run_hv+0x5e8/0xe40 [kvm_hv]
[ 228.687816] [c000200cdb50faf0] [c0080000071797dc] kvmppc_vcpu_run+0x34/0x48 [kvm]
[ 228.687863] [c000200cdb50fb10] [c0080000071755dc] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x244/0x420 [kvm]
[ 228.687916] [c000200cdb50fba0] [c008000007165ccc] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x424/0x838 [kvm]
[ 228.687957] [c000200cdb50fd10] [c000000000433a24] do_vfs_ioctl+0xd4/0xcd0
[ 228.687995] [c000200cdb50fdb0] [c000000000434724] ksys_ioctl+0x104/0x120
[ 228.688033] [c000200cdb50fe00] [c000000000434768] sys_ioctl+0x28/0x80
[ 228.688072] [c000200cdb50fe20] [c00000000000b888] system_call+0x5c/0x70
[ 228.688109] Instruction dump:
[ 228.688142] 4bf6342d 60000000 0fe00000 e8010080 7c0803a6 4bfffe60 3c82ff87 3c62ff87
[ 228.688196] 388472d0 3863d738 4bf63405 60000000 <0fe00000> 4bffff4c 3c82ff87 3c62ff87
[ 228.688251] irq event stamp: 205
[ 228.688287] hardirqs last enabled at (205): [<c0080000068fc1b4>] kvmhv_run_single_vcpu+0x30c/0x1120 [kvm_hv]
[ 228.688344] hardirqs last disabled at (204): [<c0080000068fbff0>] kvmhv_run_single_vcpu+0x148/0x1120 [kvm_hv]
[ 228.688412] softirqs last enabled at (180): [<c000000000c0b2ac>] __do_softirq+0x4ac/0x5d4
[ 228.688464] softirqs last disabled at (169): [<c000000000122aa8>] irq_exit+0x1f8/0x210
[ 228.688513] ---[ end trace eb16f6260022a812 ]---
[ 228.688548] possible reason: unannotated irqs-off.
[ 228.688571] irq event stamp: 205
[ 228.688607] hardirqs last enabled at (205): [<c0080000068fc1b4>] kvmhv_run_single_vcpu+0x30c/0x1120 [kvm_hv]
[ 228.688664] hardirqs last disabled at (204): [<c0080000068fbff0>] kvmhv_run_single_vcpu+0x148/0x1120 [kvm_hv]
[ 228.688719] softirqs last enabled at (180): [<c000000000c0b2ac>] __do_softirq+0x4ac/0x5d4
[ 228.688758] softirqs last disabled at (169): [<c000000000122aa8>] irq_exit+0x1f8/0x210
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+
Fixes: 95a6432ce903 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Streamlined guest entry/exit path on P9 for radix guests")
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Tested-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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Under XIVE, the ESB pages of an interrupt are used for interrupt
management (EOI) and triggering. They are made available to guests
through a mapping of the XIVE KVM device.
When a device is passed-through, the passthru_irq helpers,
kvmppc_xive_set_mapped() and kvmppc_xive_clr_mapped(), clear the ESB
pages of the guest IRQ number being mapped and let the VM fault
handler repopulate with the correct page.
The ESB pages are mapped at offset 4 (KVM_XIVE_ESB_PAGE_OFFSET) in the
KVM device mapping. Unfortunately, this offset was not taken into
account when clearing the pages. This lead to issues with the
passthrough devices for which the interrupts were not functional under
some guest configuration (tg3 and single CPU) or in any configuration
(e1000e adapter).
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Tested-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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According to Documentation/virtual/kvm/locking.txt, the srcu read lock
should be taken when accessing the memslots of the VM. The XIVE KVM
device needs to do so when configuring the page of the OS event queue
of vCPU for a given priority and when marking the same page dirty
before migration.
This avoids warnings such as :
[ 208.224882] =============================
[ 208.224884] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[ 208.224889] 5.2.0-rc2-xive+ #47 Not tainted
[ 208.224890] -----------------------------
[ 208.224894] ../include/linux/kvm_host.h:633 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
[ 208.224896]
other info that might help us debug this:
[ 208.224898]
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
[ 208.224901] no locks held by qemu-system-ppc/3923.
[ 208.224902]
stack backtrace:
[ 208.224907] CPU: 64 PID: 3923 Comm: qemu-system-ppc Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.2.0-rc2-xive+ #47
[ 208.224909] Call Trace:
[ 208.224918] [c000200cdd98fa30] [c000000000be1934] dump_stack+0xe8/0x164 (unreliable)
[ 208.224924] [c000200cdd98fa80] [c0000000001aec80] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x110/0x180
[ 208.224935] [c000200cdd98fb00] [c0080000075933a0] gfn_to_memslot+0x1c8/0x200 [kvm]
[ 208.224943] [c000200cdd98fb40] [c008000007599600] gfn_to_pfn+0x28/0x60 [kvm]
[ 208.224951] [c000200cdd98fb70] [c008000007599658] gfn_to_page+0x20/0x40 [kvm]
[ 208.224959] [c000200cdd98fb90] [c0080000075b495c] kvmppc_xive_native_set_attr+0x8b4/0x1480 [kvm]
[ 208.224967] [c000200cdd98fca0] [c00800000759261c] kvm_device_ioctl_attr+0x64/0xb0 [kvm]
[ 208.224974] [c000200cdd98fcf0] [c008000007592730] kvm_device_ioctl+0xc8/0x110 [kvm]
[ 208.224979] [c000200cdd98fd10] [c000000000433a24] do_vfs_ioctl+0xd4/0xcd0
[ 208.224981] [c000200cdd98fdb0] [c000000000434724] ksys_ioctl+0x104/0x120
[ 208.224984] [c000200cdd98fe00] [c000000000434768] sys_ioctl+0x28/0x80
[ 208.224988] [c000200cdd98fe20] [c00000000000b888] system_call+0x5c/0x70
legoater@boss01:~$
Fixes: 13ce3297c576 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Add controls for the EQ configuration")
Fixes: e6714bd1671d ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: XIVE: Add a control to dirty the XIVE EQ pages")
Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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The passthrough interrupts are defined at the host level and their IRQ
data should not be cleared unless specifically deconfigured (shutdown)
by the host. They differ from the IPI interrupts which are allocated
by the XIVE KVM device and reserved to the guest usage only.
This fixes a host crash when destroying a VM in which a PCI adapter
was passed-through. In this case, the interrupt is cleared and freed
by the KVM device and then shutdown by vfio at the host level.
[ 1007.360265] BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000d00
[ 1007.360285] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000009da34
[ 1007.360296] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 7 [#1]
[ 1007.360303] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV
[ 1007.360314] Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost iptable_mangle ipt_MASQUERADE iptable_nat nf_nat xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv4 ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 tun bridge stp llc kvm_hv kvm xt_tcpudp iptable_filter squashfs fuse binfmt_misc vmx_crypto ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi nfsd ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs zstd_decompress zstd_compress lzo_compress raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq multipath mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core crc32c_vpmsum mlx5_core
[ 1007.360425] CPU: 9 PID: 15576 Comm: CPU 18/KVM Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.1.0-gad7e7d0ef #4
[ 1007.360454] NIP: c00000000009da34 LR: c00000000009e50c CTR: c00000000009e5d0
[ 1007.360482] REGS: c000007f24ccf330 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (5.1.0-gad7e7d0ef)
[ 1007.360500] MSR: 900000000280b033 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24002484 XER: 00000000
[ 1007.360532] CFAR: c00000000009da10 DAR: 0000000000000d00 DSISR: 00080000 IRQMASK: 1
[ 1007.360532] GPR00: c00000000009e62c c000007f24ccf5c0 c000000001510600 c000007fe7f947c0
[ 1007.360532] GPR04: 0000000000000d00 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c000005eff02d200
[ 1007.360532] GPR08: 0000000000400000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 fffffffffffffffd
[ 1007.360532] GPR12: c00000000009e5d0 c000007fffff7b00 0000000000000031 000000012c345718
[ 1007.360532] GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000008 0000000000418004 0000000000040100
[ 1007.360532] GPR20: 0000000000000000 0000000008430000 00000000003c0000 0000000000000027
[ 1007.360532] GPR24: 00000000000000ff 0000000000000000 00000000000000ff c000007faa90d98c
[ 1007.360532] GPR28: c000007faa90da40 00000000000fe040 ffffffffffffffff c000007fe7f947c0
[ 1007.360689] NIP [c00000000009da34] xive_esb_read+0x34/0x120
[ 1007.360706] LR [c00000000009e50c] xive_do_source_set_mask.part.0+0x2c/0x50
[ 1007.360732] Call Trace:
[ 1007.360738] [c000007f24ccf5c0] [c000000000a6383c] snooze_loop+0x15c/0x270 (unreliable)
[ 1007.360775] [c000007f24ccf5f0] [c00000000009e62c] xive_irq_shutdown+0x5c/0xe0
[ 1007.360795] [c000007f24ccf630] [c00000000019e4a0] irq_shutdown+0x60/0xe0
[ 1007.360813] [c000007f24ccf660] [c000000000198c44] __free_irq+0x3a4/0x420
[ 1007.360831] [c000007f24ccf700] [c000000000198dc8] free_irq+0x78/0xe0
[ 1007.360849] [c000007f24ccf730] [c00000000096c5a8] vfio_msi_set_vector_signal+0xa8/0x350
[ 1007.360878] [c000007f24ccf7f0] [c00000000096c938] vfio_msi_set_block+0xe8/0x1e0
[ 1007.360899] [c000007f24ccf850] [c00000000096cae0] vfio_msi_disable+0xb0/0x110
[ 1007.360912] [c000007f24ccf8a0] [c00000000096cd04] vfio_pci_set_msi_trigger+0x1c4/0x3d0
[ 1007.360922] [c000007f24ccf910] [c00000000096d910] vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl+0xa0/0x170
[ 1007.360941] [c000007f24ccf930] [c00000000096b400] vfio_pci_disable+0x80/0x5e0
[ 1007.360963] [c000007f24ccfa10] [c00000000096b9bc] vfio_pci_release+0x5c/0x90
[ 1007.360991] [c000007f24ccfa40] [c000000000963a9c] vfio_device_fops_release+0x3c/0x70
[ 1007.361012] [c000007f24ccfa70] [c0000000003b5668] __fput+0xc8/0x2b0
[ 1007.361040] [c000007f24ccfac0] [c0000000001409b0] task_work_run+0x140/0x1b0
[ 1007.361059] [c000007f24ccfb20] [c000000000118f8c] do_exit+0x3ac/0xd00
[ 1007.361076] [c000007f24ccfc00] [c0000000001199b0] do_group_exit+0x60/0x100
[ 1007.361094] [c000007f24ccfc40] [c00000000012b514] get_signal+0x1a4/0x8f0
[ 1007.361112] [c000007f24ccfd30] [c000000000021cc8] do_notify_resume+0x1a8/0x430
[ 1007.361141] [c000007f24ccfe20] [c00000000000e444] ret_from_except_lite+0x70/0x74
[ 1007.361159] Instruction dump:
[ 1007.361175] 38422c00 e9230000 712a0004 41820010 548a2036 7d442378 78840020 71290020
[ 1007.361194] 4082004c e9230010 7c892214 7c0004ac <e9240000> 0c090000 4c00012c 792a0022
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12+
Fixes: 5af50993850a ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Native usage of the XIVE interrupt controller")
Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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The XICS-on-XIVE KVM device needs to allocate XIVE event queues when a
priority is used by the OS. This is referred as EQ provisioning and it
is done under the hood when :
1. a CPU is hot-plugged in the VM
2. the "set-xive" is called at VM startup
3. sources are restored at VM restore
The kvm->lock mutex is used to protect the different XIVE structures
being modified but in some contexts, kvm->lock is taken under the
vcpu->mutex which is not permitted by the KVM locking rules.
Introduce a new mutex 'lock' for the KVM devices for them to
synchronize accesses to the XIVE device structures.
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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When a vCPU is connected to the KVM device, it is done using its vCPU
identifier in the guest. Fix the enforced limit on the vCPU identifier
by taking into account the SMT mode.
Reported-by: Satheesh Rajendran <sathnaga@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Satheesh Rajendran <sathnaga@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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When a CPU is hot-unplugged, the EQ is deconfigured using a zero size
and a zero address. In this case, there is no need to check the flag
and queue size validity. Move the checks after the queue reset code
section to fix CPU hot-unplug.
Reported-by: Satheesh Rajendran <sathnaga@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Satheesh Rajendran <sathnaga@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
|
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Improve the release of the XIVE KVM device by clearing the file
address_space, which is used to unmap the interrupt ESB pages when a
device is passed-through.
Suggested-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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Currently the HV KVM code takes the kvm->lock around calls to
kvm_for_each_vcpu() and kvm_get_vcpu_by_id() (which can call
kvm_for_each_vcpu() internally). However, that leads to a lock
order inversion problem, because these are called in contexts where
the vcpu mutex is held, but the vcpu mutexes nest within kvm->lock
according to Documentation/virtual/kvm/locking.txt. Hence there
is a possibility of deadlock.
To fix this, we simply don't take the kvm->lock mutex around these
calls. This is safe because the implementations of kvm_for_each_vcpu()
and kvm_get_vcpu_by_id() have been designed to be able to be called
locklessly.
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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Currently the Book 3S KVM code uses kvm->lock to synchronize access
to the kvm->arch.rtas_tokens list. Because this list is scanned
inside kvmppc_rtas_hcall(), which is called with the vcpu mutex held,
taking kvm->lock cause a lock inversion problem, which could lead to
a deadlock.
To fix this, we add a new mutex, kvm->arch.rtas_token_lock, which nests
inside the vcpu mutexes, and use that instead of kvm->lock when
accessing the rtas token list.
This removes the lockdep_assert_held() in kvmppc_rtas_tokens_free().
At this point we don't hold the new mutex, but that is OK because
kvmppc_rtas_tokens_free() is only called when the whole VM is being
destroyed, and at that point nothing can be looking up a token in
the list.
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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Currently the HV KVM code uses kvm->lock in conjunction with a flag,
kvm->arch.mmu_ready, to synchronize MMU setup and hold off vcpu
execution until the MMU-related data structures are ready. However,
this means that kvm->lock is being taken inside vcpu->mutex, which
is contrary to Documentation/virtual/kvm/locking.txt and results in
lockdep warnings.
To fix this, we add a new mutex, kvm->arch.mmu_setup_lock, which nests
inside the vcpu mutexes, and is taken in the places where kvm->lock
was taken that are related to MMU setup.
Additionally we take the new mutex in the vcpu creation code at the
point where we are creating a new vcore, in order to provide mutual
exclusion with kvmppc_update_lpcr() and ensure that an update to
kvm->arch.lpcr doesn't get missed, which could otherwise lead to a
stale vcore->lpcr value.
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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Currently, kvmppc_xive_release() and kvmppc_xive_native_release() clear
kvm->arch.mmu_ready and call kick_all_cpus_sync() as a way of ensuring
that no vcpus are executing in the guest. However, future patches will
change the mutex associated with kvm->arch.mmu_ready to a new mutex that
nests inside the vcpu mutexes, making it difficult to continue to use
this method.
In fact, taking the vcpu mutex for a vcpu excludes execution of that
vcpu, and we already take the vcpu mutex around the call to
kvmppc_xive_[native_]cleanup_vcpu(). Once the cleanup function is
done and we release the vcpu mutex, the vcpu can execute once again,
but because we have cleared vcpu->arch.xive_vcpu, vcpu->arch.irq_type,
vcpu->arch.xive_esc_vaddr and vcpu->arch.xive_esc_raddr, that vcpu will
not be going into XIVE code any more. Thus, once we have cleaned up
all of the vcpus, we are safe to clean up the rest of the XIVE state,
and we don't need to use kvm->arch.mmu_ready to hold off vcpu execution.
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
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KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID is currently always reporting KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID on all
architectures. However, on s390x, the amount of usable CPUs is determined
during runtime - it is depending on the features of the machine the code
is running on. Since we are using the vcpu_id as an index into the SCA
structures that are defined by the hardware (see e.g. the sca_add_vcpu()
function), it is not only the amount of CPUs that is limited by the hard-
ware, but also the range of IDs that we can use.
Thus KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID must be determined during runtime on s390x, too.
So the handling of KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID has to be moved from the common
code into the architecture specific code, and on s390x we have to return
the same value here as for KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS.
This problem has been discovered with the kvm_create_max_vcpus selftest.
With this change applied, the selftest now passes on s390x, too.
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190523164309.13345-9-thuth@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
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Pull KVM fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"The usual smattering of fixes and tunings that came in too late for
the merge window, but should not wait four months before they appear
in a release.
I also travelled a bit more than usual in the first part of May, which
didn't help with picking up patches and reports promptly"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (33 commits)
KVM: x86: fix return value for reserved EFER
tools/kvm_stat: fix fields filter for child events
KVM: selftests: Wrap vcpu_nested_state_get/set functions with x86 guard
kvm: selftests: aarch64: compile with warnings on
kvm: selftests: aarch64: fix default vm mode
kvm: selftests: aarch64: dirty_log_test: fix unaligned memslot size
KVM: s390: fix memory slot handling for KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION
KVM: x86/pmu: do not mask the value that is written to fixed PMUs
KVM: x86/pmu: mask the result of rdpmc according to the width of the counters
x86/kvm/pmu: Set AMD's virt PMU version to 1
KVM: x86: do not spam dmesg with VMCS/VMCB dumps
kvm: Check irqchip mode before assign irqfd
kvm: svm/avic: fix off-by-one in checking host APIC ID
KVM: selftests: do not blindly clobber registers in guest asm
KVM: selftests: Remove duplicated TEST_ASSERT in hyperv_cpuid.c
KVM: LAPIC: Expose per-vCPU timer_advance_ns to userspace
KVM: LAPIC: Fix lapic_timer_advance_ns parameter overflow
kvm: vmx: Fix -Wmissing-prototypes warnings
KVM: nVMX: Fix using __this_cpu_read() in preemptible context
kvm: fix compilation on s390
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core
Pule more SPDX updates from Greg KH:
"Here is another set of reviewed patches that adds SPDX tags to
different kernel files, based on a set of rules that are being used to
parse the comments to try to determine that the license of the file is
"GPL-2.0-or-later".
Only the "obvious" versions of these matches are included here, a
number of "non-obvious" variants of text have been found but those
have been postponed for later review and analysis.
These patches have been out for review on the linux-spdx@vger mailing
list, and while they were created by automatic tools, they were
hand-verified by a bunch of different people, all whom names are on
the patches are reviewers"
* tag 'spdx-5.2-rc2-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core: (85 commits)
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 125
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 123
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 122
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 121
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 120
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 119
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 118
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 116
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 114
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 113
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 112
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 111
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 110
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 106
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 105
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 104
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 103
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 102
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 101
treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 98
...
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Commit 11988499e62b ("KVM: x86: Skip EFER vs. guest CPUID checks for
host-initiated writes", 2019-04-02) introduced a "return false" in a
function returning int, and anyway set_efer has a "nonzero on error"
conventon so it should be returning 1.
Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de>
Fixes: 11988499e62b ("KVM: x86: Skip EFER vs. guest CPUID checks for host-initiated writes")
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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kselftests exposed a problem in the s390 handling for memory slots.
Right now we only do proper memory slot handling for creation of new
memory slots. Neither MOVE, nor DELETION are handled properly. Let us
implement those.
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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According to the SDM, for MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0/1 "the lower-order 32 bits of
each MSR may be written with any value, and the high-order 8 bits are
sign-extended according to the value of bit 31", but the fixed counters
in real hardware are limited to the width of the fixed counters ("bits
beyond the width of the fixed-function counter are reserved and must be
written as zeros"). Fix KVM to do the same.
Reported-by: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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This patch will simplify the changes in the next, by enforcing the
masking of the counters to RDPMC and RDMSR.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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After commit:
672ff6cff80c ("KVM: x86: Raise #GP when guest vCPU do not support PMU")
my AMD guests started #GPing like this:
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 1 PID: 4355 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.1.0-rc6+ #3
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:x86_perf_event_update+0x3b/0xa0
with Code: pointing to RDPMC. It is RDPMC because the guest has the
hardware watchdog CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF enabled which uses
perf. Instrumenting kvm_pmu_rdpmc() some, showed that it fails due to:
if (!pmu->version)
return 1;
which the above commit added. Since AMD's PMU leaves the version at 0,
that causes the #GP injection into the guest.
Set pmu->version arbitrarily to 1 and move it above the non-applicable
struct kvm_pmu members.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Cc: Mihai Carabas <mihai.carabas@oracle.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 672ff6cff80c ("KVM: x86: Raise #GP when guest vCPU do not support PMU")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Userspace can easily set up invalid processor state in such a way that
dmesg will be filled with VMCS or VMCB dumps. Disable this by default
using a module parameter.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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When assigning kvm irqfd we didn't check the irqchip mode but we allow
KVM_IRQFD to succeed with all the irqchip modes. However it does not
make much sense to create irqfd even without the kernel chips. Let's
provide a arch-dependent helper to check whether a specific irqfd is
allowed by the arch. At least for x86, it should make sense to check:
- when irqchip mode is NONE, all irqfds should be disallowed, and,
- when irqchip mode is SPLIT, irqfds that are with resamplefd should
be disallowed.
For either of the case, previously we'll silently ignore the irq or
the irq ack event if the irqchip mode is incorrect. However that can
cause misterious guest behaviors and it can be hard to triage. Let's
fail KVM_IRQFD even earlier to detect these incorrect configurations.
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CC: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CC: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
CC: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Current logic does not allow VCPU to be loaded onto CPU with
APIC ID 255. This should be allowed since the host physical APIC ID
field in the AVIC Physical APIC table entry is an 8-bit value,
and APIC ID 255 is valid in system with x2APIC enabled.
Instead, do not allow VCPU load if the host APIC ID cannot be
represented by an 8-bit value.
Also, use the more appropriate AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_HOST_PHYSICAL_ID_MASK
instead of AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID_COUNT.
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Expose per-vCPU timer_advance_ns to userspace, so it is able to
query the auto-adjusted value.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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After commit c3941d9e0 (KVM: lapic: Allow user to disable adaptive tuning of
timer advancement), '-1' enables adaptive tuning starting from default
advancment of 1000ns. However, we should expose an int instead of an overflow
uint module parameter.
Before patch:
/sys/module/kvm/parameters/lapic_timer_advance_ns:4294967295
After patch:
/sys/module/kvm/parameters/lapic_timer_advance_ns:-1
Fixes: c3941d9e0 (KVM: lapic: Allow user to disable adaptive tuning of timer advancement)
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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We get a warning when build kernel W=1:
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6365:6: warning: no previous prototype for ‘vmx_update_host_rsp’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp)
Add the missing declaration to fix this.
Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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BUG: using __this_cpu_read() in preemptible [00000000] code: qemu-system-x86/4590
caller is nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode+0xebd/0x1790 [kvm_intel]
CPU: 4 PID: 4590 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G OE 5.1.0-rc4+ #1
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x67/0x95
__this_cpu_preempt_check+0xd2/0xe0
nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode+0xebd/0x1790 [kvm_intel]
nested_vmx_run+0xda/0x2b0 [kvm_intel]
handle_vmlaunch+0x13/0x20 [kvm_intel]
vmx_handle_exit+0xbd/0x660 [kvm_intel]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xa2c/0x1e50 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x3ad/0x6d0 [kvm]
do_vfs_ioctl+0xa5/0x6e0
ksys_ioctl+0x6d/0x80
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x6c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Accessing per-cpu variable should disable preemption, this patch extends the
preemption disable region for __this_cpu_read().
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Fixes: 52017608da33 ("KVM: nVMX: add option to perform early consistency checks via H/W")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Kvm now supports extended CPUID functions through 0x8000001f. CPUID
leaf 0x8000001e is AMD's Processor Topology Information leaf. This
contains similar information to CPUID leaf 0xb (Intel's Extended
Topology Enumeration leaf), and should be included in the output of
KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID, even though userspace is likely to override
some of this information based upon the configuration of the
particular VM.
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Fixes: 8765d75329a38 ("KVM: X86: Extend CPUID range to include new leaf")
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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Per the APM, "CPUID Fn8000_001D_E[D,C,B,A]X reports cache topology
information for the cache enumerated by the value passed to the
instruction in ECX, referred to as Cache n in the following
description. To gather information for all cache levels, software must
repeatedly execute CPUID with 8000_001Dh in EAX and ECX set to
increasing values beginning with 0 until a value of 00h is returned in
the field CacheType (EAX[4:0]) indicating no more cache descriptions
are available for this processor."
The termination condition is the same as leaf 4, so we can reuse that
code block for leaf 0x8000001d.
Fixes: 8765d75329a38 ("KVM: X86: Extend CPUID range to include new leaf")
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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VMX's nested_run_pending flag is subtly consumed when stuffing state to
enter guest mode, i.e. needs to be set according before KVM knows if
setting guest state is successful. If setting guest state fails, clear
the flag as a nested run is obviously not pending.
Reported-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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The offset for reading the shadow VMCS is sizeof(*kvm_state)+VMCS12_SIZE,
so the correct size must be that plus sizeof(*vmcs12). This could lead
to KVM reading garbage data from userspace and not reporting an error,
but is otherwise not sensitive.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD
KVM/arm updates for 5.2-rc2
- Correctly annotate HYP-callable code to be non-traceable
- Remove Christoffer from the MAINTAINERS file as his request
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux
Pull more arm64 fixes from Will Deacon:
- Fix incorrect LDADD instruction encoding in our disassembly macros
- Disable the broken ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI support for now
- Add workaround for Cortex-A76 CPU erratum #1463225
- Handle Cortex-A76/Neoverse-N1 erratum #1418040 w/ existing workaround
- Fix IORT build failure if IOMMU_SUPPORT=n
- Fix place-relative module relocation range checking and its
interaction with KASLR
* tag 'arm64-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux:
arm64: insn: Add BUILD_BUG_ON() for invalid masks
arm64: insn: Fix ldadd instruction encoding
arm64: Kconfig: Make ARM64_PSEUDO_NMI depend on BROKEN for now
arm64: Handle erratum 1418040 as a superset of erratum 1188873
arm64/module: deal with ambiguity in PRELxx relocation ranges
ACPI/IORT: Fix build error when IOMMU_SUPPORT is disabled
arm64/kernel: kaslr: reduce module randomization range to 2 GB
arm64: errata: Add workaround for Cortex-A76 erratum #1463225
arm64: Remove useless message during oops
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|
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version this program is distributed in the
hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even
the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you
should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along
with this program if not see the file copying or write to the free
software foundation inc
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 12 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190523091651.231300438@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 or at your option any
later version this program is distributed in the hope that it will
be useful but without any warranty without even the implied warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu
general public license for more details
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 44 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190523091651.032047323@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version this program is distributed in the
hope that it will be useful but without any warranty without even
the implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose see the gnu general public license for more details you
should have received a copy of the gnu general public license along
with this program
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 8 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana <rfontana@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190523091650.663497195@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or
later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana |