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Enhance the GHASH implementation that uses 64-bit polynomial
multiplication by adding support for 4-way aggregation. This
more than doubles the performance, from 2.4 cycles per byte
to 1.1 cpb on Cortex-A53.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Checking the TIF_NEED_RESCHED flag is disproportionately costly on cores
with fast crypto instructions and comparatively slow memory accesses.
On algorithms such as GHASH, which executes at ~1 cycle per byte on
cores that implement support for 64 bit polynomial multiplication,
there is really no need to check the TIF_NEED_RESCHED particularly
often, and so we can remove the NEON yield check from the assembler
routines.
However, unlike the AEAD or skcipher APIs, the shash/ahash APIs take
arbitrary input lengths, and so there needs to be some sanity check
to ensure that we don't hog the CPU for excessive amounts of time.
So let's simply cap the maximum input size that is processed in one go
to 64 KB.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Squeeze out another 5% of performance by minimizing the number
of invocations of kernel_neon_begin()/kernel_neon_end() on the
common path, which also allows some reloads of the key schedule
to be optimized away.
The resulting code runs at 2.3 cycles per byte on a Cortex-A53.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Implement a faster version of the GHASH transform which amortizes
the reduction modulo the characteristic polynomial across two
input blocks at a time.
On a Cortex-A53, the gcm(aes) performance increases 24%, from
3.0 cycles per byte to 2.4 cpb for large input sizes.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Update the core AES/GCM transform and the associated plumbing to operate
on 2 AES/GHASH blocks at a time. By itself, this is not expected to
result in a noticeable speedup, but it paves the way for reimplementing
the GHASH component using 2-way aggregation.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Merge crypto-2.6 to pick up NEON yield revert.
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As it turns out, checking the TIF_NEED_RESCHED flag after each
iteration results in a significant performance regression (~10%)
when running fast algorithms (i.e., ones that use special instructions
and operate in the < 4 cycles per byte range) on in-order cores with
comparatively slow memory accesses such as the Cortex-A53.
Given the speed of these ciphers, and the fact that the page based
nature of the AEAD scatterwalk API guarantees that the core NEON
transform is never invoked with more than a single page's worth of
input, we can estimate the worst case duration of any resulting
scheduling blackout: on a 1 GHz Cortex-A53 running with 64k pages,
processing a page's worth of input at 4 cycles per byte results in
a delay of ~250 us, which is a reasonable upper bound.
So let's remove the yield checks from the fused AES-CCM and AES-GCM
routines entirely.
This reverts commit 7b67ae4d5ce8e2f912377f5fbccb95811a92097f and
partially reverts commit 7c50136a8aba8784f07fb66a950cc61a7f3d2ee3.
Fixes: 7c50136a8aba ("crypto: arm64/aes-ghash - yield NEON after every ...")
Fixes: 7b67ae4d5ce8 ("crypto: arm64/aes-ccm - yield NEON after every ...")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Merge mainline to pick up c7513c2a2714 ("crypto/arm64: aes-ce-gcm -
add missing kernel_neon_begin/end pair").
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Calling pmull_gcm_encrypt_block() requires kernel_neon_begin() and
kernel_neon_end() to be used since the routine touches the NEON
register file. Add the missing calls.
Also, since NEON register contents are not preserved outside of
a kernel mode NEON region, pass the key schedule array again.
Fixes: 7c50136a8aba ("crypto: arm64/aes-ghash - yield NEON after every ...")
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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Commit b73b7ac0a774 ("crypto: sha256_generic - add cra_priority") gave
sha256-generic and sha224-generic a cra_priority of 100, to match the
convention for generic implementations. But sha256-arm64 and
sha224-arm64 also have priority 100, so their order relative to the
generic implementations became ambiguous.
Therefore, increase their priority to 125 so that they have higher
priority than the generic implementations but lower priority than the
NEON implementations which have priority 150.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Many shash algorithms set .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH. But this
is redundant with the C structure type ('struct shash_alg'), and
crypto_register_shash() already sets the type flag automatically,
clearing any type flag that was already there. Apparently the useless
assignment has just been copy+pasted around.
So, remove the useless assignment from all the shash algorithms.
This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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kernel_neon_begin, _end
In a arm64 server(QDF2400),I met a similar might-sleep warning as [1]:
[ 7.019116] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at
./include/crypto/algapi.h:416
[ 7.027863] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 410, name:
cryptomgr_test
[ 7.035106] 1 lock held by cryptomgr_test/410:
[ 7.039549] #0: (ptrval) (&drbg->drbg_mutex){+.+.}, at:
drbg_instantiate+0x34/0x398
[ 7.048038] CPU: 9 PID: 410 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted
4.17.0-rc6+ #27
[ 7.068228] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1c0
[ 7.071890] show_stack+0x24/0x30
[ 7.075208] dump_stack+0xb0/0xec
[ 7.078523] ___might_sleep+0x160/0x238
[ 7.082360] skcipher_walk_done+0x118/0x2c8
[ 7.086545] ctr_encrypt+0x98/0x130
[ 7.090035] simd_skcipher_encrypt+0x68/0xc0
[ 7.094304] drbg_kcapi_sym_ctr+0xd4/0x1f8
[ 7.098400] drbg_ctr_update+0x98/0x330
[ 7.102236] drbg_seed+0x1b8/0x2f0
[ 7.105637] drbg_instantiate+0x2ac/0x398
[ 7.109646] drbg_kcapi_seed+0xbc/0x188
[ 7.113482] crypto_rng_reset+0x4c/0xb0
[ 7.117319] alg_test_drbg+0xec/0x330
[ 7.120981] alg_test.part.6+0x1c8/0x3c8
[ 7.124903] alg_test+0x58/0xa0
[ 7.128044] cryptomgr_test+0x50/0x58
[ 7.131708] kthread+0x134/0x138
[ 7.134936] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x1c
Seems there is a bug in Ard Biesheuvel's commit.
Fixes: 683381747270 ("crypto: arm64/aes-blk - move kernel mode neon
en/disable into loop")
[1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg33103.html
Signed-off-by: jia.he@hxt-semitech.com
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.17
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Several source files have been taken from OpenSSL. In some of them a
comment that "permission to use under GPL terms is granted" was
included below a contradictory license statement. In several cases,
there was no indication that the license of the code was compatible
with the GPLv2.
This change clarifies the licensing for all of these files. I've
confirmed with the author (Andy Polyakov) that a) he has licensed the
files with the GPLv2 comment under that license and b) that he's also
happy to license the other files under GPLv2 too. In one case, the
file is already contained in his CRYPTOGAMS bundle, which has a GPLv2
option, and so no special measures are needed.
In all cases, the license status of code has been clarified by making
the GPLv2 license prominent.
The .S files have been regenerated from the updated .pl files.
This is a comment-only change. No code is changed.
Signed-off-by: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Avoid excessive scheduling delays under a preemptible kernel by
conditionally yielding the NEON after every block of input.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Avoid excessive scheduling delays under a preemptible kernel by
conditionally yielding the NEON after every block of input.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Avoid excessive scheduling delays under a preemptible kernel by
yielding the NEON after every block of input.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Avoid excessive scheduling delays under a preemptible kernel by
yielding the NEON after every block of input.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Avoid excessive scheduling delays under a preemptible kernel by
yielding the NEON after every block of input.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Avoid excessive scheduling delays under a preemptible kernel by
yielding the NEON after every block of input.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Avoid excessive scheduling delays under a preemptible kernel by
yielding the NEON after every block of input.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Avoid excessive scheduling delays under a preemptible kernel by
yielding the NEON after every block of input.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Avoid excessive scheduling delays under a preemptible kernel by
yielding the NEON after every block of input.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Avoid excessive scheduling delays under a preemptible kernel by
yielding the NEON after every block of input.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add support for the SM4 symmetric cipher implemented using the special
SM4 instructions introduced in ARM architecture revision 8.2.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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GNU Make automatically deletes intermediate files that are updated
in a chain of pattern rules.
Example 1) %.dtb.o <- %.dtb.S <- %.dtb <- %.dts
Example 2) %.o <- %.c <- %.c_shipped
A couple of makefiles mark such targets as .PRECIOUS to prevent Make
from deleting them, but the correct way is to use .SECONDARY.
.SECONDARY
Prerequisites of this special target are treated as intermediate
files but are never automatically deleted.
.PRECIOUS
When make is interrupted during execution, it may delete the target
file it is updating if the file was modified since make started.
If you mark the file as precious, make will never delete the file
if interrupted.
Both can avoid deletion of intermediate files, but the difference is
the behavior when Make is interrupted; .SECONDARY deletes the target,
but .PRECIOUS does not.
The use of .PRECIOUS is relatively rare since we do not want to keep
partially constructed (possibly corrupted) targets.
Another difference is that .PRECIOUS works with pattern rules whereas
.SECONDARY does not.
.PRECIOUS: $(obj)/%.lex.c
works, but
.SECONDARY: $(obj)/%.lex.c
has no effect. However, for the reason above, I do not want to use
.PRECIOUS which could cause obscure build breakage.
The targets specified as .SECONDARY must be explicit. $(targets)
contains all targets that need to include .*.cmd files. So, the
intermediates you want to keep are mostly in there. Therefore, mark
$(targets) as .SECONDARY. It means primary targets are also marked
as .SECONDARY, but I do not see any drawback for this.
I replaced some .SECONDARY / .PRECIOUS markers with 'targets'. This
will make Kbuild search for non-existing .*.cmd files, but this is
not a noticeable performance issue.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: Frank Rowand <frowand.list@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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The decision to rebuild .S_shipped is made based on the relative
timestamps of .S_shipped and .pl files but git makes this essentially
random. This means that the perl script might run anyway (usually at
most once per checkout), defeating the whole purpose of _shipped.
Fix by skipping the rule unless explicit make variables are provided:
REGENERATE_ARM_CRYPTO or REGENERATE_ARM64_CRYPTO.
This can produce nasty occasional build failures downstream, for example
for toolchains with broken perl. The solution is minimally intrusive to
make it easier to push into stable.
Another report on a similar issue here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/8/1379
Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez <leonard.crestez@nxp.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Tweak the SHA256 update routines to invoke the SHA256 block transform
block by block, to avoid excessive scheduling delays caused by the
NEON algorithm running with preemption disabled.
Also, remove a stale comment which no longer applies now that kernel
mode NEON is actually disallowed in some contexts.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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CBC MAC is strictly sequential, and so the current AES code simply
processes the input one block at a time. However, we are about to add
yield support, which adds a bit of overhead, and which we prefer to
align with other modes in terms of granularity (i.e., it is better to
have all routines yield every 64 bytes and not have an exception for
CBC MAC which yields every 16 bytes)
So unroll the loop by 4. We still cannot perform the AES algorithm in
parallel, but we can at least merge the loads and stores.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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CBC encryption is strictly sequential, and so the current AES code
simply processes the input one block at a time. However, we are
about to add yield support, which adds a bit of overhead, and which
we prefer to align with other modes in terms of granularity (i.e.,
it is better to have all routines yield every 64 bytes and not have
an exception for CBC encrypt which yields every 16 bytes)
So unroll the loop by 4. We still cannot perform the AES algorithm in
parallel, but we can at least merge the loads and stores.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The AES block mode implementation using Crypto Extensions or plain NEON
was written before real hardware existed, and so its interleave factor
was made build time configurable (as well as an option to instantiate
all interleaved sequences inline rather than as subroutines)
We ended up using INTERLEAVE=4 with inlining disabled for both flavors
of the core AES routines, so let's stick with that, and remove the option
to configure this at build time. This makes the code easier to modify,
which is nice now that we're adding yield support.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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When kernel mode NEON was first introduced on arm64, the preserve and
restore of the userland NEON state was completely unoptimized, and
involved saving all registers on each call to kernel_neon_begin(),
and restoring them on each call to kernel_neon_end(). For this reason,
the NEON crypto code that was introduced at the time keeps the NEON
enabled throughout the execution of the crypto API methods, which may
include calls back into the crypto API that could result in memory
allocation or other actions that we should avoid when running with
preemption disabled.
Since then, we have optimized the kernel mode NEON handling, which now
restores lazily (upon return to userland), and so the preserve action
is only costly the first time it is called after entering the kernel.
So let's put the kernel_neon_begin() and kernel_neon_end() calls around
the actual invocations of the NEON crypto code, and run the remainder of
the code with kernel mode NEON disabled (and preemption enabled)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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When kernel mode NEON was first introduced on arm64, the preserve and
restore of the userland NEON state was completely unoptimized, and
involved saving all registers on each call to kernel_neon_begin(),
and restoring them on each call to kernel_neon_end(). For this reason,
the NEON crypto code that was introduced at the time keeps the NEON
enabled throughout the execution of the crypto API methods, which may
include calls back into the crypto API that could result in memory
allocation or other actions that we should avoid when running with
preemption disabled.
Since then, we have optimized the kernel mode NEON handling, which now
restores lazily (upon return to userland), and so the preserve action
is only costly the first time it is called after entering the kernel.
So let's put the kernel_neon_begin() and kernel_neon_end() calls around
the actual invocations of the NEON crypto code, and run the remainder of
the code with kernel mode NEON disabled (and preemption enabled)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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When kernel mode NEON was first introduced on arm64, the preserve and
restore of the userland NEON state was completely unoptimized, and
involved saving all registers on each call to kernel_neon_begin(),
and restoring them on each call to kernel_neon_end(). For this reason,
the NEON crypto code that was introduced at the time keeps the NEON
enabled throughout the execution of the crypto API methods, which may
include calls back into the crypto API that could result in memory
allocation or other actions that we should avoid when running with
preemption disabled.
Since then, we have optimized the kernel mode NEON handling, which now
restores lazily (upon return to userland), and so the preserve action
is only costly the first time it is called after entering the kernel.
So let's put the kernel_neon_begin() and kernel_neon_end() calls around
the actual invocations of the NEON crypto code, and run the remainder of
the code with kernel mode NEON disabled (and preemption enabled)
Note that this requires some reshuffling of the registers in the asm
code, because the XTS routines can no longer rely on the registers to
retain their contents between invocations.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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When kernel mode NEON was first introduced on arm64, the preserve and
restore of the userland NEON state was completely unoptimized, and
involved saving all registers on each call to kernel_neon_begin(),
and restoring them on each call to kernel_neon_end(). For this reason,
the NEON crypto code that was introduced at the time keeps the NEON
enabled throughout the execution of the crypto API methods, which may
include calls back into the crypto API that could result in memory
allocation or other actions that we should avoid when running with
preemption disabled.
Since then, we have optimized the kernel mode NEON handling, which now
restores lazily (upon return to userland), and so the preserve action
is only costly the first time it is called after entering the kernel.
So let's put the kernel_neon_begin() and kernel_neon_end() calls around
the actual invocations of the NEON crypto code, and run the remainder of
the code with kernel mode NEON disabled (and preemption enabled)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add a NEON-accelerated implementation of Speck128-XTS and Speck64-XTS
for ARM64. This is ported from the 32-bit version. It may be useful on
devices with 64-bit ARM CPUs that don't have the Cryptography
Extensions, so cannot do AES efficiently -- e.g. the Cortex-A53
processor on the Raspberry Pi 3.
It generally works the same way as the 32-bit version, but there are
some slight differences due to the different instructions, registers,
and syntax available in ARM64 vs. in ARM32. For example, in the 64-bit
version there are enough registers to hold the XTS tweaks for each
128-byte chunk, so they don't need to be saved on the stack.
Benchmarks on a Raspberry Pi 3 running a 64-bit kernel:
Algorithm Encryption Decryption
--------- ---------- ----------
Speck64/128-XTS (NEON) 92.2 MB/s 92.2 MB/s
Speck128/256-XTS (NEON) 75.0 MB/s 75.0 MB/s
Speck128/256-XTS (generic) 47.4 MB/s 35.6 MB/s
AES-128-XTS (NEON bit-sliced) 33.4 MB/s 29.6 MB/s
AES-256-XTS (NEON bit-sliced) 24.6 MB/s 21.7 MB/s
The code performs well on higher-end ARM64 processors as well, though
such processors tend to have the Crypto Extensions which make AES
preferred. For example, here are the same benchmarks run on a HiKey960
(with CPU affinity set for the A73 cores), with the Crypto Extensions
implementation of AES-256-XTS added:
Algorithm Encryption Decryption
--------- ----------- -----------
AES-256-XTS (Crypto Extensions) 1273.3 MB/s 1274.7 MB/s
Speck64/128-XTS (NEON) 359.8 MB/s 348.0 MB/s
Speck128/256-XTS (NEON) 292.5 MB/s 286.1 MB/s
Speck128/256-XTS (generic) 186.3 MB/s 181.8 MB/s
AES-128-XTS (NEON bit-sliced) 142.0 MB/s 124.3 MB/s
AES-256-XTS (NEON bit-sliced) 104.7 MB/s 91.1 MB/s
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add a missing symbol export that prevents this code to be built as a
module. Also, move the round constant table to the .rodata section,
and use a more optimized version of the core transform.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Implement the Chinese SM3 secure hash algorithm using the new
special instructions that have been introduced as an optional
extension in ARMv8.2.
Tested-by: Steve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Implement the various flavours of SHA3 using the new optional
EOR3/RAX1/XAR/BCAX instructions introduced by ARMv8.2.
Tested-by: Steve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Load the four SHA-1 round constants using immediates rather than literal
pool entries, to avoid having executable data that may be exploitable
under speculation attacks.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Move the SHA2 round constant table to the .rodata section where it is
safe from being exploited by speculative execution.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Move the CRC-T10DIF literal data to the .rodata section where it is
safe from being exploited by speculative execution.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Move CRC32 literal data to the .rodata section where it is safe from
being exploited by speculative execution.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Move the S-boxes and some other literals to the .rodata section where
it is safe from being exploited by speculative execution.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Move the AES inverse S-box to the .rodata section where it is safe from
abuse by speculation.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Implement the SHA-512 using the new special instructions that have
been introduced as an optional extension in ARMv8.2.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Steve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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We need to consistently enforce that keyed hashes cannot be used without
setting the key. To do this we need a reliable way to determine whether
a given hash algorithm is keyed or not. AF_ALG currently does this by
checking for the presence of a ->setkey() method. However, this is
actually slightly broken because the CRC-32 algorithms implement
->setkey() but can also be used without a key. (The CRC-32 "key" is not
actually a cryptographic key but rather represents the initial state.
If not overridden, then a default initial state is used.)
Prepare to fix this by introducing a flag CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY which
indicates that the algorithm has a ->setkey() method, but it is not
required to be called. Then set it on all the CRC-32 algorithms.
The same also applies to the Adler-32 implementation in Lustre.
Also, the cryptd and mcryptd templates have to pass through the flag
from their underlying algorithm.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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When a cipher fails to register in aes_init(), the error path goes thought
aes_exit() then crypto_unregister_skciphers().
Since aes_exit calls also crypto_unregister_skcipher, this triggers a
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
Signed-off-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Most crypto drivers involving kernel mode NEON take care to put the code
that actually touches the NEON register file in a separate compilation
unit, to prevent the compiler from reordering code that preserves or
restores the NEON context with code that may corrupt it. This is
necessary because we currently have no way to express the restrictions
imposed upon use of the NEON in kernel mode in a way that the compiler
understands.
However, in the case of aes-ce-cipher, it did not seem unreasonable to
deviate from this rule, given how it does not seem possible for the
compiler to reorder cross object function calls with asm blocks whose
in- and output constraints reflect that it reads from and writes to
memory.
Now that LTO is being proposed for the arm64 kernel, it is time to
revisit this. The link time optimization may replace the function
calls to kernel_neon_begin() and kernel_neon_end() with instantiations
of the IR that make up its implementation, allowing further reordering
with the asm block.
So let's clean this up, and move the asm() blocks into a separate .S
file.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-By: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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For the final round, avoid the expanded and padded lookup tables
exported by the generic AES driver. Instead, for encryption, we can
perform byte loads from the same table we used for the inner rounds,
which will still be hot in the caches. For decryption, use the inverse
AES Sbox directly, which is 4x smaller than the inverse lookup table
exported by the generic driver.
This should significantly reduce the Dcache footprint of our code,
which makes the code more robust against timing attacks. It does not
introduce any additional module dependencies, given that we already
rely on the core AES module for the shared key expansion routines.
It also frees up register x18, which is not available as a scratch
register on all platforms, which and so avoiding it improves
shareability of this code.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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