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-rw-r--r--security/Kconfig.hardening29
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/iint.c14
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c15
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/integrity.h4
-rw-r--r--security/loadpin/loadpin.c1
-rw-r--r--security/security.c17
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/conditional.c21
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c4
9 files changed, 72 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index af4c979b38ee..269967c4fc1b 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -19,13 +19,16 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
menu "Memory initialization"
-config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT
+config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern)
+config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
+ def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero -enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang)
+
choice
prompt "Initialize kernel stack variables at function entry"
default GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && GCC_PLUGINS
- default INIT_STACK_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT
+ default INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN if COMPILE_TEST && CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
default INIT_STACK_NONE
help
This option enables initialization of stack variables at
@@ -88,9 +91,9 @@ choice
of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
exposures.
- config INIT_STACK_ALL
+ config INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN
bool "0xAA-init everything on the stack (strongest)"
- depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT
+ depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
help
Initializes everything on the stack with a 0xAA
pattern. This is intended to eliminate all classes
@@ -98,6 +101,24 @@ choice
exposures, even variables that were warned to have been
left uninitialized.
+ Pattern initialization is known to provoke many existing bugs
+ related to uninitialized locals, e.g. pointers receive
+ non-NULL values, buffer sizes and indices are very big.
+
+ config INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO
+ bool "zero-init everything on the stack (strongest and safest)"
+ depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
+ help
+ Initializes everything on the stack with a zero
+ value. This is intended to eliminate all classes
+ of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
+ exposures, even variables that were warned to have been
+ left uninitialized.
+
+ Zero initialization provides safe defaults for strings,
+ pointers, indices and sizes, and is therefore
+ more suitable as a security mitigation measure.
+
endchoice
config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index e12c4900510f..1d20003243c3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -188,19 +188,7 @@ DEFINE_LSM(integrity) = {
int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
void *addr, unsigned long count)
{
- mm_segment_t old_fs;
- char __user *buf = (char __user *)addr;
- ssize_t ret;
-
- if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
- return -EBADF;
-
- old_fs = get_fs();
- set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
- ret = __vfs_read(file, buf, count, &offset);
- set_fs(old_fs);
-
- return ret;
+ return __kernel_read(file, addr, count, &offset);
}
/*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index df93ac258e01..9d94080bdad8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN,
IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT, IMA_SHOW_ASCII };
-enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
+enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8, TPM_PCR10 = 10 };
/* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */
#define IMA_DIGEST_SIZE SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 220b14920c37..011c3c76af86 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -823,13 +823,26 @@ static int ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(char *digest, u16 alg_id,
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- /* cumulative sha1 over tpm registers 0-7 */
+ /* cumulative digest over TPM registers 0-7 */
for (i = TPM_PCR0; i < TPM_PCR8; i++) {
ima_pcrread(i, &d);
/* now accumulate with current aggregate */
rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, d.digest,
crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm));
}
+ /*
+ * Extend cumulative digest over TPM registers 8-9, which contain
+ * measurement for the kernel command line (reg. 8) and image (reg. 9)
+ * in a typical PCR allocation. Registers 8-9 are only included in
+ * non-SHA1 boot_aggregate digests to avoid ambiguity.
+ */
+ if (alg_id != TPM_ALG_SHA1) {
+ for (i = TPM_PCR8; i < TPM_PCR10; i++) {
+ ima_pcrread(i, &d);
+ rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, d.digest,
+ crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm));
+ }
+ }
if (!rc)
crypto_shash_final(shash, digest);
return rc;
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 298b73794d8b..16c1894c29bb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ struct ima_digest_data {
} ng;
u8 data[2];
} xattr;
- u8 digest[0];
+ u8 digest[];
} __packed;
/*
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ struct signature_v2_hdr {
uint8_t hash_algo; /* Digest algorithm [enum hash_algo] */
__be32 keyid; /* IMA key identifier - not X509/PGP specific */
__be16 sig_size; /* signature size */
- uint8_t sig[0]; /* signature payload */
+ uint8_t sig[]; /* signature payload */
} __packed;
/* integrity data associated with an inode */
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index ee5cb944f4ad..670a1aebb8a1 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/blkdev.h>
#include <linux/path.h>
#include <linux/sched.h> /* current */
#include <linux/string_helpers.h>
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0ce3e73edd42..70a7ad357bc6 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1414,7 +1414,22 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up);
int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
{
- return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up_xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP, name);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ /*
+ * The implementation can return 0 (accept the xattr), 1 (discard the
+ * xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything about the xattr or
+ * any other error code incase of an error.
+ */
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp,
+ &security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr, list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.inode_copy_up_xattr(name);
+ if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr))
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index e68dd2e4cac1..5a47258c1d77 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ static int cond_evaluate_expr(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
int s[COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH];
int sp = -1;
+ if (expr->len == 0)
+ return -1;
+
for (i = 0; i < expr->len; i++) {
struct cond_expr_node *node = &expr->nodes[i];
@@ -392,27 +395,19 @@ static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
if (rc)
- goto err;
+ return rc;
expr->expr_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
expr->bool = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- if (!expr_node_isvalid(p, expr)) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto err;
- }
+ if (!expr_node_isvalid(p, expr))
+ return -EINVAL;
}
rc = cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->true_list, NULL);
if (rc)
- goto err;
- rc = cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, &node->true_list);
- if (rc)
- goto err;
- return 0;
-err:
- cond_node_destroy(node);
- return rc;
+ return rc;
+ return cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, &node->true_list);
}
int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 9e76a80db6e1..1caf4e603309 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2888,8 +2888,12 @@ err:
if (*names) {
for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
kfree((*names)[i]);
+ kfree(*names);
}
kfree(*values);
+ *len = 0;
+ *names = NULL;
+ *values = NULL;
goto out;
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-06-10 19:43:11 +0000