diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
105 files changed, 5431 insertions, 2306 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile index e2ec54e2b952..eb26e12c6c2a 100644 --- a/kernel/Makefile +++ b/kernel/Makefile @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ obj-y = fork.o exec_domain.o panic.o \ extable.o params.o \ kthread.o sys_ni.o nsproxy.o \ notifier.o ksysfs.o cred.o reboot.o \ - async.o range.o smpboot.o + async.o range.o smpboot.o ucount.o obj-$(CONFIG_MULTIUSER) += groups.o diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index a8a91bd2b2a9..f1ca11613379 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -877,6 +877,12 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) return err; } if (s.mask & AUDIT_STATUS_PID) { + /* NOTE: we are using task_tgid_vnr() below because + * the s.pid value is relative to the namespace + * of the caller; at present this doesn't matter + * much since you can really only run auditd + * from the initial pid namespace, but something + * to keep in mind if this changes */ int new_pid = s.pid; pid_t requesting_pid = task_tgid_vnr(current); @@ -1917,7 +1923,7 @@ void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk) " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u" " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u", task_ppid_nr(tsk), - task_pid_nr(tsk), + task_tgid_nr(tsk), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(tsk)), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid), from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->gid), diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 5abf1dc1f91c..2cd5256dbff7 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_PID: - pid = task_pid_nr(tsk); + pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk); result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_PPID: @@ -1993,7 +1993,7 @@ static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid, loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid), tty = audit_get_tty(current); - audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_pid_nr(current), uid); + audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_tgid_nr(current), uid); audit_log_task_context(ab); audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u tty=%s old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d", oldloginuid, loginuid, tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)", @@ -2220,7 +2220,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; - context->target_pid = task_pid_nr(t); + context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t); context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); context->target_uid = task_uid(t); context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); @@ -2245,7 +2245,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) { if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) { - audit_sig_pid = task_pid_nr(tsk); + audit_sig_pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk); if (uid_valid(tsk->loginuid)) audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid; else @@ -2345,7 +2345,7 @@ int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; - context->capset.pid = task_pid_nr(current); + context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current); context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective; context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective; context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; @@ -2377,7 +2377,7 @@ static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab) from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid), sessionid); audit_log_task_context(ab); - audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_pid_nr(current)); + audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current)); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current)); audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm); } diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c index 633a650d7aeb..a2ac051c342f 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c @@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static int __init register_perf_event_array_map(void) } late_initcall(register_perf_event_array_map); -#ifdef CONFIG_SOCK_CGROUP_DATA +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS static void *cgroup_fd_array_get_ptr(struct bpf_map *map, struct file *map_file /* not used */, int fd) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index 03fd23d4d587..aa6d98154106 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ void bpf_user_rnd_init_once(void) prandom_init_once(&bpf_user_rnd_state); } -u64 bpf_user_rnd_u32(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) +BPF_CALL_0(bpf_user_rnd_u32) { /* Should someone ever have the rather unwise idea to use some * of the registers passed into this function, then note that @@ -1031,7 +1031,7 @@ u64 bpf_user_rnd_u32(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) state = &get_cpu_var(bpf_user_rnd_state); res = prandom_u32_state(state); - put_cpu_var(state); + put_cpu_var(bpf_user_rnd_state); return res; } diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c index 1ea3afba1a4f..39918402e6e9 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <linux/ktime.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/uidgid.h> +#include <linux/filter.h> /* If kernel subsystem is allowing eBPF programs to call this function, * inside its own verifier_ops->get_func_proto() callback it should return @@ -26,48 +27,32 @@ * if program is allowed to access maps, so check rcu_read_lock_held in * all three functions. */ -static u64 bpf_map_lookup_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) +BPF_CALL_2(bpf_map_lookup_elem, struct bpf_map *, map, void *, key) { - /* verifier checked that R1 contains a valid pointer to bpf_map - * and R2 points to a program stack and map->key_size bytes were - * initialized - */ - struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1; - void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2; - void *value; - WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held()); - - value = map->ops->map_lookup_elem(map, key); - - /* lookup() returns either pointer to element value or NULL - * which is the meaning of PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL type - */ - return (unsigned long) value; + return (unsigned long) map->ops->map_lookup_elem(map, key); } const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_map_lookup_elem_proto = { .func = bpf_map_lookup_elem, .gpl_only = false, + .pkt_access = true, .ret_type = RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR, .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, }; -static u64 bpf_map_update_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) +BPF_CALL_4(bpf_map_update_elem, struct bpf_map *, map, void *, key, + void *, value, u64, flags) { - struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1; - void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2; - void *value = (void *) (unsigned long) r3; - WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held()); - - return map->ops->map_update_elem(map, key, value, r4); + return map->ops->map_update_elem(map, key, value, flags); } const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_map_update_elem_proto = { .func = bpf_map_update_elem, .gpl_only = false, + .pkt_access = true, .ret_type = RET_INTEGER, .arg1_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR, .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, @@ -75,19 +60,16 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_map_update_elem_proto = { .arg4_type = ARG_ANYTHING, }; -static u64 bpf_map_delete_elem(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5) +BPF_CALL_2(bpf_map_delete_elem, struct bpf_map *, map, void *, key) { - struct bpf_map *map = (struct bpf_map *) (unsigned long) r1; - void *key = (void *) (unsigned long) r2; - WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held()); - |