diff options
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/device-mapper/dm-integrity.txt | 189 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/md/Kconfig | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/md/Makefile | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/md/dm-integrity.c | 3085 |
4 files changed, 3285 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/device-mapper/dm-integrity.txt b/Documentation/device-mapper/dm-integrity.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2406f56501dc --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/device-mapper/dm-integrity.txt @@ -0,0 +1,189 @@ +The dm-integrity target emulates a block device that has additional +per-sector tags that can be used for storing integrity information. + +A general problem with storing integrity tags with every sector is that +writing the sector and the integrity tag must be atomic - i.e. in case of +crash, either both sector and integrity tag or none of them is written. + +To guarantee write atomicity, the dm-integrity target uses journal, it +writes sector data and integrity tags into a journal, commits the journal +and then copies the data and integrity tags to their respective location. + +The dm-integrity target can be used with the dm-crypt target - in this +situation the dm-crypt target creates the integrity data and passes them +to the dm-integrity target via bio_integrity_payload attached to the bio. +In this mode, the dm-crypt and dm-integrity targets provide authenticated +disk encryption - if the attacker modifies the encrypted device, an I/O +error is returned instead of random data. + +The dm-integrity target can also be used as a standalone target, in this +mode it calculates and verifies the integrity tag internally. In this +mode, the dm-integrity target can be used to detect silent data +corruption on the disk or in the I/O path. + + +When loading the target for the first time, the kernel driver will format +the device. But it will only format the device if the superblock contains +zeroes. If the superblock is neither valid nor zeroed, the dm-integrity +target can't be loaded. + +To use the target for the first time: +1. overwrite the superblock with zeroes +2. load the dm-integrity target with one-sector size, the kernel driver + will format the device +3. unload the dm-integrity target +4. read the "provided_data_sectors" value from the superblock +5. load the dm-integrity target with the the target size + "provided_data_sectors" +6. if you want to use dm-integrity with dm-crypt, load the dm-crypt target + with the size "provided_data_sectors" + + +Target arguments: + +1. the underlying block device + +2. the number of reserved sector at the beginning of the device - the + dm-integrity won't read of write these sectors + +3. the size of the integrity tag (if "-" is used, the size is taken from + the internal-hash algorithm) + +4. mode: + D - direct writes (without journal) - in this mode, journaling is + not used and data sectors and integrity tags are written + separately. In case of crash, it is possible that the data + and integrity tag doesn't match. + J - journaled writes - data and integrity tags are written to the + journal and atomicity is guaranteed. In case of crash, + either both data and tag or none of them are written. The + journaled mode degrades write throughput twice because the + data have to be written twice. + +5. the number of additional arguments + +Additional arguments: + +journal-sectors:number + The size of journal, this argument is used only if formatting the + device. If the device is already formatted, the value from the + superblock is used. + +interleave-sectors:number + The number of interleaved sectors. This values is rounded down to + a power of two. If the device is already formatted, the value from + the superblock is used. + +buffer-sectors:number + The number of sectors in one buffer. The value is rounded down to + a power of two. + + The tag area is accessed using buffers, the buffer size is + configurable. The large buffer size means that the I/O size will + be larger, but there could be less I/Os issued. + +journal-watermark:number + The journal watermark in percents. When the size of the journal + exceeds this watermark, the thread that flushes the journal will + be started. + +commit-time:number + Commit time in milliseconds. When this time passes, the journal is + written. The journal is also written immediatelly if the FLUSH + request is received. + +internal-hash:algorithm(:key) (the key is optional) + Use internal hash or crc. + When this argument is used, the dm-integrity target won't accept + integrity tags from the upper target, but it will automatically + generate and verify the integrity tags. + + You can use a crc algorithm (such as crc32), then integrity target + will protect the data against accidental corruption. + You can also use a hmac algorithm (for example + "hmac(sha256):0123456789abcdef"), in this mode it will provide + cryptographic authentication of the data without encryption. + + When this argument is not used, the integrity tags are accepted + from an upper layer target, such as dm-crypt. The upper layer + target should check the validity of the integrity tags. + +journal-crypt:algorithm(:key) (the key is optional) + Encrypt the journal using given algorithm to make sure that the + attacker can't read the journal. You can use a block cipher here + (such as "cbc(aes)") or a stream cipher (for example "chacha20", + "salsa20", "ctr(aes)" or "ecb(arc4)"). + + The journal contains history of last writes to the block device, + an attacker reading the journal could see the last sector nubmers + that were written. From the sector numbers, the attacker can infer + the size of files that were written. To protect against this + situation, you can encrypt the journal. + +journal-mac:algorithm(:key) (the key is optional) + Protect sector numbers in the journal from accidental or malicious + modification. To protect against accidental modification, use a + crc algorithm, to protect against malicious modification, use a + hmac algorithm with a key. + + This option is not needed when using internal-hash because in this + mode, the integrity of journal entries is checked when replaying + the journal. Thus, modified sector number would be detected at + this stage. + + +The journal mode (D/J), buffer-sectors, journal-watermark, commit-time can +be changed when reloading the target (load an inactive table and swap the +tables with suspend and resume). The other arguments should not be changed +when reloading the target because the layout of disk data depend on them +and the reloaded target would be non-functional. + + +The layout of the formatted block device: +* reserved sectors (they are not used by this target, they can be used for + storing LUKS metadata or for other purpose), the size of the reserved + area is specified in the target arguments +* superblock (4kiB) + * magic string - identifies that the device was formatted + * version + * log2(interleave sectors) + * integrity tag size + * the number of journal sections + * provided data sectors - the number of sectors that this target + provides (i.e. the size of the device minus the size of all + metadata and padding). The user of this target should not send + bios that access data beyond the "provided data sectors" limit. + * flags - a flag is set if journal-mac is used +* journal + The journal is divided into sections, each section contains: + * metadata area (4kiB), it contains journal entries + every journal entry contains: + * logical sector (specifies where the data and tag should + be written) + * last 8 bytes of data + * integrity tag (the size is specified in the superblock) + every metadata sector ends with + * mac (8-bytes), all the macs in 8 metadata sectors form a + 64-byte value. It is used to store hmac of sector + numbers in the journal section, to protect against a + possibility that the attacker tampers with sector + numbers in the journal. + * commit id + * data area (the size is variable; it depends on how many journal + entries fit into the metadata area) + every sector in the data area contains: + * data (504 bytes of data, the last 8 bytes are stored in + the journal entry) + * commit id + To test if the whole journal section was written correctly, every + 512-byte sector of the journal ends with 8-byte commit id. If the + commit id matches on all sectors in a journal section, then it is + assumed that the section was written correctly. If the commit id + doesn't match, the section was written partially and it should not + be replayed. +* one or more runs of interleaved tags and data. Each run contains: + * tag area - it contains integrity tags. There is one tag for each + sector in the data area + * data area - it contains data sectors. The number of data sectors + in one run must be a power of two. log2 of this value is stored + in the superblock. diff --git a/drivers/md/Kconfig b/drivers/md/Kconfig index 982cd0626bc7..5c5ed97c9fda 100644 --- a/drivers/md/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/md/Kconfig @@ -500,4 +500,14 @@ config DM_LOG_WRITES If unsure, say N. +config DM_INTEGRITY + tristate "Integrity target" + depends on BLK_DEV_DM + select BLK_DEV_INTEGRITY + select DM_BUFIO + select CRYPTO + select ASYNC_XOR + ---help--- + This is the integrity target. + endif # MD diff --git a/drivers/md/Makefile b/drivers/md/Makefile index 2801b2fb452d..39cf2a1b5f90 100644 --- a/drivers/md/Makefile +++ b/drivers/md/Makefile @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_DM_CACHE) += dm-cache.o obj-$(CONFIG_DM_CACHE_SMQ) += dm-cache-smq.o obj-$(CONFIG_DM_ERA) += dm-era.o obj-$(CONFIG_DM_LOG_WRITES) += dm-log-writes.o +obj-$(CONFIG_DM_INTEGRITY) += dm-integrity.o ifeq ($(CONFIG_DM_UEVENT),y) dm-mod-objs += dm-uevent.o diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c b/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ea779cca8b45 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/md/dm-integrity.c @@ -0,0 +1,3085 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Milan Broz + * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Mikulas Patocka + * + * This file is released under the GPL. + */ + +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/device-mapper.h> +#include <linux/dm-io.h> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/sort.h> +#include <linux/rbtree.h> +#include <linux/delay.h> +#include <linux/random.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/skcipher.h> +#include <linux/async_tx.h> +#include "dm-bufio.h" + +#define DM_MSG_PREFIX "integrity" + +#define DEFAULT_INTERLEAVE_SECTORS 32768 +#define DEFAULT_JOURNAL_SIZE_FACTOR 7 +#define DEFAULT_BUFFER_SECTORS 128 +#define DEFAULT_JOURNAL_WATERMARK 50 +#define DEFAULT_SYNC_MSEC 10000 +#define DEFAULT_MAX_JOURNAL_SECTORS 131072 +#define MIN_INTERLEAVE_SECTORS 3 +#define MAX_INTERLEAVE_SECTORS 31 +#define METADATA_WORKQUEUE_MAX_ACTIVE 16 + +/* + * Warning - DEBUG_PRINT prints security-sensitive data to the log, + * so it should not be enabled in the official kernel + */ +//#define DEBUG_PRINT +//#define INTERNAL_VERIFY + +/* + * On disk structures + */ + +#define SB_MAGIC "integrt" +#define SB_VERSION 1 +#define SB_SECTORS 8 + +struct superblock { + __u8 magic[8]; + __u8 version; + __u8 log2_interleave_sectors; + __u16 integrity_tag_size; + __u32 journal_sections; + __u64 provided_data_sectors; /* userspace uses this value */ + __u32 flags; +}; + +#define SB_FLAG_HAVE_JOURNAL_MAC 0x1 + +#define JOURNAL_ENTRY_ROUNDUP 8 + +typedef __u64 commit_id_t; +#define JOURNAL_MAC_PER_SECTOR 8 + +struct journal_entry { + union { + struct { + __u32 sector_lo; + __u32 sector_hi; + } s; + __u64 sector; + } u; + commit_id_t last_bytes; + __u8 tag[0]; +}; + +#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64 +#define journal_entry_set_sector(je, x) do { smp_wmb(); ACCESS_ONCE((je)->u.sector) = cpu_to_le64(x); } while (0) +#define journal_entry_get_sector(je) le64_to_cpu((je)->u.sector) +#elif defined(CONFIG_LBDAF) +#define journal_entry_set_sector(je, x) do { (je)->u.s.sector_lo = cpu_to_le32(x); smp_wmb(); ACCESS_ONCE((je)->u.s.sector_hi) = cpu_to_le32((x) >> 32); } while (0) +#define journal_entry_get_sector(je) le64_to_cpu((je)->u.sector) +#else +#define journal_entry_set_sector(je, x) do { (je)->u.s.sector_lo = cpu_to_le32(x); smp_wmb(); ACCESS_ONCE((je)->u.s.sector_hi) = cpu_to_le32(0); } while (0) +#define journal_entry_get_sector(je) le32_to_cpu((je)->u.s.sector_lo) +#endif +#define journal_entry_is_unused(je) ((je)->u.s.sector_hi == cpu_to_le32(-1)) +#define journal_entry_set_unused(je) do { ((je)->u.s.sector_hi = cpu_to_le32(-1)); } while (0) +#define journal_entry_is_inprogress(je) ((je)->u.s.sector_hi == cpu_to_le32(-2)) +#define journal_entry_set_inprogress(je) do { ((je)->u.s.sector_hi = cpu_to_le32(-2)); } while (0) + +#define JOURNAL_BLOCK_SECTORS 8 +#define JOURNAL_SECTOR_DATA ((1 << SECTOR_SHIFT) - sizeof(commit_id_t)) +#define JOURNAL_MAC_SIZE (JOURNAL_MAC_PER_SECTOR * JOURNAL_BLOCK_SECTORS) + +struct journal_sector { + __u8 entries[JOURNAL_SECTOR_DATA - JOURNAL_MAC_PER_SECTOR]; + __u8 mac[JOURNAL_MAC_PER_SECTOR]; + commit_id_t commit_id; +}; + +#define MAX_TAG_SIZE (JOURNAL_SECTOR_DATA - JOURNAL_MAC_PER_SECTOR - offsetof(struct journal_entry, tag)) + +#define METADATA_PADDING_SECTORS 8 + +#define N_COMMIT_IDS 4 + +static unsigned char prev_commit_seq(unsigned char seq) +{ + return (seq + N_COMMIT_IDS - 1) % N_COMMIT_IDS; +} + +static unsigned char next_commit_seq(unsigned char seq) +{ + return (seq + 1) % N_COMMIT_IDS; +} + +/* + * In-memory structures + */ + +struct journal_node { + struct rb_node node; + sector_t sector; +}; + +struct alg_spec { + char *alg_string; + char *key_string; + __u8 *key; + unsigned key_size; +}; + +struct dm_integrity_c { + struct dm_dev *dev; + unsigned tag_size; + __s8 log2_tag_size; + sector_t start; + mempool_t *journal_io_mempool; + struct dm_io_client *io; + struct dm_bufio_client *bufio; + struct workqueue_struct *metadata_wq; + struct superblock *sb; + unsigned journal_pages; + struct page_list *journal; + struct page_list *journal_io; + struct page_list *journal_xor; + + struct crypto_skcipher *journal_crypt; + struct scatterlist **journal_scatterlist; + struct scatterlist **journal_io_scatterlist; + struct skcipher_request **sk_requests; + + struct crypto_shash *journal_mac; + + struct journal_node *journal_tree; + struct rb_root journal_tree_root; + + sector_t provided_data_sectors; + + unsigned short journal_entry_size; + unsigned char journal_entries_per_sector; + unsigned char journal_section_entries; + unsigned char journal_section_sectors; + unsigned journal_sections; + unsigned journal_entries; + sector_t device_sectors; + unsigned initial_sectors; + unsigned metadata_run; + __s8 log2_metadata_run; + __u8 log2_buffer_sectors; + + unsigned char mode; + bool suspending; + + int failed; + + struct crypto_shash *internal_hash; + + /* these variables are locked with endio_wait.lock */ + struct rb_root in_progress; + wait_queue_head_t endio_wait; + struct workqueue_struct *wait_wq; + + unsigned char commit_seq; + commit_id_t commit_ids[N_COMMIT_IDS]; + + unsigned committed_section; + unsigned n_committed_sections; + + unsigned uncommitted_section; + unsigned n_uncommitted_sections; + + unsigned free_section; + unsigned char free_section_entry; + unsigned free_sectors; + + unsigned free_sectors_threshold; + + struct workqueue_struct *commit_wq; + struct work_struct commit_work; + + struct workqueue_struct *writer_wq; + struct work_struct writer_work; + + struct bio_list flush_bio_list; + + unsigned long autocommit_jiffies; + struct timer_list autocommit_timer; + unsigned autocommit_msec; + + wait_queue_head_t copy_to_journal_wait; + + struct completion crypto_backoff; + + bool journal_uptodate; + bool just_formatted; + + struct alg_spec internal_hash_alg; + struct alg_spec journal_crypt_alg; + struct alg_spec journal_mac_alg; +}; + +struct dm_integrity_range { + sector_t logical_sector; + unsigned n_sectors; + struct rb_node node; +}; + +struct dm_integrity_io { + struct work_struct work; + + struct dm_integrity_c *ic; + bool write; + bool fua; + + struct dm_integrity_range range; + + sector_t metadata_block; + unsigned metadata_offset; + + atomic_t in_flight; + int bi_error; + + struct completion *completion; + + struct block_device *orig_bi_bdev; + bio_end_io_t *orig_bi_end_io; + struct bio_integrity_payload *orig_bi_integrity; + struct bvec_iter orig_bi_iter; +}; + +struct journal_completion { + struct dm_integrity_c *ic; + atomic_t in_flight; + struct completion comp; +}; + +struct journal_io { + struct dm_integrity_range range; + struct journal_completion *comp; +}; + +static struct kmem_cache *journal_io_cache; + +#define JOURNAL_IO_MEMPOOL 32 + +#ifdef DEBUG_PRINT +#define DEBUG_print(x, ...) printk(KERN_DEBUG x, ##__VA_ARGS__) +static void __DEBUG_bytes(__u8 *bytes, size_t len, const char *msg, ...) +{ + va_list args; + va_start(args, msg); + vprintk(msg, args); + va_end(args); + if (len) + pr_cont(":"); + while (len) { + pr_cont(" %02x", *bytes); + bytes++; + len--; + } + pr_cont("\n"); +} +#define DEBUG_bytes(bytes, len, msg, ...) __DEBUG_bytes(bytes, len, KERN_DEBUG msg, ##__VA_ARGS__) +#else +#define DEBUG_print(x, ...) do { } while (0) +#define DEBUG_bytes(bytes, len, msg, ...) do { } while (0) +#endif + +/* + * DM Integrity profile, protection is performed layer above (dm-crypt) + */ +static struct blk_integrity_profile dm_integrity_profile = { + .name = "DM-DIF-EXT-TAG", + .generate_fn = NULL, + .verify_fn = NULL, +}; + +static void dm_integrity_map_continue(struct dm_integrity_io *dio, bool from_map); +static void integrity_bio_wait(struct work_struct *w); +static void dm_integrity_dtr(struct dm_target *ti); + +static void dm_integrity_io_error(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, const char *msg, int err) +{ + if (!cmpxchg(&ic->failed, 0, err)) + DMERR("Error on %s: %d", msg, err); +} + +static int dm_integrity_failed(struct dm_integrity_c *ic) +{ + return ACCESS_ONCE(ic->failed); +} + +static commit_id_t dm_integrity_commit_id(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, unsigned i, + unsigned j, unsigned char seq) +{ + /* + * Xor the number with section and sector, so that if a piece of + * journal is written at wrong place, it is detected. + */ + return ic->commit_ids[seq] ^ cpu_to_le64(((__u64)i << 32) ^ j); +} + +static void get_area_and_offset(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, sector_t data_sector, + sector_t *area, sector_t *offset) +{ + __u8 log2_interleave_sectors = ic->sb->log2_interleave_sectors; + + *area = data_sector >> log2_interleave_sectors; + *offset = (unsigned)data_sector & ((1U << log2_interleave_sectors) - 1); +} + +static __u64 get_metadata_sector_and_offset(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, sector_t area, + sector_t offset, unsigned *metadata_offset) +{ + __u64 ms; + unsigned mo; + + ms = area << ic->sb->log2_interleave_sectors; + if (likely(ic->log2_metadata_run >= 0)) + ms += area << ic->log2_metadata_run; + else + ms += area * ic->metadata_run; + ms >>= ic->log2_buffer_sectors; + + if (likely(ic->log2_tag_size >= 0)) { + ms += offset >> (SECTOR_SHIFT + ic->log2_buffer_sectors - ic->log2_tag_size); + mo = (offset << ic->log2_tag_size) & ((1U << SECTOR_SHIFT << ic->log2_buffer_sectors) - 1); + } else { + ms += (__u64)offset * ic->tag_size >> (SECTOR_SHIFT + ic->log2_buffer_sectors); + mo = (offset * ic->tag_size) & ((1U << SECTOR_SHIFT << ic->log2_buffer_sectors) - 1); + } + *metadata_offset = mo; + return ms; +} + +static sector_t get_data_sector(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, sector_t area, sector_t offset) +{ + sector_t result; + + result = area << ic->sb->log2_interleave_sectors; + if (likely(ic->log2_metadata_run >= 0)) + result += (area + 1) << ic->log2_metadata_run; + else + result += (area + 1) * ic->metadata_run; + + result += (sector_t)ic->initial_sectors + offset; + return result; +} + +static void wraparound_section(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, unsigned *sec_ptr) +{ + if (unlikely(*sec_ptr >= ic->journal_sections)) + *sec_ptr -= ic->journal_sections; +} + +static int sync_rw_sb(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, int op, int op_flags) +{ + struct dm_io_request io_req; + struct dm_io_region io_loc; + + io_req.bi_op = op; + io_req.bi_op_flags = op_flags; + io_req.mem.type = DM_IO_KMEM; + io_req.mem.ptr.addr = ic->sb; + io_req.notify.fn = NULL; + io_req.client = ic->io; + io_loc.bdev = ic->dev->bdev; + io_loc.sector = ic->start; + io_loc.count = SB_SECTORS; + + return dm_io(&io_req, 1, &io_loc, NULL); +} + +static void access_journal_check(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, unsigned section, unsigned offset, + bool e, const char *function) +{ +#if defined(CONFIG_DM_DEBUG) || defined(INTERNAL_VERIFY) + unsigned limit = e ? ic->journal_section_entries : ic->journal_section_sectors; + + if (unlikely(section >= ic->journal_sections) || + unlikely(offset >= limit)) { + printk(KERN_CRIT "%s: invalid access at (%u,%u), limit (%u,%u)\n", + function, section, offset, ic->journal_sections, limit); + BUG(); + } +#endif +} + +static void page_list_location(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, unsigned section, unsigned offset, + unsigned *pl_index, unsigned *pl_offset) +{ + unsigned sector; + + access_journal_check(ic, section, offset, false, "access_journal"); + + sector = section * ic->journal_section_sectors + offset; + + *pl_index = sector >> (PAGE_SHIFT - SECTOR_SHIFT); + *pl_offset = (sector << SECTOR_SHIFT) & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); +} + +static struct journal_sector *access_page_list(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, struct page_list *pl, + unsigned section, unsigned offset, unsigned *n_sectors) +{ + unsigned pl_index, pl_offset; + char *va; + + page_list_location(ic, section, offset, &pl_index, &pl_offset); + + if (n_sectors) + *n_sectors = (PAGE_SIZE - pl_offset) >> SECTOR_SHIFT; + + va = lowmem_page_address(pl[pl_index].page); + + return (struct journal_sector *)(va + pl_offset); +} + +static struct journal_sector *access_journal(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, unsigned section, unsigned offset) +{ + return access_page_list(ic, ic->journal, section, offset, NULL); +} + +static struct journal_entry *access_journal_entry(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, unsigned section, unsigned n) +{ + unsigned rel_sector, offset; + struct journal_sector *js; + + access_journal_check(ic, section, n, true, "access_journal_entry"); + + rel_sector = n % JOURNAL_BLOCK_SECTORS; + offset = n / JOURNAL_BLOCK_SECTORS; + + js = access_journal(ic, section, rel_sector); + return (struct journal_entry *)((char *)js + offset * ic->journal_entry_size); +} + +static struct journal_sector *access_journal_data(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, unsigned section, unsigned n) +{ + access_journal_check(ic, section, n, true, "access_journal_data"); + + return access_journal(ic, section, n + JOURNAL_BLOCK_SECTORS); +} + +static void section_mac(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, unsigned section, __u8 result[JOURNAL_MAC_SIZE]) +{ + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, ic->journal_mac); + int r; + unsigned j, size; + + desc->tfm = ic->journal_mac; + desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + + r = crypto_shash_init(desc); + if (unlikely(r)) { + dm_integrity_io_error(ic, "crypto_shash_init", r); + goto err; + } + + for (j = 0; j < ic->journal_section_entries; j++) { + struct journal_entry *je = access_journal_entry(ic, section, j); + r = crypto_shash_update(desc, (__u8 *)&je->u.sector, sizeof je->u.sector); + if (unlikely(r)) { + dm_integrity_io_error(ic, "crypto_shash_update", r); + goto err; + } + } + + size = crypto_shash_digestsize(ic->journal_mac); + + if (likely(size <= JOURNAL_MAC_SIZE)) { + r = crypto_shash_final(desc, result); + if (unlikely(r)) { + dm_integrity_io_error(ic, "crypto_shash_final", r); + goto err; + } + memset(result + size, 0, JOURNAL_MAC_SIZE - size); + } else { + __u8 digest[size]; + r = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); + if (unlikely(r)) { + dm_integrity_io_error(ic, "crypto_shash_final", r); + goto err; + } + memcpy(result, digest, JOURNAL_MAC_SIZE); + } + + return; +err: + memset(result, 0, JOURNAL_MAC_SIZE); +} + +static void rw_section_mac(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, unsigned section, bool wr) +{ + __u8 result[JOURNAL_MAC_SIZE]; + unsigned j; + + if (!ic->journal_mac) + return; + + section_mac(ic, section, result); + + for (j = 0; j < JOURNAL_BLOCK_SECTORS; j++) { + struct journal_sector *js = access_journal(ic, section, j); + + if (likely(wr)) + memcpy(&js->mac, result + (j * JOURNAL_MAC_PER_SECTOR), JOURNAL_MAC_PER_SECTOR); + else { + if (memcmp(&js->mac, result + (j * JOURNAL_MAC_PER_SECTOR), JOURNAL_MAC_PER_SECTOR)) + dm_integrity_io_error(ic, "journal mac", -EILSEQ); + } + } +} + +static void complete_journal_op(void *context) +{ + struct journal_completion *comp = context; + BUG_ON(!atomic_read(&comp->in_flight)); + if (likely(atomic_dec_and_test(&comp->in_flight))) + complete(&comp->comp); +} + +static void xor_journal(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, bool encrypt, unsigned section, + unsigned n_sections, struct journal_completion *comp) +{ + struct async_submit_ctl submit; + size_t n_bytes = (size_t)(n_sections * ic->journal_section_sectors) << SECTOR_SHIFT; + unsigned pl_index, pl_offset, section_index; + struct page_list *source_pl, *target_pl; + + if (likely(encrypt)) { + source_pl = ic->journal; + target_pl = ic->journal_io; + } else { + source_pl = ic->journal_io; + target_pl = ic->journal; + } + + page_list_location(ic, section, 0, &pl_index, &pl_offset); + + atomic_add(roundup(pl_offset + n_bytes, PAGE_SIZE) >> PAGE_SHIFT, &comp->in_flight); + + init_async_submit(&submit, ASYNC_TX_XOR_ZERO_DST, NULL, complete_journal_op, comp, NULL); + + section_index = pl_index; + + do { + size_t this_step; + struct page *src_pages[2]; + struct page *dst_page; + + while (unlikely(pl_index == section_index)) { + unsigned dummy; + if (likely(encrypt)) + rw_section_mac(ic, section, true); + section++; + n_sections--; + if (!n_sections) + break; + page_list_location(ic, section, 0, §ion_index, &dummy); + } + + this_step = min(n_bytes, (size_t)PAGE_SIZE - pl_offset); + dst_page = target_pl[pl_index].page; + src_pages[0] = source_pl[pl_index].page; + src_pages[1] = ic->journal_xor[pl_index].page; + + async_xor(dst_page, src_pages, pl_offset, 2, this_step, &submit); + + pl_index++; + pl_offset = 0; + n_bytes -= this_step; + } while (n_bytes); + + BUG_ON(n_sections); + + async_tx_issue_pending_all(); +} + +static void complete_journal_encrypt(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err) +{ + struct journal_completion *comp = req->data; + if (unlikely(err)) { + if (likely(err == -EINPROGRESS)) { + complete(&comp->ic->crypto_backoff); + return; + } + dm_integrity_io_error(comp->ic, "asynchronous encrypt", err); + } + complete_journal_op(comp); +} + +static bool do_crypt(bool encrypt, struct skcipher_request *req, struct journal_completion *comp) +{ + int r; + skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, + complete_journal_encrypt, comp); + if (likely(encrypt)) + r = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); + else + r = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req); + if (likely(!r)) + return false; + if (likely(r == -EINPROGRESS)) + return true; + if (likely(r == -EBUSY)) { + wait_for_completion(&comp->ic->crypto_backoff); + reinit_completion(&comp->ic->crypto_backoff); + return true; + } + dm_integrity_io_error(comp->ic, "encrypt", r); + return false; +} + +static void crypt_journal(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, bool encrypt, unsigned section, + unsigned n_sections, struct journal_completion *comp) +{ + struct scatterlist **source_sg; + struct scatterlist **target_sg; + + atomic_add(2, &comp->in_flight); + + if (likely(encrypt)) { + source_sg = ic->journal_scatterlist; + target_sg = ic->journal_io_scatterlist; + } else { + source_sg = ic->journal_io_scatterlist; + target_sg = ic->journal_scatterlist; + } + + do { + struct skcipher_request *req; + unsigned ivsize; + char *iv; + + if (likely(encrypt)) + rw_section_mac(ic, section, true); + + req = ic->sk_requests[section]; + ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(ic->journal_crypt); + iv = req->iv; + + memcpy(iv, iv + ivsize, ivsize); + + req->src = source_sg[section]; + req->dst = target_sg[section]; + + if (unlikely(do_crypt(encrypt, req, comp))) + atomic_inc(&comp->in_flight); + + section++; + n_sections--; + } while (n_sections); + + atomic_dec(&comp->in_flight); + complete_journal_op(comp); +} + +static void encrypt_journal(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, bool encrypt, unsigned section, + unsigned n_sections, struct journal_completion *comp) +{ + if (ic->journal_xor) + return xor_journal(ic, encrypt, section, n_sections, comp); + else + return crypt_journal(ic, encrypt, section, n_sections, comp); +} + +static void complete_journal_io(unsigned long error, void *context) +{ + struct journal_completion *comp = context; + if (unlikely(error != 0)) + dm_integrity_io_error(comp->ic, "writing journal", -EIO); + complete_journal_op(comp); +} + +static void rw_journal(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, int op, int op_flags, unsigned section, + unsigned n_sections, struct journal_completion *comp) +{ + struct dm_io_request io_req; + struct dm_io_region io_loc; + unsigned sector, n_sectors, pl_index, pl_offset; + int r; + + if (unlikely(dm_integrity_failed(ic))) { + if (comp) + complete_journal_io(-1UL, comp); + return; + } + + sector = section * ic->journal_section_sectors; + n_sectors = n_sections * ic->journal_section_sectors; + + pl_index = sector >> (PAGE_SHIFT - SECTOR_SHIFT); + pl_offset = (sector << SECTOR_SHIFT) & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); + + io_req.bi_op = op; + io_req.bi_op_flags = op_flags; + io_req.mem.type = DM_IO_PAGE_LIST; + if (ic->journal_io) + io_req.mem.ptr.pl = &ic->journal_io[pl_index]; + else + io_req.mem.ptr.pl = &ic->journal[pl_index]; + io_req.mem.offset = pl_offset; + if (likely(comp != NULL)) { + io_req.notify.fn = complete_journal_io; + io_req.notify.context = comp; + } else { + io_req.notify.fn = NULL; + } + io_req.client = ic->io; + io_loc.bdev = ic->dev->bdev; + io_loc.sector = ic->start + SB_SECTORS + sector; + io_loc.count = n_sectors; + + r = dm_io(&io_req, 1, &io_loc, NULL); + if (unlikely(r)) { + dm_integrity_io_error(ic, op == REQ_OP_READ ? "reading journal" : "writing journal", r); + if (comp) { + WARN_ONCE(1, "asynchronous dm_io failed: %d", r); + complete_journal_io(-1UL, comp); + } + } +} + +static void write_journal(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, unsigned commit_start, unsigned commit_sections) +{ + struct journal_completion io_comp; + struct journal_completion crypt_comp_1; + struct journal_completion crypt_comp_2; + unsigned i; + + io_comp.ic = ic; + io_comp.comp = COMPLETION_INITIALIZER_ONSTACK(io_comp.comp); + + if (commit_start + commit_sections <= ic->journal_sections) { + io_comp.in_flight = (atomic_t)ATOMIC_INIT(1); + if (ic->journal_io) { + crypt_comp_1.ic = ic; + crypt_comp_1.comp = COMPLETION_INITIALIZER_ONSTACK(crypt_comp_1.comp); + crypt_comp_1.in_flight = (atomic_t)ATOMIC_INIT(0); + encrypt_journal(ic, true, commit_start, commit_sections, &crypt_comp_1); + wait_for_completion_io(&crypt_comp_1.comp); + } else { + for (i = 0; i < commit_sections; i++) + rw_section_mac(ic, commit_start + i, true); + } + rw_journal(ic, REQ_OP_WRITE, REQ_FUA, commit_start, commit_sections, &io_comp); + } else { + unsigned to_end; + io_comp.in_flight = (atomic_t)ATOMIC_INIT(2); + to_end = ic->journal_sections - commit_start; + if (ic->journal_io) { + crypt_comp_1.ic = ic; + crypt_comp_1.comp = COMPLETION_INITIALIZER_ONSTACK(crypt_comp_1.comp); + crypt_comp_1.in_flight = (atomic_t)ATOMIC_INIT(0); + encrypt_journal(ic, true, commit_start, to_end, &crypt_comp_1); + if (try_wait_for_completion(&crypt_comp_1.comp)) { + rw_journal(ic, REQ_OP_WRITE, REQ_FUA, commit_start, to_end, &io_comp); + crypt_comp_1.comp = COMPLETION_INITIALIZER_ONSTACK(crypt_comp_1.comp); + crypt_comp_1.in_flight = (atomic_t)ATOMIC_INIT(0); + encrypt_journal(ic, true, 0, commit_sections - to_end, &crypt_comp_1); + wait_for_completion_io(&crypt_comp_1.comp); + } else { + crypt_comp_2.ic = ic; + crypt_comp_2.comp = COMPLETION_INITIALIZER_ONSTACK(crypt_comp_2.comp); + crypt_comp_2.in_flight = (atomic_t)ATOMIC_INIT(0); + encrypt_journal(ic, true, 0, commit_sections - to_end, &crypt_comp_2); + wait_for_completion_io(&crypt_comp_1.comp); + rw_journal(ic, REQ_OP_WRITE, REQ_FUA, commit_start, to_end, &io_comp); + wait_for_completion_io(&crypt_comp_2.comp); + } + } else { + for (i = 0; i < to_end; i++) + rw_section_mac(ic, commit_start + i, true); + rw_journal(ic, REQ_OP_WRITE, REQ_FUA, commit_start, to_end, &io_comp); + for (i = 0; i < commit_sections - to_end; i++) + rw_section_mac(ic, i, true); + } + rw_journal(ic, REQ_OP_WRITE, REQ_FUA, 0, commit_sections - to_end, &io_comp); + } + + wait_for_completion_io(&io_comp.comp); +} + +static void copy_from_journal(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, unsigned section, unsigned offset, + unsigned n_sectors, sector_t target, io_notify_fn fn, void *data) +{ + struct dm_io_request io_req; + struct dm_io_region io_loc; + int r; + unsigned sector, pl_index, pl_offset; + + if (unlikely(dm_integrity_failed(ic))) { + fn(-1UL, data); + return; + } + + sector = section * ic->journal_section_sectors + JOURNAL_BLOCK_SECTORS + offset; + + pl_index = sector >> (PAGE_SHIFT - SECTOR_SHIFT); + pl_offset = (sector << SECTOR_SHIFT) & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); + + io_req.bi_op = REQ_OP_WRITE; + io_req.bi_op_flags = 0; + io_req.mem.type = DM_IO_PAGE_LIST; + io_req.mem.ptr.pl = &ic->journal[pl_index]; + io_req.mem.offset = pl_offset; + io_req.notify.fn = fn; + io_req.notify.context = data; + io_req.client = ic->io; + io_loc.bdev = ic->dev->bdev; + io_loc.sector = ic->start + target; + io_loc.count = n_sectors; + + r = dm_io(&io_req, 1, &io_loc, NULL); + if (unlikely(r)) { + WARN_ONCE(1, "asynchronous dm_io failed: %d", r); + fn(-1UL, data); + } +} + +static bool add_new_range(struct dm_integrity_c *ic, struct dm_integrity_range *new_range) +{ + struct rb_node **n = &ic->in_progress.rb_node; + struct rb_node *parent; + + parent = NULL; + + while (*n) { + struct dm_integrity_range *range = container_of(*n, struct dm_integrity_range, node); + + parent = *n; + if (new_range->logical_sector + new_range->n_s |