diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2008-10-10 11:20:42 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2008-10-10 11:20:42 -0700 |
commit | f6bccf695431da0e9bd773550ae91b8cb9ffb227 (patch) | |
tree | ff81689bd9bf849b4827da6fbd69fce471842057 /crypto | |
parent | 3af73d392c9c414ca527bab9c5d4c2a97698acbd (diff) | |
parent | a0f000ec9b61b99111757df138b11144236fc59b (diff) |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
crypto: skcipher - Use RNG interface instead of get_random_bytes
crypto: rng - RNG interface and implementation
crypto: api - Add fips_enable flag
crypto: skcipher - Move IV generators into their own modules
crypto: cryptomgr - Test ciphers using ECB
crypto: api - Use test infrastructure
crypto: cryptomgr - Add test infrastructure
crypto: tcrypt - Add alg_test interface
crypto: tcrypt - Abort and only log if there is an error
crypto: crc32c - Use Intel CRC32 instruction
crypto: tcrypt - Avoid using contiguous pages
crypto: api - Display larval objects properly
crypto: api - Export crypto_alg_lookup instead of __crypto_alg_lookup
crypto: Kconfig - Replace leading spaces with tabs
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/Kconfig | 127 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/Makefile | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/algapi.c | 147 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/algboss.c (renamed from crypto/cryptomgr.c) | 92 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/ansi_cprng.c | 417 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/api.c | 81 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/blkcipher.c | 29 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/chainiv.c | 44 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/eseqiv.c | 35 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/fips.c | 27 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/internal.h | 18 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/krng.c | 66 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/proc.c | 57 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rng.c | 126 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/seqiv.c | 27 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/tcrypt.c | 1347 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/tcrypt.h | 8709 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/testmgr.c | 1868 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/testmgr.h | 8738 |
19 files changed, 11914 insertions, 10053 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig index d83185915eee..39dbd8e4dde1 100644 --- a/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/crypto/Kconfig @@ -21,6 +21,14 @@ if CRYPTO comment "Crypto core or helper" +config CRYPTO_FIPS + bool "FIPS 200 compliance" + help + This options enables the fips boot option which is + required if you want to system to operate in a FIPS 200 + certification. You should say no unless you know what + this is. + config CRYPTO_ALGAPI tristate help @@ -33,14 +41,21 @@ config CRYPTO_AEAD config CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER tristate select CRYPTO_ALGAPI + select CRYPTO_RNG config CRYPTO_HASH tristate select CRYPTO_ALGAPI +config CRYPTO_RNG + tristate + select CRYPTO_ALGAPI + config CRYPTO_MANAGER tristate "Cryptographic algorithm manager" - select CRYPTO_ALGAPI + select CRYPTO_AEAD + select CRYPTO_HASH + select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER help Create default cryptographic template instantiations such as cbc(aes). @@ -85,9 +100,7 @@ config CRYPTO_AUTHENC config CRYPTO_TEST tristate "Testing module" depends on m - select CRYPTO_ALGAPI - select CRYPTO_AEAD - select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER + select CRYPTO_MANAGER help Quick & dirty crypto test module. @@ -113,6 +126,7 @@ config CRYPTO_SEQIV tristate "Sequence Number IV Generator" select CRYPTO_AEAD select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER + select CRYPTO_RNG help This IV generator generates an IV based on a sequence number by xoring it with a salt. This algorithm is mainly useful for CTR @@ -219,7 +233,19 @@ config CRYPTO_CRC32C Castagnoli, et al Cyclic Redundancy-Check Algorithm. Used by iSCSI for header and data digests and by others. See Castagnoli93. This implementation uses lib/libcrc32c. - Module will be crc32c. + Module will be crc32c. + +config CRYPTO_CRC32C_INTEL + tristate "CRC32c INTEL hardware acceleration" + depends on X86 + select CRYPTO_HASH + help + In Intel processor with SSE4.2 supported, the processor will + support CRC32C implementation using hardware accelerated CRC32 + instruction. This option will create 'crc32c-intel' module, + which will enable any routine to use the CRC32 instruction to + gain performance compared with software implementation. + Module will be crc32c-intel. config CRYPTO_MD4 tristate "MD4 digest algorithm" @@ -243,55 +269,58 @@ config CRYPTO_MICHAEL_MIC of the algorithm. config CRYPTO_RMD128 - tristate "RIPEMD-128 digest algorithm" - select CRYPTO_ALGAPI - help - RIPEMD-128 (ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004). + tristate "RIPEMD-128 digest algorithm" + select CRYPTO_ALGAPI + help + RIPEMD-128 (ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004). - RIPEMD-128 is a 128-bit cryptographic hash function. It should only - to be used as a secure replacement for RIPEMD. For other use cases - RIPEMD-160 should be used. + RIPEMD-128 is a 128-bit cryptographic hash function. It should only + to be used as a secure replacement for RIPEMD. For other use cases + RIPEMD-160 should be used. - Developed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers and Bart Preneel. - See <http://home.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html> + Developed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers and Bart Preneel. + See <http://home.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html> config CRYPTO_RMD160 - tristate "RIPEMD-160 digest algorithm" - select CRYPTO_ALGAPI - help - RIPEMD-160 (ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004). + tristate "RIPEMD-160 digest algorithm" + select CRYPTO_ALGAPI + help + RIPEMD-160 (ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004). - RIPEMD-160 is a 160-bit cryptographic hash function. It is intended - to be used as a secure replacement for the 128-bit hash functions - MD4, MD5 and it's predecessor RIPEMD (not to be confused with RIPEMD-128). + RIPEMD-160 is a 160-bit cryptographic hash function. It is intended + to be used as a secure replacement for the 128-bit hash functions + MD4, MD5 and it's predecessor RIPEMD + (not to be confused with RIPEMD-128). - It's speed is comparable to SHA1 and there are no known attacks against - RIPEMD-160. + It's speed is comparable to SHA1 and there are no known attacks + against RIPEMD-160. - Developed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers and Bart Preneel. - See <http://home.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html> + Developed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers and Bart Preneel. + See <http://home.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html> config CRYPTO_RMD256 - tristate "RIPEMD-256 digest algorithm" - select CRYPTO_ALGAPI - help - RIPEMD-256 is an optional extension of RIPEMD-128 with a 256 bit hash. - It is intended for applications that require longer hash-results, without - needing a larger security level (than RIPEMD-128). + tristate "RIPEMD-256 digest algorithm" + select CRYPTO_ALGAPI + help + RIPEMD-256 is an optional extension of RIPEMD-128 with a + 256 bit hash. It is intended for applications that require + longer hash-results, without needing a larger security level + (than RIPEMD-128). - Developed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers and Bart Preneel. - See <http://home.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html> + Developed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers and Bart Preneel. + See <http://home.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html> config CRYPTO_RMD320 - tristate "RIPEMD-320 digest algorithm" - select CRYPTO_ALGAPI - help - RIPEMD-320 is an optional extension of RIPEMD-160 with a 320 bit hash. - It is intended for applications that require longer hash-results, without - needing a larger security level (than RIPEMD-160). + tristate "RIPEMD-320 digest algorithm" + select CRYPTO_ALGAPI + help + RIPEMD-320 is an optional extension of RIPEMD-160 with a + 320 bit hash. It is intended for applications that require + longer hash-results, without needing a larger security level + (than RIPEMD-160). - Developed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers and Bart Preneel. - See <http://home.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html> + Developed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers and Bart Preneel. + See <http://home.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html> config CRYPTO_SHA1 tristate "SHA1 digest algorithm" @@ -308,8 +337,8 @@ config CRYPTO_SHA256 This version of SHA implements a 256 bit hash with 128 bits of security against collision attacks. - This code also includes SHA-224, a 224 bit hash with 112 bits - of security against collision attacks. + This code also includes SHA-224, a 224 bit hash with 112 bits + of security against collision attacks. config CRYPTO_SHA512 tristate "SHA384 and SHA512 digest algorithms" @@ -666,6 +695,18 @@ config CRYPTO_LZO help This is the LZO algorithm. +comment "Random Number Generation" + +config CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG + tristate "Pseudo Random Number Generation for Cryptographic modules" + select CRYPTO_AES + select CRYPTO_RNG + select CRYPTO_FIPS + help + This option enables the generic pseudo random number generator + for cryptographic modules. Uses the Algorithm specified in + ANSI X9.31 A.2.4 + source "drivers/crypto/Kconfig" endif # if CRYPTO diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile index d4f3ed857df0..5862b807334e 100644 --- a/crypto/Makefile +++ b/crypto/Makefile @@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO) += crypto.o crypto-objs := api.o cipher.o digest.o compress.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS) += fips.o + crypto_algapi-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o crypto_algapi-objs := algapi.o scatterwalk.o $(crypto_algapi-y) obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ALGAPI) += crypto_algapi.o @@ -13,15 +15,17 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AEAD) += aead.o crypto_blkcipher-objs := ablkcipher.o crypto_blkcipher-objs += blkcipher.o -crypto_blkcipher-objs += chainiv.o -crypto_blkcipher-objs += eseqiv.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER) += crypto_blkcipher.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER) += chainiv.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER) += eseqiv.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEQIV) += seqiv.o crypto_hash-objs := hash.o crypto_hash-objs += ahash.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) += crypto_hash.o +cryptomgr-objs := algboss.o testmgr.o + obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER) += cryptomgr.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HMAC) += hmac.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_XCBC) += xcbc.o @@ -69,7 +73,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MICHAEL_MIC) += michael_mic.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32C) += crc32c.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_AUTHENC) += authenc.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO) += lzo.o - +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RNG) += rng.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RNG) += krng.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG) += ansi_cprng.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEST) += tcrypt.o # diff --git a/crypto/algapi.c b/crypto/algapi.c index e65cb50cf4af..7c41e7405c41 100644 --- a/crypto/algapi.c +++ b/crypto/algapi.c @@ -21,15 +21,15 @@ #include "internal.h" +static void crypto_remove_final(struct list_head *list); + static LIST_HEAD(crypto_template_list); void crypto_larval_error(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask) { struct crypto_alg *alg; - down_read(&crypto_alg_sem); - alg = __crypto_alg_lookup(name, type, mask); - up_read(&crypto_alg_sem); + alg = crypto_alg_lookup(name, type, mask); if (alg) { if (crypto_is_larval(alg)) { @@ -128,23 +128,97 @@ static void crypto_remove_spawns(struct list_head *spawns, } } -static int __crypto_register_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg, - struct list_head *list) +static struct crypto_larval *__crypto_register_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg) { struct crypto_alg *q; + struct crypto_larval *larval; int ret = -EAGAIN; if (crypto_is_dead(alg)) - goto out; + goto err; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&alg->cra_users); + /* No cheating! */ + alg->cra_flags &= ~CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED; + ret = -EEXIST; atomic_set(&alg->cra_refcnt, 1); list_for_each_entry(q, &crypto_alg_list, cra_list) { if (q == alg) - goto out; + goto err; + + if (crypto_is_larval(q)) { + if (!strcmp(alg->cra_driver_name, q->cra_driver_name)) + goto err; + continue; + } + + if (!strcmp(q->cra_driver_name, alg->cra_name) || + !strcmp(q->cra_name, alg->cra_driver_name)) + goto err; + } + + larval = crypto_larval_alloc(alg->cra_name, + alg->cra_flags | CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED, 0); + if (IS_ERR(larval)) + goto out; + + ret = -ENOENT; + larval->adult = crypto_mod_get(alg); + if (!larval->adult) + goto free_larval; + + atomic_set(&larval->alg.cra_refcnt, 1); + memcpy(larval->alg.cra_driver_name, alg->cra_driver_name, + CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME); + larval->alg.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority; + + list_add(&alg->cra_list, &crypto_alg_list); + list_add(&larval->alg.cra_list, &crypto_alg_list); + +out: + return larval; + +free_larval: + kfree(larval); +err: + larval = ERR_PTR(ret); + goto out; +} + +void crypto_alg_tested(const char *name, int err) +{ + struct crypto_larval *test; + struct crypto_alg *alg; + struct crypto_alg *q; + LIST_HEAD(list); + + down_write(&crypto_alg_sem); + list_for_each_entry(q, &crypto_alg_list, cra_list) { + if (!crypto_is_larval(q)) + continue; + + test = (struct crypto_larval *)q; + + if (!strcmp(q->cra_driver_name, name)) + goto found; + } + + printk(KERN_ERR "alg: Unexpected test result for %s: %d\n", name, err); + goto unlock; + +found: + alg = test->adult; + if (err || list_empty(&alg->cra_list)) + goto complete; + + alg->cra_flags |= CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED; + + list_for_each_entry(q, &crypto_alg_list, cra_list) { + if (q == alg) + continue; if (crypto_is_moribund(q)) continue; @@ -180,17 +254,18 @@ static int __crypto_register_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg, q->cra_priority > alg->cra_priority) continue; - crypto_remove_spawns(&q->cra_users, list, alg->cra_flags); + crypto_remove_spawns(&q->cra_users, &list, alg->cra_flags); } - - list_add(&alg->cra_list, &crypto_alg_list); - crypto_notify(CRYPTO_MSG_ALG_REGISTER, alg); - ret = 0; +complete: + complete_all(&test->completion); -out: - return ret; +unlock: + up_write(&crypto_alg_sem); + + crypto_remove_final(&list); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_alg_tested); static void crypto_remove_final(struct list_head *list) { @@ -203,9 +278,27 @@ static void crypto_remove_final(struct list_head *list) } } +static void crypto_wait_for_test(struct crypto_larval *larval) +{ + int err; + + err = crypto_probing_notify(CRYPTO_MSG_ALG_REGISTER, larval->adult); + if (err != NOTIFY_STOP) { + if (WARN_ON(err != NOTIFY_DONE)) + goto out; + crypto_alg_tested(larval->alg.cra_driver_name, 0); + } + + err = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&larval->completion); + WARN_ON(err); + +out: + crypto_larval_kill(&larval->alg); +} + int crypto_register_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg) { - LIST_HEAD(list); + struct crypto_larval *larval; int err; err = crypto_check_alg(alg); @@ -213,11 +306,14 @@ int crypto_register_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg) return err; down_write(&crypto_alg_sem); - err = __crypto_register_alg(alg, &list); + larval = __crypto_register_alg(alg); up_write(&crypto_alg_sem); - crypto_remove_final(&list); - return err; + if (IS_ERR(larval)) + return PTR_ERR(larval); + + crypto_wait_for_test(larval); + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_register_alg); @@ -335,8 +431,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_lookup_template); int crypto_register_instance(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct crypto_instance *inst) { - LIST_HEAD(list); - int err = -EINVAL; + struct crypto_larval *larval; + int err; err = crypto_check_alg(&inst->alg); if (err) @@ -346,8 +442,8 @@ int crypto_register_instance(struct crypto_template *tmpl, down_write(&crypto_alg_sem); - err = __crypto_register_alg(&inst->alg, &list); - if (err) + larval = __crypto_register_alg(&inst->alg); + if (IS_ERR(larval)) goto unlock; hlist_add_head(&inst->list, &tmpl->instances); @@ -356,7 +452,12 @@ int crypto_register_instance(struct crypto_template *tmpl, unlock: up_write(&crypto_alg_sem); - crypto_remove_final(&list); + err = PTR_ERR(larval); + if (IS_ERR(larval)) + goto err; + + crypto_wait_for_test(larval); + err = 0; err: return err; diff --git a/crypto/cryptomgr.c b/crypto/algboss.c index e5e3cf848d42..4601e4267c88 100644 --- a/crypto/cryptomgr.c +++ b/crypto/algboss.c @@ -45,6 +45,15 @@ struct cryptomgr_param { char larval[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; char template[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; + + u32 otype; + u32 omask; +}; + +struct crypto_test_param { + char driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; + char alg[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; + u32 type; }; static int cryptomgr_probe(void *data) @@ -76,8 +85,7 @@ out: module_put_and_exit(0); err: - crypto_larval_error(param->larval, param->type.data.type, - param->type.data.mask); + crypto_larval_error(param->larval, param->otype, param->omask); goto out; } @@ -169,13 +177,65 @@ static int cryptomgr_schedule_probe(struct crypto_larval *larval) param->type.attr.rta_len = sizeof(param->type); param->type.attr.rta_type = CRYPTOA_TYPE; - param->type.data.type = larval->alg.cra_flags; - param->type.data.mask = larval->mask; + param->type.data.type = larval->alg.cra_flags & ~CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED; + param->type.data.mask = larval->mask & ~CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED; param->tb[0] = ¶m->type.attr; + param->otype = larval->alg.cra_flags; + param->omask = larval->mask; + memcpy(param->larval, larval->alg.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME); - thread = kthread_run(cryptomgr_probe, param, "cryptomgr"); + thread = kthread_run(cryptomgr_probe, param, "cryptomgr_probe"); + if (IS_ERR(thread)) + goto err_free_param; + + return NOTIFY_STOP; + +err_free_param: + kfree(param); +err_put_module: + module_put(THIS_MODULE); +err: + return NOTIFY_OK; +} + +static int cryptomgr_test(void *data) +{ + struct crypto_test_param *param = data; + u32 type = param->type; + int err = 0; + + if (!((type ^ CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER) & + CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER_MASK) && !(type & CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV)) + goto skiptest; + + err = alg_test(param->driver, param->alg, type, CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED); + +skiptest: + crypto_alg_tested(param->driver, err); + + kfree(param); + module_put_and_exit(0); +} + +static int cryptomgr_schedule_test(struct crypto_alg *alg) +{ + struct task_struct *thread; + struct crypto_test_param *param; + + if (!try_module_get(THIS_MODULE)) + goto err; + + param = kzalloc(sizeof(*param), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!param) + goto err_put_module; + + memcpy(param->driver, alg->cra_driver_name, sizeof(param->driver)); + memcpy(param->alg, alg->cra_name, sizeof(param->alg)); + param->type = alg->cra_flags; + + thread = kthread_run(cryptomgr_test, param, "cryptomgr_test"); if (IS_ERR(thread)) goto err_free_param; @@ -195,6 +255,8 @@ static int cryptomgr_notify(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long msg, switch (msg) { case CRYPTO_MSG_ALG_REQUEST: return cryptomgr_schedule_probe(data); + case CRYPTO_MSG_ALG_REGISTER: + return cryptomgr_schedule_test(data); } return NOTIFY_DONE; @@ -206,16 +268,32 @@ static struct notifier_block cryptomgr_notifier = { static int __init cryptomgr_init(void) { - return crypto_register_notifier(&cryptomgr_notifier); + int err; + + err = testmgr_init(); + if (err) + return err; + + err = crypto_register_notifier(&cryptomgr_notifier); + if (err) + goto free_testmgr; + + return 0; + +free_testmgr: + testmgr_exit(); + return err; } static void __exit cryptomgr_exit(void) { int err = crypto_unregister_notifier(&cryptomgr_notifier); BUG_ON(err); + + testmgr_exit(); } -module_init(cryptomgr_init); +subsys_initcall(cryptomgr_init); module_exit(cryptomgr_exit); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/crypto/ansi_cprng.c b/crypto/ansi_cprng.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..72db0fd763cc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/ansi_cprng.c @@ -0,0 +1,417 @@ +/* + * PRNG: Pseudo Random Number Generator + * Based on NIST Recommended PRNG From ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 using + * AES 128 cipher + * + * (C) Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it + * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the + * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your + * any later version. + * + * + */ + +#include <crypto/internal/rng.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/moduleparam.h> +#include <linux/string.h> + +#include "internal.h" + +#define DEFAULT_PRNG_KEY "0123456789abcdef" +#define DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ 16 +#define DEFAULT_BLK_SZ 16 +#define DEFAULT_V_SEED "zaybxcwdveuftgsh" + +/* + * Flags for the prng_context flags field + */ + +#define PRNG_FIXED_SIZE 0x1 +#define PRNG_NEED_RESET 0x2 + +/* + * Note: DT is our counter value + * I is our intermediate value + * V is our seed vector + * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/rng/931rngext.pdf + * for implementation details + */ + + +struct prng_context { + spinlock_t prng_lock; + unsigned char rand_data[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ]; + unsigned char last_rand_data[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ]; + unsigned char DT[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ]; + unsigned char I[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ]; + unsigned char V[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ]; + u32 rand_data_valid; + struct crypto_cipher *tfm; + u32 flags; +}; + +static int dbg; + +static void hexdump(char *note, unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len) +{ + if (dbg) { + printk(KERN_CRIT "%s", note); + print_hex_dump(KERN_CONT, "", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, + 16, 1, + buf, len, false); + } +} + +#define dbgprint(format, args...) do {\ +if (dbg)\ + printk(format, ##args);\ +} while (0) + +static void xor_vectors(unsigned char *in1, unsigned char *in2, + unsigned char *out, unsigned int size) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < size; i++) + out[i] = in1[i] ^ in2[i]; + +} +/* + * Returns DEFAULT_BLK_SZ bytes of random data per call + * returns 0 if generation succeded, <0 if something went wrong + */ +static int _get_more_prng_bytes(struct prng_context *ctx) +{ + int i; + unsigned char tmp[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ]; + unsigned char *output = NULL; + + + dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "Calling _get_more_prng_bytes for context %p\n", + ctx); + + hexdump("Input DT: ", ctx->DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + hexdump("Input I: ", ctx->I, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + hexdump("Input V: ", ctx->V, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + + /* + * This algorithm is a 3 stage state machine + */ + for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { + + switch (i) { + case 0: + /* + * Start by encrypting the counter value + * This gives us an intermediate value I + */ + memcpy(tmp, ctx->DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + output = ctx->I; + hexdump("tmp stage 0: ", tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + break; + case 1: + + /* + * Next xor I with our secret vector V + * encrypt that result to obtain our + * pseudo random data which we output + */ + xor_vectors(ctx->I, ctx->V, tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + hexdump("tmp stage 1: ", tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + output = ctx->rand_data; + break; + case 2: + /* + * First check that we didn't produce the same + * random data that we did last time around through this + */ + if (!memcmp(ctx->rand_data, ctx->last_rand_data, + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ)) { + printk(KERN_ERR + "ctx %p Failed repetition check!\n", + ctx); + ctx->flags |= PRNG_NEED_RESET; + return -EINVAL; + } + memcpy(ctx->last_rand_data, ctx->rand_data, + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + + /* + * Lastly xor the random data with I + * and encrypt that to obtain a new secret vector V + */ + xor_vectors(ctx->rand_data, ctx->I, tmp, + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + output = ctx->V; + hexdump("tmp stage 2: ", tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + break; + } + + + /* do the encryption */ + crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->tfm, output, tmp); + + } + + /* + * Now update our DT value + */ + for (i = 0; i < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ; i++) { + ctx->DT[i] += 1; + if (ctx->DT[i] != 0) + break; + } + + dbgprint("Returning new block for context %p\n", ctx); + ctx->rand_data_valid = 0; + + hexdump("Output DT: ", ctx->DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + hexdump("Output I: ", ctx->I, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + hexdump("Output V: ", ctx->V, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + hexdump("New Random Data: ", ctx->rand_data, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + + return 0; +} + +/* Our exported functions */ +static int get_prng_bytes(char *buf, size_t nbytes, struct prng_context *ctx) +{ + unsigned long flags; + unsigned char *ptr = buf; + unsigned int byte_count = (unsigned int)nbytes; + int err; + + + if (nbytes < 0) + return -EINVAL; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->prng_lock, flags); + + err = -EINVAL; + if (ctx->flags & PRNG_NEED_RESET) + goto done; + + /* + * If the FIXED_SIZE flag is on, only return whole blocks of + * pseudo random data + */ + err = -EINVAL; + if (ctx->flags & PRNG_FIXED_SIZE) { + if (nbytes < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) + goto done; + byte_count = DEFAULT_BLK_SZ; + } + + err = byte_count; + + dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "getting %d random bytes for context %p\n", + byte_count, ctx); + + +remainder: + if (ctx->rand_data_valid == DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) { + if (_get_more_prng_bytes(ctx) < 0) { + memset(buf, 0, nbytes); + err = -EINVAL; + goto done; + } + } + + /* + * Copy up to the next whole block size + */ + if (byte_count < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) { + for (; ctx->rand_data_valid < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ; + ctx->rand_data_valid++) { + *ptr = ctx->rand_data[ctx->rand_data_valid]; + ptr++; + byte_count--; + if (byte_count == 0) + goto done; + } + } + + /* + * Now copy whole blocks + */ + for (; byte_count >= DEFAULT_BLK_SZ; byte_count -= DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) { + if (_get_more_prng_bytes(ctx) < 0) { + memset(buf, 0, nbytes); + err = -EINVAL; + goto done; + } + memcpy(ptr, ctx->rand_data, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + ctx->rand_data_valid += DEFAULT_BLK_SZ; + ptr += DEFAULT_BLK_SZ; + } + + /* + * Now copy any extra partial data + */ + if (byte_count) + goto remainder; + +done: + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->prng_lock, flags); + dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "returning %d from get_prng_bytes in context %p\n", + err, ctx); + return err; +} + +static void free_prng_context(struct prng_context *ctx) +{ + crypto_free_cipher(ctx->tfm); +} + +static int reset_prng_context(struct prng_context *ctx, + unsigned char *key, size_t klen, + unsigned char *V, unsigned char *DT) +{ + int ret; + int rc = -EINVAL; + unsigned char *prng_key; + + spin_lock(&ctx->prng_lock); + ctx->flags |= PRNG_NEED_RESET; + + prng_key = (key != NULL) ? key : (unsigned char *)DEFAULT_PRNG_KEY; + + if (!key) + klen = DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ; + + if (V) + memcpy(ctx->V, V, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + else + memcpy(ctx->V, DEFAULT_V_SEED, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + + if (DT) + memcpy(ctx->DT, DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + else + memset(ctx->DT, 0, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + + memset(ctx->rand_data, 0, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + memset(ctx->last_rand_data, 0, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ); + + if (ctx->tfm) + crypto_free_cipher(ctx->tfm); + + ctx->tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(ctx->tfm)) { + dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "Failed to alloc tfm for context %p\n", + ctx); + ctx->tfm = NULL; + goto out; + } + + ctx->rand_data_valid = DEFAULT_BLK_SZ; + + ret = crypto_cipher_setkey(ctx->tfm, prng_key, klen); + if (ret) { + dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "PRNG: setkey() failed flags=%x\n", + crypto_cipher_get_flags(ctx->tfm)); + crypto_free_cipher(ctx->tfm); + goto out; + } + + rc = 0; + ctx->flags &= ~PRNG_NEED_RESET; +out: + spin_unlock(&ctx->prng_lock); + + return rc; + +} + +static int cprng_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) +{ + struct prng_context *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + spin_lock_init(&ctx->prng_lock); + + return reset_prng_context(ctx, NULL, DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ, NULL, NULL); +} + +static void cprng_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) +{ + free_prng_context(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm)); +} + +static int cprng_get_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *rdata, + unsigned int dlen) +{ + struct prng_context *prng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm); + + return get_prng_bytes(rdata, dlen, prng); +} + +static int cprng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *seed, unsigned int slen) +{ + struct prng_context *prng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm); + u8 *key = seed + DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ; + + if (slen < DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) + return -EINVAL; + + reset_prng_context(prng, key, DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ, seed, NULL); + + if (prng->flags & PRNG_NEED_RESET) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; +} + +static struct crypto_alg rng_alg = { + .cra_name = "stdrng", + .cra_driver_name = "ansi_cprng", + .cra_priority = 100, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_RNG, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct prng_context), + .cra_type = &crypto_rng_type, + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .cra_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(rng_alg.cra_list), + .cra_init = cprng_init, + .cra_exit = cprng_exit, + .cra_u = { + .rng = { + .rng_make_random = cprng_get_random, + .rng_reset = cprng_reset, + |