diff options
author | Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com> | 2019-04-30 15:44:19 +0800 |
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committer | Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> | 2019-06-20 10:06:46 +0200 |
commit | 1a79c1b8a04153c4c387518967ce851f89e22733 (patch) | |
tree | c41413bbff31bc0c8f46d6b9ced47e0b931359d4 /Documentation/acpi | |
parent | 980621daf368f2b9aa69c7ea01baa654edb7577b (diff) |
x86/kexec: Do not map kexec area as decrypted when SEV is active
When a virtual machine panics, its memory needs to be dumped for
analysis. With memory encryption in the picture, special care must be
taken when loading a kexec/kdump kernel in a SEV guest.
A SEV guest starts and runs fully encrypted. In order to load a kexec
kernel and initrd, arch_kexec_post_{alloc,free}_pages() need to not map
areas as decrypted unconditionally but differentiate whether the kernel
is running as a SEV guest and if so, leave kexec area encrypted.
[ bp: Reduce commit message to the relevant information pertaining to
this commit only. ]
Co-developed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: bhe@redhat.com
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: dyoung@redhat.com
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430074421.7852-2-lijiang@redhat.com
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/acpi')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions