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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@g5.osdl.org>2006-03-25 09:24:53 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@g5.osdl.org>2006-03-25 09:24:53 -0800
commit1b9a3917366028cc451a98dd22e3bcd537d4e5c1 (patch)
treed911058720e0a9aeeaf9f407ccdc6fbf4047f47d
parent3661f00e2097676847deb01add1a0918044bd816 (diff)
parent71e1c784b24a026a490b3de01541fc5ee14ebc09 (diff)
Merge branch 'audit.b3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current
* 'audit.b3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current: (22 commits) [PATCH] fix audit_init failure path [PATCH] EXPORT_SYMBOL patch for audit_log, audit_log_start, audit_log_end and audit_format [PATCH] sem2mutex: audit_netlink_sem [PATCH] simplify audit_free() locking [PATCH] Fix audit operators [PATCH] promiscuous mode [PATCH] Add tty to syscall audit records [PATCH] add/remove rule update [PATCH] audit string fields interface + consumer [PATCH] SE Linux audit events [PATCH] Minor cosmetic cleanups to the code moved into auditfilter.c [PATCH] Fix audit record filtering with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL [PATCH] Fix IA64 success/failure indication in syscall auditing. [PATCH] Miscellaneous bug and warning fixes [PATCH] Capture selinux subject/object context information. [PATCH] Exclude messages by message type [PATCH] Collect more inode information during syscall processing. [PATCH] Pass dentry, not just name, in fsnotify creation hooks. [PATCH] Define new range of userspace messages. [PATCH] Filter rule comparators ... Fixed trivial conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c
-rw-r--r--arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c12
-rw-r--r--arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c10
-rw-r--r--fs/namei.c11
-rw-r--r--fs/open.c8
-rw-r--r--fs/xattr.c11
-rw-r--r--include/linux/audit.h130
-rw-r--r--include/linux/fsnotify.h14
-rw-r--r--include/linux/security.h33
-rw-r--r--ipc/msg.c5
-rw-r--r--ipc/sem.c5
-rw-r--r--ipc/shm.c4
-rw-r--r--kernel/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--kernel/audit.c175
-rw-r--r--kernel/audit.h88
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditfilter.c630
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditsc.c834
-rw-r--r--net/core/dev.c7
-rw-r--r--security/dummy.c14
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c98
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c9
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c11
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c15
22 files changed, 1580 insertions, 546 deletions
diff --git a/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c b/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c
index f51c894a7da5..aee14fafd13d 100644
--- a/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c
+++ b/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
@@ -252,6 +253,7 @@ out:
static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm86_struct *info, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct tss_struct *tss;
+ long eax;
/*
* make sure the vm86() system call doesn't try to do anything silly
*/
@@ -305,13 +307,19 @@ static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm86_struct *info, struct task_struct *tsk
tsk->thread.screen_bitmap = info->screen_bitmap;
if (info->flags & VM86_SCREEN_BITMAP)
mark_screen_rdonly(tsk->mm);
+ __asm__ __volatile__("xorl %eax,%eax; movl %eax,%fs; movl %eax,%gs\n\t");
+ __asm__ __volatile__("movl %%eax, %0\n" :"=r"(eax));
+
+ /*call audit_syscall_exit since we do not exit via the normal paths */
+ if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
+ audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(eax), eax);
+
__asm__ __volatile__(
- "xorl %%eax,%%eax; movl %%eax,%%fs; movl %%eax,%%gs\n\t"
"movl %0,%%esp\n\t"
"movl %1,%%ebp\n\t"
"jmp resume_userspace"
: /* no outputs */
- :"r" (&info->regs), "r" (task_thread_info(tsk)) : "ax");
+ :"r" (&info->regs), "r" (task_thread_info(tsk)));
/* we never return here */
}
diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
index eaed14aac6aa..9887c8787e7a 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -1656,8 +1656,14 @@ syscall_trace_leave (long arg0, long arg1, long arg2, long arg3,
long arg4, long arg5, long arg6, long arg7,
struct pt_regs regs)
{
- if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
- audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs.r10), regs.r8);
+ if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) {
+ int success = AUDITSC_RESULT(regs.r10);
+ long result = regs.r8;
+
+ if (success != AUDITSC_SUCCESS)
+ result = -result;
+ audit_syscall_exit(current, success, result);
+ }
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
&& (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED))
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 712dfc77793b..98dc2e134362 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -1353,6 +1353,7 @@ static int may_delete(struct inode *dir,struct dentry *victim,int isdir)
return -ENOENT;
BUG_ON(victim->d_parent->d_inode != dir);
+ audit_inode_child(victim->d_name.name, victim->d_inode, dir->i_ino);
error = permission(dir,MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC, NULL);
if (error)
@@ -1472,7 +1473,7 @@ int vfs_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
DQUOT_INIT(dir);
error = dir->i_op->create(dir, dentry, mode, nd);
if (!error)
- fsnotify_create(dir, dentry->d_name.name);
+ fsnotify_create(dir, dentry);
return error;
}
@@ -1799,7 +1800,7 @@ int vfs_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
DQUOT_INIT(dir);
error = dir->i_op->mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
if (!error)
- fsnotify_create(dir, dentry->d_name.name);
+ fsnotify_create(dir, dentry);
return error;
}
@@ -1876,7 +1877,7 @@ int vfs_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
DQUOT_INIT(dir);
error = dir->i_op->mkdir(dir, dentry, mode);
if (!error)
- fsnotify_mkdir(dir, dentry->d_name.name);
+ fsnotify_mkdir(dir, dentry);
return error;
}
@@ -2139,7 +2140,7 @@ int vfs_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *oldname, i
DQUOT_INIT(dir);
error = dir->i_op->symlink(dir, dentry, oldname);
if (!error)
- fsnotify_create(dir, dentry->d_name.name);
+ fsnotify_create(dir, dentry);
return error;
}
@@ -2216,7 +2217,7 @@ int vfs_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_de
error = dir->i_op->link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
mutex_unlock(&old_dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
if (!error)
- fsnotify_create(dir, new_dentry->d_name.name);
+ fsnotify_create(dir, new_dentry);
return error;
}
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 7d02d19bd0a2..c32c89d6d8db 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
@@ -626,6 +627,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchmod(unsigned int fd, mode_t mode)
dentry = file->f_dentry;
inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ audit_inode(NULL, inode, 0);
+
err = -EROFS;
if (IS_RDONLY(inode))
goto out_putf;
@@ -775,7 +778,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchown(unsigned int fd, uid_t user, gid_t group)
file = fget(fd);
if (file) {
- error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user, group);
+ struct dentry * dentry;
+ dentry = file->f_dentry;
+ audit_inode(NULL, dentry->d_inode, 0);
+ error = chown_common(dentry, user, group);
fput(file);
}
return error;
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index 80eca7d3d69f..e416190f5e9c 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -234,12 +235,15 @@ sys_fsetxattr(int fd, char __user *name, void __user *value,
size_t size, int flags)
{
struct file *f;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
int error = -EBADF;
f = fget(fd);
if (!f)
return error;
- error = setxattr(f->f_dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+ dentry = f->f_dentry;
+ audit_inode(NULL, dentry->d_inode, 0);
+ error = setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
fput(f);
return error;
}
@@ -458,12 +462,15 @@ asmlinkage long
sys_fremovexattr(int fd, char __user *name)
{
struct file *f;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
int error = -EBADF;
f = fget(fd);
if (!f)
return error;
- error = removexattr(f->f_dentry, name);
+ dentry = f->f_dentry;
+ audit_inode(NULL, dentry->d_inode, 0);
+ error = removexattr(dentry, name);
fput(f);
return error;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index da3c01955f3d..1c47c59058c1 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -33,27 +33,42 @@
* 1200 - 1299 messages internal to the audit daemon
* 1300 - 1399 audit event messages
* 1400 - 1499 SE Linux use
- * 1500 - 1999 future use
- * 2000 is for otherwise unclassified kernel audit messages
+ * 1500 - 1599 kernel LSPP events
+ * 1600 - 1699 kernel crypto events
+ * 1700 - 1799 kernel anomaly records
+ * 1800 - 1999 future kernel use (maybe integrity labels and related events)
+ * 2000 is for otherwise unclassified kernel audit messages (legacy)
+ * 2001 - 2099 unused (kernel)
+ * 2100 - 2199 user space anomaly records
+ * 2200 - 2299 user space actions taken in response to anomalies
+ * 2300 - 2399 user space generated LSPP events
+ * 2400 - 2499 user space crypto events
+ * 2500 - 2999 future user space (maybe integrity labels and related events)
*
- * Messages from 1000-1199 are bi-directional. 1200-1299 are exclusively user
- * space. Anything over that is kernel --> user space communication.
+ * Messages from 1000-1199 are bi-directional. 1200-1299 & 2100 - 2999 are
+ * exclusively user space. 1300-2099 is kernel --> user space
+ * communication.
*/
#define AUDIT_GET 1000 /* Get status */
#define AUDIT_SET 1001 /* Set status (enable/disable/auditd) */
-#define AUDIT_LIST 1002 /* List syscall filtering rules */
-#define AUDIT_ADD 1003 /* Add syscall filtering rule */
-#define AUDIT_DEL 1004 /* Delete syscall filtering rule */
+#define AUDIT_LIST 1002 /* List syscall rules -- deprecated */
+#define AUDIT_ADD 1003 /* Add syscall rule -- deprecated */
+#define AUDIT_DEL 1004 /* Delete syscall rule -- deprecated */
#define AUDIT_USER 1005 /* Message from userspace -- deprecated */
#define AUDIT_LOGIN 1006 /* Define the login id and information */
#define AUDIT_WATCH_INS 1007 /* Insert file/dir watch entry */
#define AUDIT_WATCH_REM 1008 /* Remove file/dir watch entry */
#define AUDIT_WATCH_LIST 1009 /* List all file/dir watches */
#define AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO 1010 /* Get info about sender of signal to auditd */
+#define AUDIT_ADD_RULE 1011 /* Add syscall filtering rule */
+#define AUDIT_DEL_RULE 1012 /* Delete syscall filtering rule */
+#define AUDIT_LIST_RULES 1013 /* List syscall filtering rules */
#define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG 1100 /* Userspace messages mostly uninteresting to kernel */
#define AUDIT_USER_AVC 1107 /* We filter this differently */
#define AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG 1199
+#define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 2100 /* More user space messages */
+#define AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2 2999
#define AUDIT_DAEMON_START 1200 /* Daemon startup record */
#define AUDIT_DAEMON_END 1201 /* Daemon normal stop record */
@@ -72,6 +87,13 @@
#define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
#define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */
#define AUDIT_AVC_PATH 1402 /* dentry, vfsmount pair from avc */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD 1403 /* Policy file load */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_STATUS 1404 /* Changed enforcing,permissive,off */
+#define AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE 1405 /* Changes to booleans */
+
+#define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700
+#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
+#define AUDIT_ANOM_PROMISCUOUS 1700 /* Device changed promiscuous mode */
#define AUDIT_KERNEL 2000 /* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
@@ -81,8 +103,9 @@
#define AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY 0x02 /* Apply rule at syscall entry */
#define AUDIT_FILTER_WATCH 0x03 /* Apply rule to file system watches */
#define AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT 0x04 /* Apply rule at syscall exit */
+#define AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE 0x05 /* Apply rule at audit_log_start */
-#define AUDIT_NR_FILTERS 5
+#define AUDIT_NR_FILTERS 6
#define AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND 0x10 /* Prepend to front of list */
@@ -98,6 +121,13 @@
#define AUDIT_WORD(nr) ((__u32)((nr)/32))
#define AUDIT_BIT(nr) (1 << ((nr) - AUDIT_WORD(nr)*32))
+/* This bitmask is used to validate user input. It represents all bits that
+ * are currently used in an audit field constant understood by the kernel.
+ * If you are adding a new #define AUDIT_<whatever>, please ensure that
+ * AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS is updated if need be. */
+#define AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS 0x0FFFFC00
+
+
/* Rule fields */
/* These are useful when checking the
* task structure at task creation time
@@ -114,6 +144,7 @@
#define AUDIT_LOGINUID 9
#define AUDIT_PERS 10
#define AUDIT_ARCH 11
+#define AUDIT_MSGTYPE 12
/* These are ONLY useful when checking
* at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */
@@ -128,8 +159,28 @@
#define AUDIT_ARG2 (AUDIT_ARG0+2)
#define AUDIT_ARG3 (AUDIT_ARG0+3)
-#define AUDIT_NEGATE 0x80000000
+#define AUDIT_NEGATE 0x80000000
+/* These are the supported operators.
+ * 4 2 1
+ * = > <
+ * -------
+ * 0 0 0 0 nonsense
+ * 0 0 1 1 <
+ * 0 1 0 2 >
+ * 0 1 1 3 !=
+ * 1 0 0 4 =
+ * 1 0 1 5 <=
+ * 1 1 0 6 >=
+ * 1 1 1 7 all operators
+ */
+#define AUDIT_LESS_THAN 0x10000000
+#define AUDIT_GREATER_THAN 0x20000000
+#define AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL 0x30000000
+#define AUDIT_EQUAL 0x40000000
+#define AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL (AUDIT_LESS_THAN|AUDIT_EQUAL)
+#define AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL (AUDIT_GREATER_THAN|AUDIT_EQUAL)
+#define AUDIT_OPERATORS (AUDIT_EQUAL|AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
/* Status symbols */
/* Mask values */
@@ -186,6 +237,26 @@ struct audit_status {
__u32 backlog; /* messages waiting in queue */
};
+/* audit_rule_data supports filter rules with both integer and string
+ * fields. It corresponds with AUDIT_ADD_RULE, AUDIT_DEL_RULE and
+ * AUDIT_LIST_RULES requests.
+ */
+struct audit_rule_data {
+ __u32 flags; /* AUDIT_PER_{TASK,CALL}, AUDIT_PREPEND */
+ __u32 action; /* AUDIT_NEVER, AUDIT_POSSIBLE, AUDIT_ALWAYS */
+ __u32 field_count;
+ __u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE]; /* syscall(s) affected */
+ __u32 fields[AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS];
+ __u32 values[AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS];
+ __u32 fieldflags[AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS];
+ __u32 buflen; /* total length of string fields */
+ char buf[0]; /* string fields buffer */
+};
+
+/* audit_rule is supported to maintain backward compatibility with
+ * userspace. It supports integer fields only and corresponds to
+ * AUDIT_ADD, AUDIT_DEL and AUDIT_LIST requests.
+ */
struct audit_rule { /* for AUDIT_LIST, AUDIT_ADD, and AUDIT_DEL */
__u32 flags; /* AUDIT_PER_{TASK,CALL}, AUDIT_PREPEND */
__u32 action; /* AUDIT_NEVER, AUDIT_POSSIBLE, AUDIT_ALWAYS */
@@ -222,22 +293,33 @@ extern void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *task, int arch,
extern void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *task, int failed, long return_code);
extern void audit_getname(const char *name);
extern void audit_putname(const char *name);
-extern void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags);
+extern void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags);
+extern void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
+ unsigned long pino);
+static inline void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode,
+ unsigned flags) {
+ if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
+ __audit_inode(name, inode, flags);
+}
+static inline void audit_inode_child(const char *dname,
+ const struct inode *inode,
+ unsigned long pino) {
+ if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
+ __audit_inode_child(dname, inode, pino);
+}
/* Private API (for audit.c only) */
-extern int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq,
- void *data, uid_t loginuid);
extern unsigned int audit_serial(void);
extern void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial);
extern int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid);
extern uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx);
-extern int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode);
+extern int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);
extern int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args);
extern int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *addr);
extern int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
extern void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t);
-extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type);
+extern int audit_set_macxattr(const char *name);
#else
#define audit_alloc(t) ({ 0; })
#define audit_free(t) do { ; } while (0)
@@ -245,16 +327,18 @@ extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type);
#define audit_syscall_exit(t,f,r) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_getname(n) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_putname(n) do { ; } while (0)
+#define __audit_inode(n,i,f) do { ; } while (0)
+#define __audit_inode_child(d,i,p) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_inode(n,i,f) do { ; } while (0)
-#define audit_receive_filter(t,p,u,s,d,l) ({ -EOPNOTSUPP; })
+#define audit_inode_child(d,i,p) do { ; } while (0)
#define auditsc_get_stamp(c,t,s) do { BUG(); } while (0)
#define audit_get_loginuid(c) ({ -1; })
-#define audit_ipc_perms(q,u,g,m) ({ 0; })
+#define audit_ipc_perms(q,u,g,m,i) ({ 0; })
#define audit_socketcall(n,a) ({ 0; })
#define audit_sockaddr(len, addr) ({ 0; })
#define audit_avc_path(dentry, mnt) ({ 0; })
#define audit_signal_info(s,t) do { ; } while (0)
-#define audit_filter_user(cb,t) ({ 1; })
+#define audit_set_macxattr(n) do { ; } while (0)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -278,12 +362,11 @@ extern void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab,
const char *prefix,
struct dentry *dentry,
struct vfsmount *vfsmnt);
- /* Private API (for auditsc.c only) */
-extern void audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type,
- int done, int multi,
- void *payload, int size);
-extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
-extern struct semaphore audit_netlink_sem;
+ /* Private API (for audit.c only) */
+extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type);
+extern int audit_filter_type(int type);
+extern int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq,
+ void *data, size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid);
#else
#define audit_log(c,g,t,f,...) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_log_start(c,g,t) ({ NULL; })
@@ -293,6 +376,7 @@ extern struct semaphore audit_netlink_sem;
#define audit_log_hex(a,b,l) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_log_untrustedstring(a,s) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_log_d_path(b,p,d,v) do { ; } while (0)
+#define audit_panic(m) do { ; } while (0)
#endif
#endif
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/fsnotify.h b/include/linux/fsnotify.h
index f7e517c1f1bd..11438eff4d44 100644
--- a/include/linux/fsnotify.h
+++ b/include/linux/fsnotify.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/dnotify.h>
#include <linux/inotify.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
/*
* fsnotify_d_instantiate - instantiate a dentry for inode
@@ -64,6 +65,8 @@ static inline void fsnotify_move(struct inode *old_dir, struct inode *new_dir,
if (source) {
inotify_inode_queue_event(source, IN_MOVE_SELF, 0, NULL);
}
+ audit_inode_child(old_name, source, old_dir->i_ino);
+ audit_inode_child(new_name, target, new_dir->i_ino);
}
/*
@@ -89,19 +92,22 @@ static inline void fsnotify_inoderemove(struct inode *inode)
/*
* fsnotify_create - 'name' was linked in
*/
-static inline void fsnotify_create(struct inode *inode, const char *name)
+static inline void fsnotify_create(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
{
inode_dir_notify(inode, DN_CREATE);
- inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE, 0, name);
+ inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE, 0, dentry->d_name.name);
+ audit_inode_child(dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_inode, inode->i_ino);
}
/*
* fsnotify_mkdir - directory 'name' was created
*/
-static inline void fsnotify_mkdir(struct inode *inode, const char *name)
+static inline void fsnotify_mkdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
{
inode_dir_notify(inode, DN_CREATE);
- inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE | IN_ISDIR, 0, name);
+ inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE | IN_ISDIR, 0,
+ dentry->d_name.name);
+ audit_inode_child(dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_inode, inode->i_ino);
}
/*
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 3c19be35124b..aaa0a5cdbf75 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -869,6 +869,11 @@ struct swap_info_struct;
* @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure
* @flag contains the desired (requested) permission set
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @ipc_getsecurity:
+ * Copy the security label associated with the ipc object into
+ * @buffer. @buffer may be NULL to request the size of the buffer
+ * required. @size indicates the size of @buffer in bytes. Return
+ * number of bytes used/required on success.
*
* Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues
* @msg_msg_alloc_security:
@@ -1168,7 +1173,8 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*inode_getxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
int (*inode_listxattr) (struct dentry *dentry);
int (*inode_removexattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
- int (*inode_getsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err);
+ const char *(*inode_xattr_getsuffix) (void);
+ int (*inode_getsecurity)(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err);
int (*inode_setsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
@@ -1217,6 +1223,7 @@ struct security_operations {
void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int (*ipc_permission) (struct kern_ipc_perm * ipcp, short flag);
+ int (*ipc_getsecurity)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size);
int (*msg_msg_alloc_security) (struct msg_msg * msg);
void (*msg_msg_free_security) (struct msg_msg * msg);
@@ -1680,7 +1687,12 @@ static inline int security_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
return security_ops->inode_removexattr (dentry, name);
}
-static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
+static inline const char *security_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
+{
+ return security_ops->inode_xattr_getsuffix();
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
{
if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (inode)))
return 0;
@@ -1875,6 +1887,11 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
return security_ops->ipc_permission (ipcp, flag);
}
+static inline int security_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+ return security_ops->ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, buffer, size);
+}
+
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg * msg)
{
return security_ops->msg_msg_alloc_security (msg);
@@ -2327,7 +2344,12 @@ static inline int security_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
return cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
}
-static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
+static inline const char *security_inode_xattr_getsuffix (void)
+{
+ return NULL ;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
@@ -2510,6 +2532,11 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg * msg)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/ipc/msg.c b/ipc/msg.c
index 60c1e5c23418..7eec5ed32379 100644
--- a/ipc/msg.c
+++ b/ipc/msg.c
@@ -428,8 +428,6 @@ asmlinkage long sys_msgctl (int msqid, int cmd, struct msqid_ds __user *buf)
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_msqid_from_user (&setbuf, buf, version))
return -EFAULT;
- if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(setbuf.qbytes, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode)))
- return err;
break;
case IPC_RMID:
break;
@@ -460,6 +458,9 @@ asmlinkage long sys_msgctl (int msqid, int cmd, struct msqid_ds __user *buf)
switch (cmd) {
case IPC_SET:
{
+ if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(setbuf.qbytes, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, ipcp)))
+ goto out_unlock_up;
+
err = -EPERM;
if (setbuf.qbytes > msg_ctlmnb && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
goto out_unlock_up;
diff --git a/ipc/sem.c b/ipc/sem.c
index 31fd4027d2b5..59696a840be1 100644
--- a/ipc/sem.c
+++ b/ipc/sem.c
@@ -809,8 +809,6 @@ static int semctl_down(int semid, int semnum, int cmd, int version, union semun
if(cmd == IPC_SET) {
if(copy_semid_from_user (&setbuf, arg.buf, version))
return -EFAULT;
- if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode)))
- return err;
}
sma = sem_lock(semid);
if(sma==NULL)
@@ -821,7 +819,6 @@ static int semctl_down(int semid, int semnum, int cmd, int version, union semun
goto out_unlock;
}
ipcp = &sma->sem_perm;
-
if (current->euid != ipcp->cuid &&
current->euid != ipcp->uid && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
err=-EPERM;
@@ -838,6 +835,8 @@ static int semctl_down(int semid, int semnum, int cmd, int version, union semun
err = 0;
break;
case IPC_SET:
+ if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, ipcp)))
+ goto out_unlock;
ipcp->uid = setbuf.uid;
ipcp->gid = setbuf.gid;
ipcp->mode = (ipcp->mode & ~S_IRWXUGO)
diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c
index 16fe2786087d..6f9615c09fb2 100644
--- a/ipc/shm.c
+++ b/ipc/shm.c
@@ -620,13 +620,13 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shmctl (int shmid, int cmd, struct shmid_ds __user *buf)
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
- if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode)))
- return err;
down(&shm_ids.sem);
shp = shm_lock(shmid);
err=-EINVAL;
if(shp==NULL)
goto out_up;
+ if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, &(shp->shm_perm))))
+ goto out_unlock_up;
err = shm_checkid(shp,shmid);
if(err)
goto out_unlock_up;
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index aebd7a78984e..ff1c11dc12cf 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += compat.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CPUSETS) += cpuset.o
obj-$(CONFIG_IKCONFIG) += configs.o
obj-$(CONFIG_STOP_MACHINE) += stop_machine.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o auditfilter.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL) += auditsc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KPROBES) += kprobes.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSFS) += ksysfs.o
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 0a813d2883e5..04fe2e301b61 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <net/netlink.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
@@ -72,7 +73,7 @@ static int audit_failure = AUDIT_FAIL_PRINTK;
* contains the (non-zero) pid. */
int audit_pid;
-/* If audit_limit is non-zero, limit the rate of sending audit records
+/* If audit_rate_limit is non-zero, limit the rate of sending audit records
* to that number per second. This prevents DoS attacks, but results in
* audit records being dropped. */
static int audit_rate_limit;
@@ -102,7 +103,7 @@ static struct sock *audit_sock;
* than AUDIT_MAXFREE are in use, the audit buffer is freed instead of
* being placed on the freelist). */
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(audit_freelist_lock);
-static int audit_freelist_count = 0;
+static int audit_freelist_count;
static LIST_HEAD(audit_freelist);
static struct sk_buff_head audit_skb_queue;
@@ -113,7 +114,7 @@ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(audit_backlog_wait);
/* The netlink socket is only to be read by 1 CPU, which lets us assume
* that list additions and deletions never happen simultaneously in
* auditsc.c */
-DECLARE_MUTEX(audit_netlink_sem);
+DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_netlink_mutex);
/* AUDIT_BUFSIZ is the size of the temporary buffer used for formatting
* audit records. Since printk uses a 1024 byte buffer, this buffer
@@ -142,7 +143,7 @@ static void audit_set_pid(struct audit_buffer *ab, pid_t pid)
nlh->nlmsg_pid = pid;
}
-static void audit_panic(const char *message)
+void audit_panic(const char *message)
{
switch (audit_failure)
{
@@ -186,8 +187,14 @@ static inline int audit_rate_check(void)
return retval;
}
-/* Emit at least 1 message per second, even if audit_rate_check is
- * throttling. */
+/**
+ * audit_log_lost - conditionally log lost audit message event
+ * @message: the message stating reason for lost audit message
+ *
+ * Emit at least 1 message per second, even if audit_rate_check is
+ * throttling.
+ * Always increment the lost messages counter.
+*/
void audit_log_lost(const char *message)
{
static unsigned long last_msg = 0;
@@ -218,7 +225,6 @@ void audit_log_lost(const char *message)
audit_backlog_limit);
audit_panic(message);
}
-
}
static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid)
@@ -300,8 +306,22 @@ static int kauditd_thread(void *dummy)
remove_wait_queue(&kauditd_wait, &wait);
}
}
+ return 0;
}
+/**
+ * audit_send_reply - send an audit reply message via netlink
+ * @pid: process id to send reply to
+ * @seq: sequence number
+ * @type: audit message type
+ * @done: done (last) flag
+ * @multi: multi-part message flag
+ * @payload: payload data
+ * @size: payload size
+ *
+ * Allocates an skb, builds the netlink message, and sends it to the pid.
+ * No failure notifications.
+ */
void audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type, int done, int multi,
void *payload, int size)
{
@@ -342,15 +362,19 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(kernel_cap_t eff_cap, u16 msg_type)
switch (msg_type) {
case AUDIT_GET:
case AUDIT_LIST:
+ case AUDIT_LIST_RULES:
case AUDIT_SET:
case AUDIT_ADD:
+ case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
case AUDIT_DEL:
+ case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
if (!cap_raised(eff_cap, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
err = -EPERM;
break;
case AUDIT_USER:
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
+ case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
if (!cap_raised(eff_cap, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
err = -EPERM;
break;
@@ -376,7 +400,8 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (err)
return err;
- /* As soon as there's any sign of userspace auditd, start kauditd to talk to it */
+ /* As soon as there's any sign of userspace auditd,
+ * start kauditd to talk to it */
if (!kauditd_task)
kauditd_task = kthread_run(kauditd_thread, NULL, "kauditd");
if (IS_ERR(kauditd_task)) {
@@ -430,6 +455,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)