Merge pull request #8159 from ThomasWaldmann/repo-upgrade-helper-1.2

repo upgrade helpers (1.2-maint)

5 files changed, 136 insertions, 68 deletions

diff --git a/.pre-commit-config.yaml b/.pre-commit-config.yaml
index f7a03542b..0c1a27a78 100644
--- a/.pre-commit-config.yaml
+++ b/.pre-commit-config.yaml
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 repos:
 -   repo: https://github.com/pycqa/flake8
-    rev: 6.0.0
+    rev: 6.1.0
     hooks:
     -   id: flake8
         files: '(src|scripts|conftest.py)'
diff --git a/docs/changes.rst b/docs/changes.rst
index 50c29ee9b..96da705b5 100644
--- a/docs/changes.rst
+++ b/docs/changes.rst
@@ -29,49 +29,63 @@ places. Borg now considers archives without TAM as garbage or an attack.
 
 We are not aware of others having discovered, disclosed or exploited this vulnerability.
 
-Below, if we speak of borg 1.2.6, we mean a borg version >= 1.2.6 **or** a
-borg version that has the relevant security patches for this vulnerability applied
+Below, if we speak of borg 1.2.8, we mean a borg version >= 1.2.8 **or** a
+borg version that has the relevant patches for this vulnerability applied
 (could be also an older version in that case).
 
 Steps you must take to upgrade a repository (this applies to all kinds of repos
 no matter what encryption mode they use, including "none"):
 
-1. Upgrade all clients using this repository to borg 1.2.6.
+1. Upgrade all clients using this repository to borg 1.2.8.
    Note: it is not required to upgrade a server, except if the server-side borg
    is also used as a client (and not just for "borg serve").
 
-   Do **not** run ``borg check`` with borg 1.2.6 before completing the upgrade steps:
+   Do **not** run ``borg check`` with borg > 1.2.4 before completing the upgrade steps:
 
    - ``borg check`` would complain about archives without a valid archive TAM.
    - ``borg check --repair`` would remove such archives!
-2. Run: ``BORG_WORKAROUNDS=ignore_invalid_archive_tam borg info --debug <repo> 2>&1 | grep TAM | grep -i manifest``
+2. Do this step on every client using this repo: ``borg upgrade --show-rc --check-tam <repo>``
 
-   a) If you get "TAM-verified manifest", continue with 3.
-   b) If you get "Manifest TAM not found and not required", run
-      ``borg upgrade --tam --force <repository>`` *on every client*.
+   This will check the manifest TAM authentication setup in the repo and on this client.
+   The command will exit with rc=0 if all is OK, otherwise with rc=1.
 
-3. Run: ``BORG_WORKAROUNDS=ignore_invalid_archive_tam borg list --consider-checkpoints --format='{name} {time} tam:{tam}{NL}' <repo>``
+   a) If you get "Manifest authentication setup OK for this client and this repository."
+      and rc=0, continue with 3.
+   b) If you get some warnings and rc=1, run:
+      ``borg upgrade --tam --force <repository>``
 
-   "tam:verified" means that the archive has a valid TAM authentication.
-   "tam:none" is expected as output for archives created by borg <1.0.9.
-   "tam:none" is also expected for archives resulting from a borg rename
-   or borg recreate operation (see #7791).
-   "tam:none" could also come from archives created by an attacker.
-   You should verify that "tam:none" archives are authentic and not malicious
+3. Run: ``borg upgrade --show-rc --check-archives-tam <repo>``
+
+   This will create a report about the TAM status for all archives.
+   In the last line(s) of the report, it will also report the overall status.
+   The command will exit with rc=0 if all archives are TAM authenticated or with rc=1
+   if there are some archives with TAM issues.
+
+   If there are no issues and all archives are TAM authenticated, continue with 5.
+
+   Archive TAM issues are expected for:
+
+   - archives created by borg <1.0.9.
+   - archives resulting from a borg rename or borg recreate operation (see #7791)
+
+   But, important, archive TAM issues could also come from archives created by an attacker.
+   You should verify that archives with TAM issues are authentic and not malicious
    (== have good content, have correct timestamp, can be extracted successfully).
    In case you find crappy/malicious archives, you must delete them before proceeding.
+
    In low-risk, trusted environments, you may decide on your own risk to skip step 3
    and just trust in everything being OK.
 
-4. If there are no tam:none archives left at this point, you can skip this step.
-   Run ``BORG_WORKAROUNDS=ignore_invalid_archive_tam borg upgrade --archives-tam <repo>``.
+4. If there are no archives with TAM issues left at this point, you can skip this step.
+
+   Run ``borg upgrade --archives-tam <repo>``.
+
    This will unconditionally add a correct archive TAM to all archives not having one.
    ``borg check`` would consider TAM-less or invalid-TAM archives as garbage or a potential attack.
-   To see that all archives now are "tam:verified" run: ``borg list --consider-checkpoints --format='{name} {time} tam:{tam}{NL}' <repo>``
 
-5. Please note that you should never use BORG_WORKAROUNDS=ignore_invalid_archive_tam
-   for normal production operations - it is only needed once to get the archives in a
-   repository into a good state. All archives have a valid TAM now.
+   To see that all archives are OK now, you can optionally repeat the command from step 3.
+
+5. Done. Manifest and archives are TAM authenticated now.
 
 Vulnerability time line:
 
diff --git a/src/borg/archiver.py b/src/borg/archiver.py
index b5edc6cb4..e46fe1109 100644
--- a/src/borg/archiver.py
+++ b/src/borg/archiver.py
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ try:
     from .helpers import sig_int, ignore_sigint
     from .helpers import iter_separated
     from .helpers import get_tar_filter
+    from .helpers import ignore_invalid_archive_tam
     from .helpers.parseformat import BorgJsonEncoder, safe_decode
     from .nanorst import rst_to_terminal
     from .patterns import ArgparsePatternAction, ArgparseExcludeFileAction, ArgparsePatternFileAction, parse_exclude_pattern
@@ -1635,52 +1636,88 @@ class Archiver:
                           DASHES, logger=logging.getLogger('borg.output.stats'))
         return self.exit_code
 
-    @with_repository(fake=('tam', 'disable_tam', 'archives_tam'), invert_fake=True, manifest=False, exclusive=True)
+    @with_repository(fake=('tam', 'check_tam', 'disable_tam', 'archives_tam', 'check_archives_tam'), invert_fake=True, manifest=False, exclusive=True)
     def do_upgrade(self, args, repository, manifest=None, key=None):
         """upgrade a repository from a previous version"""
-        if args.archives_tam:
-            manifest, key = Manifest.load(repository, (Manifest.Operation.CHECK,), force_tam_not_required=args.force)
-            with Cache(repository, key, manifest) as cache:
-                stats = Statistics()
-                for info in manifest.archives.list(sort_by=['ts']):
-                    archive_id = info.id
-                    archive_formatted = format_archive(info)
-                    cdata = repository.get(archive_id)
-                    data = key.decrypt(archive_id, cdata)
-                    archive, verified, _ = key.unpack_and_verify_archive(data, force_tam_not_required=True)
-                    if not verified:  # we do not have an archive TAM yet -> add TAM now!
-                        archive = ArchiveItem(internal_dict=archive)
-                        archive.cmdline = [safe_decode(arg) for arg in archive.cmdline]
-                        data = key.pack_and_authenticate_metadata(archive.as_dict(), context=b'archive')
-                        new_archive_id = key.id_hash(data)
-                        cache.add_chunk(new_archive_id, data, stats)
-                        cache.chunk_decref(archive_id, stats)
-                        manifest.archives[info.name] = (new_archive_id, info.ts)
-                        print(f"Added archive TAM:   {archive_formatted} -> [{bin_to_hex(new_archive_id)}]")
+        if args.archives_tam or args.check_archives_tam:
+            with ignore_invalid_archive_tam():
+                archive_tam_issues = 0
+                read_only = args.check_archives_tam
+                manifest, key = Manifest.load(repository, (Manifest.Operation.CHECK,), force_tam_not_required=args.force)
+                with Cache(repository, key, manifest) as cache:
+                    stats = Statistics()
+                    for info in manifest.archives.list(sort_by=['ts']):
+                        archive_id = info.id
+                        archive_formatted = format_archive(info)
+                        cdata = repository.get(archive_id)
+                        data = key.decrypt(archive_id, cdata)
+                        archive, verified, _ = key.unpack_and_verify_archive(data, force_tam_not_required=True)
+                        if not verified:
+                            if not read_only:
+                                # we do not have an archive TAM yet -> add TAM now!
+                                archive = ArchiveItem(internal_dict=archive)
+                                archive.cmdline = [safe_decode(arg) for arg in archive.cmdline]
+                                data = key.pack_and_authenticate_metadata(archive.as_dict(), context=b'archive')
+                                new_archive_id = key.id_hash(data)
+                                cache.add_chunk(new_archive_id, data, stats)
+                                cache.chunk_decref(archive_id, stats)
+                                manifest.archives[info.name] = (new_archive_id, info.ts)
+                                print(f"Added archive TAM:   {archive_formatted} -> [{bin_to_hex(new_archive_id)}]")
+                            else:
+                                print(f"Archive TAM missing: {archive_formatted}")
+                            archive_tam_issues += 1
+                        else:
+                            print(f"Archive TAM present: {archive_formatted}")
+                    if not read_only:
+                        manifest.write()
+                        repository.commit(compact=False)
+                        cache.commit()
+                        if archive_tam_issues > 0:
+                            print(f"Fixed {archive_tam_issues} archives with TAM issues!")
+                            print("All archives are TAM authenticated now.")
+                        else:
+                            print("All archives are TAM authenticated.")
                     else:
-                        print(f"Archive TAM present: {archive_formatted}")
-                manifest.write()
-                repository.commit(compact=False)
-                cache.commit()
-        elif args.tam:
-            manifest, key = Manifest.load(repository, (Manifest.Operation.CHECK,), force_tam_not_required=args.force)
-            if not manifest.tam_verified or not manifest.config.get(b'tam_required', False):
-                print('Manifest contents:')
-                for archive_info in manifest.archives.list(sort_by=['ts']):
-                    print(format_archive(archive_info))
-                manifest.config[b'tam_required'] = True
-                manifest.write()
-                repository.commit(compact=False)
-            if not key.tam_required and hasattr(key, 'change_passphrase'):
-                key.tam_required = True
-                key.change_passphrase(key._passphrase)
-                print('Key updated')
-                if hasattr(key, 'find_key'):
-                    print('Key location:', key.find_key())
-            if not tam_required(repository):
-                tam_file = tam_required_file(repository)
-                open(tam_file, 'w').close()
-                print('Updated security database')
+                        if archive_tam_issues > 0:
+                            self.print_warning(f"Found {archive_tam_issues} archives with TAM issues!")
+                        else:
+                            print("All archives are TAM authenticated.")
+        elif args.tam or args.check_tam:
+            with ignore_invalid_archive_tam():
+                manifest_tam_issues = 0
+                read_only = args.check_tam
+                manifest, key = Manifest.load(repository, (Manifest.Operation.CHECK,), force_tam_not_required=args.force)
+                if not manifest.tam_verified or not manifest.config.get(b'tam_required', False):
+                    if not read_only:
+                        print('Manifest contents:')
+                        for archive_info in manifest.archives.list(sort_by=['ts']):
+                            print(format_archive(archive_info))
+                        manifest.config[b'tam_required'] = True
+                        manifest.write()
+                        repository.commit(compact=False)
+                    else:
+                        manifest_tam_issues += 1
+                        self.print_warning("Repository Manifest is not TAM verified or a TAM is not required!")
+                if not key.tam_required and hasattr(key, 'change_passphrase'):
+                    if not read_only:
+                        key.tam_required = True
+                        key.change_passphrase(key._passphrase)
+                        print('Key updated')
+                        if hasattr(key, 'find_key'):
+                            print('Key location:', key.find_key())
+                    else:
+                        manifest_tam_issues += 1
+                        self.print_warning("Key does not require TAM authentication!")
+                if not tam_required(repository):
+                    if not read_only:
+                        tam_file = tam_required_file(repository)
+                        open(tam_file, 'w').close()
+                        print('Updated security database')
+                    else:
+                        manifest_tam_issues += 1
+                        self.print_warning("Client-side security database does not require a TAM!")
+                if read_only and manifest_tam_issues == 0:
+                    print("Manifest authentication setup OK for this client and this repository.")
         elif args.disable_tam:
             manifest, key = Manifest.load(repository, Manifest.NO_OPERATION_CHECK, force_tam_not_required=True)
             if tam_required(repository):
@@ -4996,8 +5033,12 @@ class Archiver:
                                help='Force upgrade')
         subparser.add_argument('--tam', dest='tam', action='store_true',
                                help='Enable manifest authentication (in key and cache) (Borg 1.0.9 and later).')
+        subparser.add_argument('--check-tam', dest='check_tam', action='store_true',
+                               help='check manifest authentication (in key and cache).')
         subparser.add_argument('--disable-tam', dest='disable_tam', action='store_true',
                                help='Disable manifest authentication (in key and cache).')
+        subparser.add_argument('--check-archives-tam', dest='check_archives_tam', action='store_true',
+                               help='check TAM authentication for all archives.')
         subparser.add_argument('--archives-tam', dest='archives_tam', action='store_true',
                                help='add TAM authentication for all archives.')
         subparser.add_argument('location', metavar='REPOSITORY', nargs='?', default='',
diff --git a/src/borg/crypto/key.py b/src/borg/crypto/key.py
index 57c528aef..2f6f1ed75 100644
--- a/src/borg/crypto/key.py
+++ b/src/borg/crypto/key.py
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ from ..logger import create_logger
 
 logger = create_logger()
 
+from .. import helpers
 from ..constants import *  # NOQA
 from ..compress import Compressor
 from ..helpers import StableDict
@@ -24,7 +25,6 @@ from ..helpers import get_limited_unpacker
 from ..helpers import bin_to_hex
 from ..helpers import prepare_subprocess_env
 from ..helpers import msgpack
-from ..helpers import workarounds
 from ..item import Key, EncryptedKey
 from ..platform import SaveFile
 
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ from .low_level import AES256_CTR_HMAC_SHA256, AES256_CTR_BLAKE2b
 
 
 # workaround for lost passphrase or key in "authenticated" or "authenticated-blake2" mode
-AUTHENTICATED_NO_KEY = 'authenticated_no_key' in workarounds
+AUTHENTICATED_NO_KEY = 'authenticated_no_key' in helpers.workarounds
 
 
 class NoPassphraseFailure(Error):
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ class KeyBase:
         tam_key = self._tam_key(tam_salt, context=b'archive')
         calculated_hmac = hmac.digest(tam_key, data, 'sha512')
         if not hmac.compare_digest(calculated_hmac, tam_hmac):
-            if 'ignore_invalid_archive_tam' in workarounds:
+            if 'ignore_invalid_archive_tam' in helpers.workarounds:
                 logger.debug('ignoring invalid archive TAM due to BORG_WORKAROUNDS')
                 return unpacked, False, None  # same as if no TAM is present
             else:
diff --git a/src/borg/helpers/__init__.py b/src/borg/helpers/__init__.py
index 34a59b903..b24d61a6f 100644
--- a/src/borg/helpers/__init__.py
+++ b/src/borg/helpers/__init__.py
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ that did not fit better elsewhere.
 Code used to be in borg/helpers.py but was split into the modules in this
 package, which are imported into here for compatibility.
 """
+from contextlib import contextmanager
 
 from .checks import *  # NOQA
 from .datastruct import *  # NOQA
@@ -26,6 +27,18 @@ from . import msgpack
 # see the docs for a list of known workaround strings.
 workarounds = tuple(os.environ.get('BORG_WORKAROUNDS', '').split(','))
 
+
+@contextmanager
+def ignore_invalid_archive_tam():
+    global workarounds
+    saved = workarounds
+    if 'ignore_invalid_archive_tam' not in workarounds:
+        # we really need this workaround here or borg will likely raise an exception.
+        workarounds += ('ignore_invalid_archive_tam',)
+    yield
+    workarounds = saved
+
+
 """
 The global exit_code variable is used so that modules other than archiver can increase the program exit code if a
 warning or error occurred during their operation. This is different from archiver.exit_code, which is only accessible