diff options
| author | Neal H. Walfield <neal@pep.foundation> | 2020-12-14 22:45:43 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Neal H. Walfield <neal@pep.foundation> | 2020-12-14 22:52:43 +0100 |
| commit | c31ceb8dab94d2ea08879e36ad450547136ca2e1 (patch) | |
| tree | 63c6402bdcfe4fcc41063793d220fe49c1218118 /openpgp/src/cert.rs | |
| parent | 360da4f78448dc0b2c2724f5e13a12874604ce3e (diff) | |
openpgp: Simplify hash policies.
- The standard policy currently has two policies related to hash
algorithms: when a hash algorithm should be rejected for normal
signatures, and when a hash algorithm should be rejected for
revocation sigantures.
- If we distinguish two security contexts, then we'll have four
policies (the cross product).
- If the currently state is not already unmanageable, then this
certainly is.
- Simplify this by using a single scalar to represent how long a
revocation certificate using a broken hash should continue to be
accepted.
- This is probably sufficiently expressive in practice as this is a
largely inexact science. And, if a more nuanced policy is
required, it is always possible to wrap `StandardPolicy`.
Diffstat (limited to 'openpgp/src/cert.rs')
| -rw-r--r-- | openpgp/src/cert.rs | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/openpgp/src/cert.rs b/openpgp/src/cert.rs index 648be37a..5a840ab5 100644 --- a/openpgp/src/cert.rs +++ b/openpgp/src/cert.rs @@ -5324,7 +5324,7 @@ Pu1xwz57O4zo1VYf6TqHJzVC3OMvMUM2hhdecMUe5x6GorNaj6g= // signatures. The standard policy reject SHA-1. So, use a // custom policy. let p = &P::new(); - let sha1 = p.hash_cutoffs(HashAlgorithm::SHA1).0.unwrap(); + let sha1 = p.hash_cutoff(HashAlgorithm::SHA1).unwrap(); let p = &P::at(sha1 - std::time::Duration::from_secs(1)); let cert = Cert::from_bytes( |