diff options
author | Cesar Pereida Garcia <cesar.pereidagarcia@tut.fi> | 2019-09-05 12:13:11 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2019-09-06 16:19:41 +0100 |
commit | 8bb913a3d7c29c189c7ac656c726f4a2bfcdd73b (patch) | |
tree | 8c6887e7e190a05d6e452ebabb25a84975de5cb9 | |
parent | 04882f77a8bb5df8bc9f3f9f82191f487d350be1 (diff) |
[crypto/asn1] Fix multiple SCA vulnerabilities during RSA key validation.
This commit addresses multiple side-channel vulnerabilities present
during RSA key validation.
Private key parameters are re-computed using variable-time functions.
This issue was discovered and reported by the NISEC group at TAU Finland.
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9779)
(cherry picked from commit 311e903d8468e2a380d371609a10eda71de16c0e)
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c | 17 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c | 6 |
2 files changed, 20 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c b/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c index da57e77a7a..c1e3e523a0 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c @@ -130,9 +130,20 @@ static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len, static int bn_secure_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { - if (!*pval) - bn_secure_new(pval, it); - return bn_c2i(pval, cont, len, utype, free_cont, it); + int ret; + BIGNUM *bn; + + if (!*pval && !bn_secure_new(pval, it)) + return 0; + + ret = bn_c2i(pval, cont, len, utype, free_cont, it); + if (!ret) + return 0; + + /* Set constant-time flag for all secure BIGNUMS */ + bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval; + BN_set_flags(bn, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + return ret; } static int bn_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c index d99d04916d..4a1250127c 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c @@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) if (d != NULL) { BN_free(r->d); r->d = d; + BN_set_flags(r->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } return 1; @@ -201,10 +202,12 @@ int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q) if (p != NULL) { BN_free(r->p); r->p = p; + BN_set_flags(r->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } if (q != NULL) { BN_free(r->q); r->q = q; + BN_set_flags(r->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } return 1; @@ -223,14 +226,17 @@ int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp) if (dmp1 != NULL) { BN_free(r->dmp1); r->dmp1 = dmp1; + BN_set_flags(r->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } if (dmq1 != NULL) { BN_free(r->dmq1); r->dmq1 = dmq1; + BN_set_flags(r->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } if (iqmp != NULL) { BN_free(r->iqmp); r->iqmp = iqmp; + BN_set_flags(r->iqmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } return 1; |